








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Meijboom, B. R. (1986). Planning in decentralized firms: a contribution to the theory on multilevel decisions.
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.




the theory on multilevel decisions
BERT MEIJBOOM
Stellingen
behorende bij het proefschrift:
Planning in decentralized firms
a contribution to the theory on multilevel decisions
1. Bij het gebruik van de term "decentralisatie"
dient men na te gaan en aan te geven welke
aspecten beoogd worden.
2. De allocatie van kosten tijdens de planningsfase
van een besluitvormingsproces kan het eindresul-
taat van dit proces ongunstig beïnvloeden.
3. In de beschrijving van op decompositie gebaseerde
planningsprocedures worden het aandeel en de rol
van het hoofdkantoor veelal onvoldoende belicht.
4. In de laatste planningsronde van de toewijzings-
gerichte planningsprocedure zoals besproken in
paragraaf 4.4 van dit proefschrift, rapporteren
de divisies van elkaar verschillende waarderingen
voor de gemeenschappelijke produktiefactoren, met
andere woorden: er treedt op divisieniveau geen
gelijkheid van waarderingen op.
Lit.: Freeland, J.R. en J.H. Moore (1977),
Implications of resource-directive allocatíon
models for organizational design, Management
Science, 23, no. 10, pp. 1050-1059.
5. De bestudering van multilevel planning kan zinvol
worden uitgebreid door analyse van de betekenis
van a priori informatie, d.i. informatie welke
het hoofdkantoor ter beschikking staat bij aanvang
van het planningsproces.
6. Het in paragraaf 5.3 van dit proefschrift besproken
gemengde decompositieprincipe dient ook praktisch
getest te worden.
7. In de publikatie van Burton en Obel (1980) worden
uit het resultaat van een serie simulatie-
experimenten ten onrechte algemene conclusies
getrokken
Lit.: Burton, R.M. en B. Obel (1980), The
efficiency of the price, budget, and mixed
approaches under varying a priori information
levels for decentralized planning, P4anagement
Science, 26, no. 4, April 1980, pp. 401-417.
8. "Zuivere wiskunde kan soms worden toegepast,
toegepast wiskunde kan soms worden gezuiverd".
Lit.: de Bruijn, N.G. (1985), Omzien in
bewondering, Nieuw archief voor Wiskunde (4),
3, no. 1, pp. 105-119.
9. Verbreding van algemene kennis van het vakgebied
door middel van een verplicht curriculum voor
AIO's laat zich niet verenigen met behoud niveau
van de te vervaardigen proefschriften.
10. Het is realistischer om te spreken over het
gezin als 'n hoeksteen van de samenleving, in
plaats van de hoeksteen van de samenleving.
11. Vanaf het moment waarop de tekst van het proef-
schrift inhoudelijk voldoet, worden de nog uit
uit te voeren werkzaamheden steeds gemakkelijker
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This thesis deals with the problem of multilevel decision-making. To be
more specific, the planning process in a general, two-level, decentrali-
zed enterprise is investigated.
In big companies processes of specialization and differentiation
usually lead to a decentralized organization structure with two or more
hierarchical levels. A number of product divisions and service depart-
ments is present and the information on the basis of which decisions
must be made is dispersed among these subunits. Due to the delegation of
tasks and responsibilities, managers at several levels in the organiza-
tion become local decision-makers, possibly with individual goals and
preferences.
In order to realize the objectives of the company as a whole, the top
management has to coordinate the managers of the subunits. The parts of
the organization must be in balance. For instance, the way in which the
top management allocates resources, directly ('budgets') or through an
internal price system ('transfer prices'), should guide local decision-
makers in choosing actions that are desíred for the company as a whole.
It is clear that under such circumstances the decision-making process
is not simple. Decisions cannot be made at once, but are usually pre-
ceeded by a phase of preparations, negotiations, information gathering
etc. This phase will be referred to as the 'planning phase'. It ends as
soon as the ultimate plan to be carried out is established. At this
point the execution phase starts, in which actions are taken according
to the decisions made upon termination of the planning phase. Possibly
some form of evaluation or control is then desired to check whether ac-
tions have been carried out correctly.
We will focus on the information dispersal being one of the essential
dimensions of the issue of decentralization in the enterprise, and in-
vestigate how the top management determines the decisions to be carried
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out without having complete information. Furthermore the analysis as
provided in this book concentrates on the planning phase. The problem
the top management is faced with during the planning phase will be
called the planning problem. As a third preliminary, we consider a
situation with only two hierarchical levels. Due to the localized infor-
mation, the interaction between the two levels is a matter of infortna-
tion exchange.
This introductory problem description clearly shows practical relevance
of the topic. However, the approach to be presented is a theoretical
one. Concepts from three theoretical areas, namely the theory of the
firm, management accounting and organization theory will be combined in
builing the model of a general, two-level, decentralized firm. We follow
the activity analysis approach for the representation of the prevalent
production possibilities to be chosen from by the management of the
firm. A second realistíc feature is the incorporation of cost allocation
mechanisms, as frequently advocated in accounting literature. Thirdly,
issues such as decentralization, delegation and coordination will be
accounted for because of our interest in multilevel decisions.
Having outlined the main characteristics of the object of our study,
-C.e. a general two-level enterprise, we turn to the methodological as-
pects. As an abstraction of reality we will use formal models. This
means that our analysis is based on a mathematical representation of the
planning problem at hand. Furthermore mathematical techniques will be
introduced that function as conceptual tools in developing a planning
model and particularly not as computational methods or as solution algo-
rithms. Thus we aim at building a conceptual framework for planning in
decentralized organizations: a planning model. The model formulation
will be deterministic and static because we ignore uncertainty and time-
dependent aspects.
From the large field of multilevel systems analysis we apply the theo-
ry on decomposition for large-scale linear programming problems. The
linearity of problem formulations is not really restrictive in the
present descriptive study. The decomposition approach is suitable for
planning with incomplete information at the top level of the organiza-
tion. It should be noted that we preswne a form of harmony between the
top management and the lower level managers. Because of agreement on the
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objectives for the firm as a whole, each one is willing to participate
in the planning process. There is no conflict of interests. As a conse-
quence we can (and will) use optimization models with a one-dimensional
objective function.
The book concludes with an application of the decomposition philosophy
to the model of the firm. After having built this model we will also
analyse and solve the associated planning problem.
The aim of this book is threefold:
First of all, a general model of the firm is to be designed. By 'gene-
ral' we mean that the model takes into account technological, financial
and organizational issues as prevalent in real-world enterprises.
Through the process of developing the model we will demonstrate the
relevance of analysing multilevel decisions. Furthermore the model will
serve as the basic framework when we investigate the two-level planning
process.
The second goal of the book is of a methodological nature, namely to
analyse planning in a two-level organization from a formal and an ab-
stract point of view. To this end two elementary decomposition-based
planning procedures will be reviewed to illustrate the conceptual use-
fulness of decomposition techniques. One typical feature is that in a
similar procedure coordination is accomplished by prices or by direct
allocations, analogous to price and budget directive planning in
existing organizatíons. Moreover we will present a new decomposition
technique in which prices and direct allocations occur simultaneously.
The third goal is to compare 'overall modelling' with 'multilevel mo-
delling', More specifically, we will describe how the planning problem
of our fictitious firm would be solved in the case of complete infor-
mation and in the case of decentralized information. We also compare the
requirements for cost allocations under both types of circumstances.
Concretely this means that, apart from solving the planning problem
directly, we also apply a decomposition-based planning procedure. We
then analyse the flow of information during the planning process and
incorporate cost allocation mechanisms in the procedure.
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In effect, the present book contributes to the theory on multilevel
decisions because
- a new mixed príce-resource directive decomposition will be presented;
- the effect of decomposition-based planning is analysed in the context
of an input-output inspired model of the firm.
As our model of the firm captures a number of realistic features, the
final part of the book may contribute to the understanding of two-level
planning as observed in the real-world.
1.2. Outline of the book
The body of the book i s organized according to the three goals as set
out above.
In chapter two the technological part of our general model of the firm,
i.e. the corporate model, is developed. The production transformation
processes are described in terms of an input-output model of the firm.
However, the element of choice, e.g, decisions concerning alternative
production techniques, cannot be represented by such a model. Therefore
we generalize the input-output model by introducing multiple techniques
and make-or-buy decisions. We end with a mixed-integer programming model
that integrates all alternatives to be decided upon into one overall
formulation.
Chapter three extends the corporate model with financial and organiza-
tional features. Being an important financial aspect, the issue of cost
allocation is discussed. After some definitions and examples we explain
why cost allocation is a most realistic option to be included in our
model, especially in the context of multilevel decision-making. Then we
propose the organizational structure for our hypothetical firm. The cor-
porate model will be reformulated in such a way that it reflects the
assinned divisional organízation structure.
In chapter four we start analysing two-level planning with incomplete
information at the higher level in the organization. Under these circum-
stances it is appropriate to apply decomposition-based planning proce-
dures. The subunits at the lower level in the organization are usually
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coordinated indirectly, by prices, or directly, by resource allocations.
As an example of price-directive planning we discuss the famous method
of Dantzig-Wolfe. Similarly, Benders' method is treated, being a well-
known resource-directive approach. For completeness the mathematical
derivation is provided in an appendix.
In existing organizations, however, indirect and direct coordination
instruments may well occur simultaneously. In chapter five we analyse
such settings formally by describing mixed price-resource directive
planning procedures. The formal derivation of the presented procedures
is integrated in the text because the underlying mathematics are
scarcely touched in the literature.
Having investigated the planning problem from a rather abstract, concep-
tual point of view, we return to our general, two-level, divisionalized
enterprise as developed in chapters two and three. In chapter six the
planning problem as stated at the end of chapter three is analysed under
the assumption of complete information. The top management is supposed
to have a complete specification of all relevant data. Hence the plan-
ning problem can be solved without the participation of managers of sub-
units. This overall approach thus ignores organizational aspects and
provides some provisional but limited insight into the firm under consi-
deration.
Of course, the assvmption of complete information is quite unrealis-
tic, especially at the presumed organizational conditions. In order to
account for the divisionalization and the information dispersal, we ap-
ply the decomposition philosophy as introduced in chapters four and
five. Before actually solving the planning problem, the top management
has to gather information. The data as exchanged between the two organi-
zational levels will appear to be of an aggregated nature. Tentative,
intermediate solutions can differ essentially from the ultimate, firm-
wide optimal solution. Cost allocation mechanisms should be incorporated
very carefully.
We construct a numerical example which is used in chapters six and
seven in order to illustrate our results in an informal way.
Now the three goals of the book are achieved and we review and evaluate
the research in the final chapter.
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1.3. Relevant economic literature
The present study is a theoretical one. It integrates elements and con-
cepts from a number of economic and mathematical theories. In the re-
mainder of this introductory chapter these theories are briefly
reviewed. We present a short description of some relevant contributions
and point out opportunities for extension of existing theories, We start
with economics. In the next section, key references concerning multi-
level systems analysis are given.
First of all the theory of the firm, Naylor and Vernon (1969, p. 2)
stated that "what is designated in economics as 'the economic theory of
the firm' is a collection of theories about the behavior of firms
operating under a very special set of environmental conditions known in
the aggregate as a market economy". One indispensable element in
theoretical models of firms ís the notion of a production transformation
process. Basically, two approaches in describing the production trans-
formation process can be distinguished: marginal analysis and activity
(or programming) analysis. Compare chapter eleven and twelve in Baumol
(1977). The latter approach is felt to be more realistic and will be
adopted here.
A typical restriction of the theory of the firm is that the firm is
víewed as an entity directed by or identified with a single decision-
maker, the entrepreneur. In other words, the organizational structure
and its ímpact on decision-making are not considered.
In the literature on management and organizations issues like decentra-
lization, delegation and coordination are discussed based on the obser-
vation that today's business enterprises are often very large and thus
face complex problems. See Dessler (1982, ch. 7), Dopuch et al. (1982,
ch. 10), Kaplan (1982, ch. 13). An interesting and useful attempt to
build a conceptual framework concerning decentralization in organiza-
tions can be found in Jennergren (1980), He states that "decentraliza-
tion usually refers to the hierarchical levels on which decisions are
made" (p. 39) and that "delegation is sometimes used interchangeably
with decentralization. However, often it has a more concrete meaning,
implying a specification of the tasks delegated or persons to whom deci-
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sion-making authority is assígned" (p. 41). Furthermore it is explained
how decentralization in firms leads to certaín organizational forms. The
components of the organization, product divisions and functional depart-
ments, must then be coordinated.
Coordination instruments can be price-directive or resource-directive.
In an almost classical paper Hirschleifer (1956) stated that "the prob-
lem of pricing the goods and services that are exchanged between divi-
sions within a firm (...) is an important one, because prices which are
set on internal transfers affect the level of activity within divisions
(...) and the total profit that is achieved by the firm as a whole".
Kence it is clear that such transfer prices can be used to coordinate
subunits in the firm.
On the other hand, budgets can be applied for coordination, too. In
Dopuch et al. (1982, p. 199) a budget is described as a"formal, quanti-
tative statement of anticipated resource flows". Anthony and Dearden
(1976, p. 20) speak of an "approved statement of the revenues that are
expected during the budget year, and the resources that are to be used
in achieving the company's goals for each responsibility center and for
the company as a whole". Thus budgets are resource-directive coordi-
nation instruments.
It should be mentioned that we ignore another well-known function of
transfer prices and budgets, namely performance evaluation.
In textbooks on management accounting very much attention is paid to
transfer pricing and budgeting. We refer to Kaplan (1982, ch. 14,17).
Moreover, Kaplan (1982, p. 5) formulates "an empirical question, to
which we do not have an answer, as to why companies continue to use
fully allocated costs for internal decision and control purposes". In-
deed, in the recent literature there is a growing interest in cost allo-
cation and its role in decision-making processes (see e.g. Biddle and
Steinberg (1985)) so that ideas from this field must be considered.
1.4. The multilevel approach
As the final section of this chapter, we present important contributions
concerning the basic concept or philosophy applied in this book, i.e.
the líterature on multilevel decisio~rmaking. Firstly, we will clarify
the term 'multilevel'.
Dirickx and Jennergren (1979, p. 2) state that "ín the multilevel
methods of modeling and solving a decision problem, a complete represen-
tation is put together from subproblems, where each subproblem refers to
some part of the whole problem situation. (...) The subproblems form an
interrelated hierarchy, which means that they are considered to be on
different hierarchical levels". Furthermore, "the subproblems must be
coordinated in some fashion, and one function of higherlevel subprob-
lems is to coordinate the lower-level ones".
As one of the most important contributions to the theory of multilevel
decision-making, we mention Mesarovic et al. (1970). In this book the
relevance of multilevel systems to organization theory is argued,
notions such as 'hierarchy' and 'multilevel' are discussed and formal-
ized, and a mathematical theory of coordination is developed. In a later
paper Jennergren (1976) advocates a broader framework for what he calls
'the multilevel approach'. In his point of view, material as presented
by Mesarovic et al. (and thus also the later work by Findeisen et al.
(1980)) are typically highly foctnalized approaches for solving problems
in a multilevel fashion.
The common feature in these contributions is the occurrence of decom-
position, i.e. to break up a big problem into small ones and to try to
coordinate the small problems so that they together yield a solution to
the big one. In this way a large variety of computational, technologi-
cal, economical and social problems can, in principle, be tackled. So
the multilevel approach implies a way of modelling and solving problems
in which one is forced to (try to) identífy subcomponents and their in-
terrelationships.
Decomposition-based planning procedures wíll be applied here as con-
ceptual tools for analysing two-level planning problems in companies. A
recent, useful reference in this area is Obel (1981), who introduced
mixed price-resource directive decomposition methods.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MODEL OF THE FIRM:
MULTIPLE TECHNIOUES AND MAKE-OR-BUY DECISIONS
2.1. Introduction
This chapter and the next are devoted to the design of a general model
of the firm. In the present chapter the technological part of the model,
to be referred to as the corporate model, is considered. The well-known
input-output model of the firm is taken as a starting point for the pre-
sentation of the corporate model.
Originally introduced ín macroeconomics by Leontief (1936), input-out-
put analysis has become a widespread and fruitful approach in corporate
modelling as well (Livingstone (1969), Verheyen (1965)). Input-output
models can be applied in practice, e.g. in planning and budgeting (see
Horngren (1982, ch. 14), Kaplan (1982, ch. 11)). Besides they are useful
in more theoretical areas, in particular in the activity analysis
approach for the multiproduct firm (see Knudsen (1973, ch. 5), Naylor
and Vernon (1969, ch. 8)).
After a first rough sketch of the corporate model, expressed in common
input-output terminology (section 2.2), the basic model is generalized,
by the allowance for multiple techniques (section 2.3) and make-or-buy
decisions (section 2.4).
2.2. The firm in input-output terminology
We consider a firm producing the following three types of commodities:
market products, technical services (TS) and general services (GS). The
sector 'market products' yields the actual output of the firm, the final
output. We assume that this sector incurs variable costs only. Further-
more, its activities require certain technical services ( e.g. housekee-
ping, data processing, maintenance, catering). Production of technical
services leads to variable and fixed costs. Finally, there is a sector
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producing certain general services (e.g. research and development, pub-
lic relations, corporate management). In this sector, only fixed costs,
the so-called common costs, are incurred.
Output from one sector may be input elsewhere in the firm, and input
factors exist which come from outside the fírm, the so-called primary
input, like labour and raw materials. All these deliveries and trans-
actions can be taken together in the well-known input-output table (see
figure 2.1).
To general technical market final









Figure 2.1: General input-output table; only 'market products' delivers
to 'final output'. A cross expresses the absence of certain
deliveries.
In common input-output analysís (e.g. Livingstone (1969), Smits and
Verheyen (1976), Verheyen (1965)), it is assumed that
- there is a constant final demand for market products,
- the market prices for primary input are constants,
- a transfer-price scheme for internal deliveries and an allocation
scheme for common costs have been established,
- the production of every commodity obeys a linear homogeneous produc-
tion function (constant returns to scale).
Based on the knowledge of final demand and production function, an in-
put-output table on a real basis (quantities of products and services)
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can be drawn. Using the prices for primary input, the transfer prices
for internal deliveries and the allocation scheme for common costs, the
table can be transformed into an input-output table on a nominal basis,
(all transactions expressed in monetary terms). Although the actual in-
put-output relations are approximated, by assuming a linear production
function, the approach may well yield satisfactory computational re-
sults, e.g. for cost accounting purposes.
After this rather informal outline of the corporate model, we continue
with the formalization of the input-output model of the firm. For the
purpose of the present chapter, the GS sector does not need to be taken
into consideration, yet.
There are M types of technical services and ~ types of market products,
denoted by TS1,...,TSm,...,TSM and X1,...,X~,...,X~ respectively.
Focusing on the internal deliveries within the firm, we consider an in-
put-output table where the sectors 'primary input' and 'final output'
are omitted: see figure 2.2. Every Dflow matrix represents the delive-
ries between and within sectors, expressed in physical quantities. For
flow flowinstance DM~ is an M x~ matrix whose (m,~)-th element Dm~ repre-
sents the flow of commodities from TSm to X~ .
To












Figure 2.2: Input-output table for corporate model, the sectors
'primary input' and 'final output' deleted.
iL
It is assumed that every input is a linear homogeneous function of the
output, For each of the products and services, fixed ratios exist be-
tween input and output. E.g. we have
Dflow- D x(~),m~ m~
where x(~) ~ 0 denotes the production volume of product X~. The constant
coefficient D~ ís called an intermediate input coefficient. We require
m flowDm~ ~ 0. Similar formulas hold for the other D matrices.
In this book, we will mainly use the intermediate input coefficíents
as just defined. Therefore we replace every element of Dflow~ Dflow~
flow MM M~D~~ by its corresponding intermediate input coefficient and call the
obtained matrices D,~M, DM~, D~~ respectively.
Because of the linear production function, formulas like (2.1) can
also be stated with respect to primary inputs. The associated coeffi-
cients are then primary input coefficients. The market for primary input
is such that the firm can buy as much as it wants at fixed per-unit
prices. Using the market prices for prímary inputs, the costs of produ-
cing one unit of a product or service are easily found. These per-unit
direct cost coefficients will be applied in our model formulation rather
than the primary input coefficients.
Now we introduce two realistic features to be incorporated in the model,
In input-output analysis each commodity requires input factors in fixed
proportions. Or, stated differently, for each commodity exactly one
linear production technique exists, In our model of the firm, however,
it will be assumed that for each market product a choice can be made
from a finite number of linear techniques. Market products of the same
type but produced by different techniques are identical (and hence phy-
sically equivalent),
Definition 2.1:
A technoloRy alternative is a collection of techniques, at least one for
each product. A pure technology alternative applíes exactly one techni-
que per product.
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As a second generalization of the input-output framework, we will ac-
count for the possibility that TS can also be bought externally, apart
from being produced internally.
Definition 2.2:
A TS alternative is a combination of make-or-buy decisions stating which
TS-types will be produced internally and which TS-types will be bought
externally.
In the following sections, we will work out the two features and inte-
grate all possible technology alternatives and TS alternatives in one
overall model formulation.
2.3. Multiple techniques for market products
Because in reality the management of a firm usually can make a choice
from a number of production possibilities, the notion of multiple tech-
niques is further explored and incorporated in the corporate model. In
this section, the TS sector is temporarily ignored, so that we can con-
centrate on the market products and their production process.
In the original input-output setting, the linearity assumption implies
that each commodity requires inputs in fixed proportions. These fixed
proportions follow from the input coefficients of that commodity, which,
in turn, completely describe the production technique according to which
that commodity is produced. In particular, for each market product
exactly one production technique is supposed to be available.
In existing firms, however, input factors can often be combined in
more than one way. In other words, multiple techniques for one specific
market product can exist. Therefore we assume that for each market
product X~ a choice exists between ~~ techniques. To this end we extend
our corporate model as follows.
Originally, the ~-th column of matrix D~~ plus the per~unit direct
costs of market product X~ formed a set of production coefficients that
fotmally represented the, one and only, production technique for X~.
From now on, ~~ sets of production coefficients are assumed to exist for
X~. As before, each specific set of production coefficients consists of
~ intermediate input coefficients and one per-unit direct cost coeffi-
cient. Being oríginally defined as the matrix of the (uniquely deter-
mined) intermediate input coefficients (see 2.2), D~~ will, from now on,
contain the intermediate input coefficients of each of the available
techniques.
The occurrence of multiple techniques implies a certain degree of free-
dom for the management of the firm. Now the question arises which cri-
terion is applied when choosing between alternatives. In the case of a
fixed final output to be met, cost minimization will be the goal. If
market restrictions exists that only pose a limit to the final output,
the sales prices must be taken in account, so that profit maximization
is a more appropriate objective. We will present the problem formulation
for both situations. Firstly, some introductory definitions are in or-
der.
Let x~(~) denote the units of produced X~ by applying technique ~
(~-1,...,~~). The production vector x~ for market product X~ is a column
vector defined by x~ :- (x~(1),...,x~(~~))' (~-1,...,~). The total pro-
duction vector xprod for the sector 'market products' is composed from
th~se individual production vectors, i.e. xprod
gether:
.- (xi,...,x~)'. Alto-
total production xprod '- (xl' " ''x~,...,x~)'
production vector x~ .- (x~(1),...,x~(~),....x~(~~))
of product type X
0
The corresponding per-unit direct costs cM}~(~) are taken together in
the (row) vector cprod' so
cprod :- (chlfl(1),...,~Itl(~Mtl)'...,cM~~(1),-...cMf~(~Mf~))
Because of the occurrence of more than one technique per market product,
the new matrix D~~ of intermediate input coefficients is not square.
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Therefore, a'generalized' identity matrix I~ is required. More specifi-





Y' 1 4' ~ Y' ~
The outside demand'for X~ is f(~) (~-1,...,~) and f:- ( f(1),...,f(~))'.
The technology alternative that can realize the final demand at mini-
mal costs follows from the following linear programming (LP) problem:
Minimize cprod xprod
s.t. (I~ - D~~) xprod - f
(2.2)
The equality constraints express the relationship between production and
outside supply of market products. The objective function equals the
direct variable costs for primary input involved in the production pro-
cess and is to be minimized. We require cprod ~ D'
f~ 0 and D~~ ) 0.
Of course it would be convenient if a feasible solution exists to pro-
blem (2.2). This would imply the existence of an optimal solution, i.e.
a cost minímizing technology alternative, because cprod ~ ~~
If exactly one technique per product is available, matrix I~ - D~~ is
square and then a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility of
(2.2) is: I~ - D~~ is invertible and (I~ - D~~)-1 ~ 0. In turn, this
condition is equivalent to the usual input-output requirement: equa-
tion (I~ - D~~)x - f has a non-negative solution for any f~ 0.
We will not prove these conjectures. They are direct consequences of the
theory of so-called M-matrices, that deals with generalizations of iir
put-output matrices. We refer to Berman and Plemmons (1979, Ch. 6 and
9).
In the present situation, with D~~ not square because of the occur`
rence of multiple techniques, the following result holds. We state a
theorem that is proved in Appendix A.
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Theorem 2.1:
Assinne that problem (2.2) is feasible for a certain final demand vector
f that is strictly positive. Now the following conjectures are true:
1. A cost minimizing technology alternative exists that can produce f
while using exactly one technique per product. Moreover, this pure
technology alternative can produce every non-negative final demand at
minimal costs.
2. Let D~ be the square matrix of the intermediate input coefficients
and let c~ be the row vector of the direct cost coefficients of the
pure technology alternative at hand. Now:
2.a. Matrix (I-D~) is invertible and (I-D~)-1 ~ 0.
~ ~ ~ -12.b, v.- c(I-D ) is dual optimal.
~
2.c. v is dual optimal for every non-negative final demand.
The main result is that if problem (2.2) is feasible for some f~ 0,
then a pure technology alternative exists that can produce a~ f~ 0 at
minimal costs. Although the model formulation allowed more than one
technique for each product, one specifíc choice of techniques can
realize any final demand f~ 0 efficiently. Theorem (2.2) is a variant
of the notr substitution theorem of Samuelson, who proved a similar
result for input-output models with just one primary input and no joínt
production. Indeed, in our model each technique, activity yields one
product type, and per product type all relevant primary input coeffi-
cients are replaced by one per-unit direct cost coefficient. Hence the
model 'recognizes' one single primary input. (See Samuelson (1951)).
~
Furthermore, the price vector v as defined in Theorem 2.1 has a use-
~
ful economic interpretation. The elements of v express the costs of
producing the final demand on a per-unit basis, while taking into ac-
count the mutual deliveries of products within the firm under the given
~
technology alternative. Therefore the price vector v can be called the
vector of per-unit redistributed variable costs for the optimal techno-
logy alternative. Apparently, the per~unit redistributed variable costs
of the optimal technology alternative do not depend on the actual
amounts of products to be delivered. Note that they need not be computed
separately, but follow immediately from the dual optimum to (2.2).
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The above discussion on the existence of a cost minimizing technology
alternative immediately leads to one particular technology alternative
which is pure, too. However, the model formulation does not exclude com-
binations of two (or even more) techniques for one single product be-
forehand (simultaneous use of more than one technique per product). We
may wonder if the solution of our LP problem (2.2) indeed leads to a
pure cost-minimizing technology alternative.
Suppose the final demand is positive for at least one of the pro-
ducts. Introducing the extra assumption that every product is involved
in the production of any other product, it can easily be demonstrated
that each basic feasible solution to problem (2.2) applies exactly one
technique per product. In the case of a unique optimum, the optimal so-
lution coincides with one of the basic feasible solutions and thus cor-
responds to a pure technology alternative. In the case of alternative
optima, the simplex method applied to (2.2) automatically comes up with
a pure cost-minimizing technology alternative. In Appendix A the related
mathematical analysis is given.
Until now, we have assumed that the firm has to meet a certain constant
final demand, regardless of the revenues of selling these products. The
last part of this section treats the more general situation in which the
firm also decides which types of products it will sell and how much of
each type, apart from choosing between techniques. Therefore the market
prices have to be taken in account and we take maximization of revenues
minus production costs as the objective.
Let p-(p(1),...,p(~)) be the market-price vector, let
z-(z(1),...,z(~))' be the vector of actual outside supply and let
f-(f(1),...,f(~))' be (redefined as) the vector of maximum outside
supply. Now our model becomes
Maximize -cprod xprod } Pz
s.t. (I~ - D~~) xprod - z- 0
z ~ f
xprod' z ~ 0 (2.3)
ls
Problem (2.3) can be written as
Maximize pz - Minimize
cprod xprod
s.t. (I~ - D~~) x rod - zP
xprod ~ 0
s.t. z t f
z 3 0 (2.4)
For any feasible z the inner minimization problem is of the form (2.2).
We assume that the inner problem is feasible for any z~ 0. From Theorem
2.1 it follows that the inner minimization yields a solution value of
the form c~(I-D~)-lz. Here v~ .- c~(I-D~)-1 are the per-unit redistri-
buted variable costs of a cost minimizing technology alternative. We~
know that v is independent of the units of products actually sold. But
it is possible, that the periunit redistributed variable costs of some
market product are higher than its sales price. Because of the objective
of the firm, profit maximization, this market product should not be sup-
plíed to the outside market. On the other hand, market products with a
sales price exceeding the pex~unit redistributed variable costs, should
be sold as much as possible. From this reasoning, it is clear that
either a market product Xm is not sold at all, or its demand is fully
satisfied. Formally, this result follows from the fact that (2.4) can be
written as
~
Maximize (p - v)z s.t. 0 t z s f (2,5)
2.4. Make-or-buy decisions for technical services
The management of an organization is often confronted with the problem
whether to make or to buy certain commodities. E.g. the computerization
of the organization's administrative system could be performed by exter-
nal experts or, alternatively, be the task of a special service depart-
ment within the organization. The choice between these possibilities
could be based mainly on qualitative criteria (absence of know-how or
skilled labour within the firm versus special requirements related to
other internal production processes in the firm). On the other hand,
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financial aspects are also important. Ouantitative approaches to the
make-or-buy problem are regularly reported on in the literature (Baker
and Taylor (1979), Capettini and Salamon (1977), Kaplan (1973, 1982,
ch. 11), Manes et al. (1982)). Especially in cases where reciprocal
services exist (i.e, mutual deliveries between service departments), the
question of whether to generate a service internally or to acquire the
service externally, is not trivial.
Chronologically ordered, the research on the so-called reciprocal
service-cost problem can be seen as a development from input-output to
mixed-integer programming models. Manes et al. (1982) have reviewed this
research and then included avoidable fixed costs in the model formula-
tion. In the present section, we will adopt their mixed integer program-
ming (MIP) approach and combine it with the (continuous) LP model for
multiple techniques. As an intermediate step, make-or-buy decisions are
treated in the case of a constant net demand for TS (cf. Manes et al.
(1982)). Subsequently, the case where the net demand for these services
depends on the number of produced market products is presented.
As noted before, we account for M technical services: TS1,...,TSm,...,
TSM. The net demand b~(m) for TSm is defined as the amount of TSm as
required by the sector products. We require b~(m) ~ 0. For some TSm
there are two possibilities:
1. TSm is produced internally. The pe~unit direct variable costs are
cp(m) and the amount of internally produced TSm is denoted by x~(m).
If x0(m) ~ 0, then the firm incurs a fixed cost equal to C(m) ~ 0 and
the direct costs of internal production are c~(m)x~(m) t C(m).
Furthermore, internal production of TSm requires an amount Dimx~(m)
of TSi, i- 1,...,M, where the rate Dim ~ 0 is again referred to as
an intermediate input coefficient.
2. TSm is bought externally. The amount of externally bought TSm is
y(m). The firm only incurs a variable cost equal to d(m)y(m), where
d(m) is the external price of TSm. If some TS is bought externally,
it does not require input from other TS.
In the case of a known, constant net demand for TS, the problem of fin-
ding the optimal TS alternative can be represented by the following
cost-minimizing MIP model:
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Minimize cOx~ f dy f Cd
s.t. (I - D~)x~ f - b0Y
x~ - W6 t 0
x~, y~ 0; d 0-1 vector (2,6)
Here c~, x~, d, y, C are the vectors corresponding to the c~(m), x~(m),
d(m), y(m), C(m), m-1,...,M. We require c0, d, C, b~ ~ 0. Matrix D~ con-
tains the coefficients Dim. We require that D~ is such that (I-D~)-1
exists and (I-DD)-1 ~ 0. Hence production of all TS-types internally is
feasible. Finally, W is a large positive manber and represents the
maximum capacity of internal TS production. If some x~(m) is positive,
the associated fixed cost C(m) ~ 0 is accounted for in the objective
function, through 6(m) - 1. Contrary to the continuous LP model of the
previous section, the present MIP model does not automatically come up
with the per-unit redistributed variable cost of the optimal TS alterna-
tive as, in principle, shadow prices are not computed. Secondly, the
cost-minimizing TS alternative can become sub-optimal if the net demand
for TS changes.
In our corporate model the net demand cannot be taken constant. Instead,
we will assume that it is a linear, homogeneous function of the produc-
tion intensities in the sector 'market products'. So
~ ~~
b(m) - E E D (~y) x(~),
C A-1 ~,-1 m~ ~
(2.7)
where the Dm~(~y) s 0 are the pex~unit requirements for TSm of product ~
under technique ~r. From this coupling equation, the interdependency be-
tween the sectors 'market products' and 'technical services' becomes
apparent. Suppose that changes in the direct cost coefficients of some
product cause a switch of techniques. This, in turn, changes the net
demand for TS, thereby eventually causing a different choice of TS
alternative.
General rules for these changes in technique and make-oribuy choice
and their mutual dependence cannot be given. Therefore we integrate all
alternatives in one overall formulation. Let matrix DM~ (cf, section
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2.2) be (re)defíned as the matrix of coupling coefficients Dm~(~y). Now
combíning the LP formulation for multiple techniques, i.e. (2.3), with
the MIP formulation for make-or-buy decisions, i.e. (2.6), yields the
following overall model:
Maximize -cprod xprod } pz - cUxp - dy - Cd
s.t. (I~ - D~~) xprod - z - 0
z t f
- DM~ xprod }(I - DD)xD t y - 0
x - Wó t 00
xprod. zr x~e Y~ 0
d 0-1 vector
(2.8)
Símilar to the case without TS, an optimal solution to problem (2.8)
exists with the following properties:
1. It is sufficient to apply exactly one technique for each market pro-
duct actually produced.
2. Market products are either sold maximally or no[ sold at all.
Moceover, we have:
3. Each TS is either produced internally or bought externally.
The formal proof of these conjectures is given in Appendix A.
Economically, this result should not be surprising. The model formula-
tion includes all possible TS alternatives. Now consider one particular
TS alternative and compute its vector of per-unit redistributed variable
cost. Using the TS consumption matrix DM~, we can add the TS costs to
the direct costs of the market products. Altogether, for each TS alter-
native, the variable part of the TS costs can be viewed as direct costs.
But then we have precisely the circumstances of section 2.3, where we
concluded that only one technique per product had to be applied. More-
over, we can compute the per-unit redistributed variable costs (in which
the variable TS costs are included!) and compare them with the sales
prices. Product types with sales prices exceeding the per-unit redistri-
buted variable costs, should be sold maximally. The other product types
should not be sold at all. This reasoning holds for any TS alternative,
so in particular it will hold for the firm-wide optimal TS alternative.
22
The optimization of MIP problem (2.8) can be described as follows. For
each TS alternative, the 'profitable' market products are selected, Sup-
plying them at the maximum level to the market yields a certain contri-
bution to the profit. This contribution must be compared with the fixed
costs of the current TS alternative. Finally, the TS alternative is cho-
sen under which the contribution to the profit minus fixed costs is
maximal. However, if this difference is negative for all TS alterna-
tives, there will be no production at all.
2.5. Summary
In this chapter we made a start with the design of a general model of
the firm. We concentrated on the production transformation processes and
took the input-output model of the firm as a starting point for our
presentation.
Because usually input factors can be combined in more than one way, we
had to generalize the input-output framework. The problem of finding the
lowest-cost technology alternative was represented by a cost-minimízing
LP model. In order to take the sales prices for market products into
consideration, we changed the formulation into a profit maximizing LP
model.
As a second generalization of input-output modelling, we considered
make-or-buy decisíons for technical services. Firstly the case with a
given, constant demand for TS was treated. Finally, the associated MIP
model and the profit maximizing LP model concerning technology alterna-
tives and sales activities were integrated into one formulation, as the




THE MODEL OF THE FIRM:
COST ALLOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
3.1. Introduction
Up to here, we have mainly been concerned with more or less technolo-
gical features as represented in our model of the firm. In this chapter,
we will discuss an important financial issue, viz. cost allocation, in
the context of the corporate model as developed in the previous chapter.
As noted there, we are considering a firm in which part of the activi-
ties can be labelled as 'general services' (abbreviated GS). The GS sec-
tor produces common goods, i.e, goods from which the firm as a whole
benefits. This gives rise to common costs. They may be variable in the
long run, but, in the short run, they are assumed to be entirely fixed.
Because output of GS is not supplied to the outside market, the common
costs must somehow be allocated.
Now we have arrived at the key problem in cost allocation, namely the
occurrence of a setting in which a need for allocation arises, although
the particular costs are non-separable, indivisible.
In the accounting líterature, a large number of articles is devoted to
cost allocation problems in firms. Comprehensive surveys and discussions
concerníng the subject can be found in Biddle and Steinberg (1985) and
Thomas (1977). It should be noted that these authors and especially
Demski and Kreps (1982) largely recommend the 'decision focus': the
analysis of cost allocation from an organizational and decísion-making
point of view.
The contributions in the literature originate from several disciplines
and a wide variety in assumptions, definitions and methodologies can be
noticed. Consequently, some kind of uniform, systematic development of
concepts and definitions hardly exists. For this reason, we will provide
first a more precise description of what is meant by cost allocation
(section 3.2). Then three particular allocation methods are discussed,
as an illustration of the problem statement (section 3.3). In the second
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half of the chapter, the link between cost allocation, managerial be-
haviour and organizational structure .will be explored (section 3.4).
Finally, the relevant organizational features are added to the corporate
model (section 3.5).
3.2. Cost allocation problems
A very general indication of what is meant by a cost allocation i s given
in the following
Definition 3.1:
A cost allocation is the partitioning of a cost among a set of cost ob-
jects. In case all of the cost is allocated, no more and no less, we
speak of a full cost allocation (or, equivalently, 'full costing').
In every cost allocation, three elements play a central role:
1, the total amount of costs to be allocated;
2. the cost objects among which the costs are to be allocated;
3, the allocation method or allocation basis that partitions the total
cost.
The type of the costs may be such that they are not entirely separable,
divisible over the cost objects. Then a cost allocation problem arises
due to the joint (common) nature of (part of) the costs. The literature
on this subjec[ can be divided roughly into two classes, viz. joint cost
allocation and common cost allocation. In order to clarify this distinc-
tion, the terms joint cost and common cost will be defined.
Definition 3.2:
A joint cost is a non-separable, indivisible cost due to a non-separable
production function which is defined on two or more products. Here the
products are the cost objects.
So joint costs are related to joint production (see Dopuch et al. (1982,
chapter 9)). After the split-off point, separately identifiable products
exist, which should jointly bear the costs incurred up to the split-off
point (example: petroleum refinery).
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Definition 3.3:
A common cost is a non-separable, indivisible cost of two or more divi-
sions (or departments). Here the divisions (or departments) are the cost
objects.
The divisions could have produced a certain intermediate product or ser-
vice independently, but apparently they had decided to act together.
Hence they jointly incur the cost of their joint action.
The reader may convince himself that these separate definitions do not
always guarantee an unambiguous answer to the question whether some non-
separable cost is either joint or common. However, what is really impor-
tant, is the apparent non-separability of costs, caused by the absence
of properties which enable some natural allocation among cost objects.
Lacking this natural allocation basis, one has to design ('invent') an
allocation rule. It is evident that every allocation rule is subject to
a certain degree of arbitrariness.
Definition 3.4:
A cost allocation problem asks for the design of an allocation rule (al-
location method, allocation basis) to be used for the allocation of cer-
tain indivisible (joint, common) costs.
3.3. Three illustrative examples
The nature of the cost allocation literature varies from i ntuitive,
pragmatic methods to pure theoretical (game-theoretical and axiomatic)
approaches. See Young ( 1985) for a compendium. In the present section,
three particular proposals will be reviewed, both the allocation method
itself and the setting ín which it is needed.
3.3.1. The Louderback-Moriarity approach
Consider a firm consisting of N divisions each of which has to supply a
certain quantity of a product. There exist three ways to fulfil this
task.
z6
In the first production possibility, the divisions jointly buy an amount
of raw material, then extract N intermediate products (costs: CO) to be
further processed by the divisions independently. A division finishing
its own product incurs a cost equal to Cn. The total cost of this pro-
duction possibility is thus: C~ t C1 f... t CN.
Secondly, each division has the opportunity to buy the required quantity
of íts final product independently. This costs: Yn, n- 1,...,N.
One could also imagíne that the finishing cost Cn of some division n is
so low that this division is tempted to buy the same amount of raw mate-
rial entirely for itself, and then extract and finish its product. The
cost then is C~ t Cn, as it is assumed impossible to buy smaller (and
henc~ cheaper) amounts of the raw material.
It will be assumed that the first option, i.e. jointly buying the raw
material and then further processing by individual divisions, is the
cheapest alternative, so C~ t C1 f... t CN ~ Y1 t.., f YN, Further-
more, every division has a potential interest for this option, as for
every division the finishing cost is lower than the cost of buying the
product independently. Formally: Cn C Yn for n- 1,...,N.
For the firm as a whole, the alternative according to which all divi-
sions jointly use the raw material is the most attractive one. Below we
describe an allocation rule which stimulates divisions to join in the
common purchase and use of the raw material. Note that in this setting
the common costs arise because of cost savings.
Balachandran and Ramakrishnan (1981) discuss the allocation problem out-
lined above, partly inspired by the contributions of Moriarity (1975,
1976) and Louderback (1976). The proposed allocation rule, to be
referred to as the Louderback-Moriarity method, can be stated as
follows,
Let Zn be the cost of the n-th division's next-best alternative. Since
a division might be tempted to buy the raw material independently, it
holds that Zn - min {Yn, C~ f Cn}. Let TOTAL denote the total cost to be
allocated, i.e. TOTAL 3 CO f C1 f... f CN, and let Gn be the cost allo-
cated to division n(n ~ 1,...,N). Now the allocation rule is:
N Z - C
Gn - Cn f(TOTAL - E Cn) N n n (3.1)
- rnl ~ (Zn - Cu)
n-1
Cn is a sort of 'basic charge', while Zn - Cn can be seen as the 'pro-
pensity to contribute'.
The allocation rule (3.1) has some attractive properties. Every divi-
sion is encouraged to take part in the joint use of the raw material
(because Gn t Zn) and has a positive share in the savings of the entire
firm. No division is subsidized: its part of the total costs is at least
as much as its own costs. Every division is tempted to look for cheaper
next-best alternatives, as that would reduce its relative propensity to
contribute. The same holds with respect to the division's finishing cost
Cn: finding cheaper finishing technologies results in a lower basic
charge.
What we find interesting in the propensity to contribute concept, is
the observation of a margin between a division's basic charge and the
cost of its next-best alternative. The allocation of cost savings in
proportion to the division's margin Zn - Cn can be viewed as a faírness
requirement. Nevertheless, this interpretation of fairness is more or
less arbitrary. The division's margin could have been utilized in a dif-
ferent way.
3.3.2. The reciprocal allocation method
The Louderback-Iloriarity method is concerned with allocating the savings
of one particular joint facility (namely the joint purchase of a common
raw material). No distinction is made between fixed and variable costs.
Now we treat a more complex situation with a number of joint facilities,
say technical services (TS), which incur fixed and variable costs. Each
TS is supplied to the divisions but the TS departments also deliver ser-
vices to each other. E.g. the data processing department provides output
for many TS departments. It is the latter feature that makes cost allo-
cation to users (divisions and TS departments!) essentially more diffi-
cult. For a TS department supplying not only to divisions but also to
itself and other TS departments, must reasonably allocate part of its
total cost to these TS departments. But this part of the cost allocation
is of a reciprocal nature, so that the 'total cost' is not known in ad-
vance and actually depends on the allocation itself.
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In order to cope with this effect, a method is proposed that computes
the allocations on a basis of usage, through a set of simultaneous
equations. As a result, both total costs, the so-called redistributed
costs, and their allocation over all consumers (including TS depart-
ments) are obtained simultaneously. Below we will summarize this method
by giving the main formulas and their meanings. See also Kaplan (1982,
ch. 11). It should be noted that the reciprocal allocation method im-
plicitly assumes financial reporting on an input-output basis. In parti-
cular, it is presumed that the deliveries between the TS departments can
be characterized by a matrix D~ with intermediate input coefficients
(cf, section 2.4).
Now let x0 denote the total production of TS. Define the diagonal
matrix diag[xp] by diag[x0]mm '- xp(m), m- 1,...,M. Here M is again the
number of different TS and we assume that all x0(m) ~ 0. The row vec-
tors cp and C' contain the per-unit direct variable cost coefficients
and the fixed costs, respectively, The price g(m) charged to the users
of service m is the m-th element of the row vector g' defined by
g' :- (cp f C' diag 1[x0]) (I-D~)-1 (3.2)
Vector g' is called the vector of per-unit redistributed costs. The
terms c~ f C'diag-1[x~] contain the direct variable and fixed costs res-
pectively, both on a pet~unit basis, Multiplication with (I - D~)-1
redistributes the direct costs on the basis of input coefficients as
contained in matrix DQ, and thus on a usage basis.
We see that the indivisibility of the fixed costs is resolved by an
appropriate modification of the vector of direct cost coefficients. If
we multiply both sides of (3.2) with diag[x0], we obtain the above men-
tioned redistributed costs G', Hence, the row vector of redistributed
costs G' is given by
G' :- (cÓ t C' diag 1[x0]) (I-D~)-ldiag[x~] (3.3)
To conclude, a few considerations are in order concerning the motives
for allocating TS costs. TS departments are typically cost centres, as
they do not produce for the market. We fully agree with Kaplan (1982,
ch. 11), who argues that charging the (profit-conscious!) divisions for
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their use of TS may well stimulate prudent usage of TS. In turn, the
divisional managers will provide signals on the quality of the services
obtained. Because the reciprocal allocation method correctly treats the
mutual deliveries between TS departments, it facilitates comparison with
externally supplied services. Altogether, allocating TS costs provides
íncentives to the TS departments to operate efficiently and to satisfy
the demands of their users.
3.3.3. Fixed cost allocation via mathematical programming
Kaplan and Thompson (1971) have described how a fixed overhead cost can
be allocated among activities in the context of a linear programming
(LP) model of the firm, without distorting the relative profitability of
products. Below, we will discuss their contribution, as we also apply a
mathematical programming approach to corporate modelling.
Suppose that the LP problem
Maximize px
s.t. Ax t a
Bx G b
x ~ 0 (3.4)
formally represents the planning problem the firm is faced with. Fur-
thermore, suppose the management of the firm has solved (3.4). The ob-
jective of the firm is profit maximization and the first set of cotr
straints, i.e. Ax t a, are associated with certain resources which are
available in limited amounts. Having solved (3.4) the management knows
an optimal plan x, maximum profit OPT if this plan is carried out, and a
valuation aa of the scarce resources just mentioned. (Here n is an
optimal dual variable associated to constraints Ax G a. We assume that
OPT is ) 0 and finite.)
Now, as a second step, the management may want to allocate fixed
costs, like overhead costs, depreciation of machinery or another kind of
common costs. Let the total costs to be allocated, say H(~ 0), be smal-
ler than the valuation of the scarce resources, i.e. H ~ na, Then these
costs can be allocated as follows.
iU
Compute the fraction h:- H~(na) (so 0 G h t 1). Each feasible plan x
captures a particular set of activities that can be performed by the
firtn and requires an amount Ax of the scarce resources. Now charge this
claim on scarce resources with per-unit prices, namely the elements of
price vector hn. This implies that plan x will be allocated a cost equal
to hnAx. Subsequently, find a feasible plan that maximizes the profit
given these pe~unit charges on scarce resources. Formally, the follow-
ing LP problem has to be solved:
Maximize (p - hnA)x
s.t. Ax G a
Bx t b
x ) 0 (3.5)
In Appendix B it is proved that the originally optimal plan, i.e. x, is
again optimal in the new situation. Moreover, it realizes a profit that
is equal to OPT - hna - OPT - H. So the original (gross) profit, i.e.
OPT, is maintained while the common costs H are fully allocated.
3.4. Cost allocation and multilevel decisions
In this section we will clarify that cost allocation, as defined and
illustrated in the two preceding sections, has an strong relationship
with the organizational structure of and the decisiocrmaking in the
firm. In this light two interesting publications are then reviewed.
3.4.1. Motives for the analvsis of allocation problems
A firm faces allocation problems whenever joint or common costs are in-
curred. Recalling the organizational setting in the Louderback-Moriarity
approach, we observe that common costs often arise because of cost
savings due to joint action (instead of independent behaviour of the
cost objects). A second source of joint costs is the occurrence of
internal 'general services' like central management, research and
development, public relations. These departments produce common goods
31
from which all other subunits in the firm benefit, thereby giving rise
to common costs to be borne by the firm as a whole.
Erom an overall point of view, i.e. if some overall optimization model
for the entire firm is applied, it is often concluded that allocation
should not be taken into account. Discussions and more references on
this theoretical result can be found in Biddle and Steinberg (1985,
p. 34) and Thomas (1977, p. 5). Briefly speaking, a substantial part of
the literature suggests 'allocation free' corporate models. But, at the
same time, we observe that in any organization of a reasonable size a
certain degree of decentralization has taken place. The information
necessary to make decisions is dispersed among the subunits within the
firm (localízed information) and, in order to reduce the complexity in
managing the whole enterprise, decision-making authority is delegated to
lower levels in the organization. This implies that the use of overall
optimization problems as models for a decentralized firm is highly
unrealistic. As a consequence, different types of models are required
explicitly recognizing the decentralization features. It is not a priori
clear whether these models again turn out to be allocation free.
In summary, the theoretical justification for not considering cost al-
location may well be non-valid in more decentralized settings.
The potential theoretical improvements by the explicit recognition of
allocation issues in modelling complex, decentralized organizations can
be of practical significance, as common cost allocations actually occur
in multi-division firms. The third and probably most important motive,
which is again inspired by decentralization, is that, whenever a process
of delegation of decision authority occurs, the division managers become
local decision-makers with their own responsibílities, goals and prefe-
rences. Now a motivation and a coordination problem arises, as Dopuch et
al. (1982, p. 330) notes. How can local decision-makers be lead towards
firm-wide optimal decisions? Thomas (1977, pp. 7-8) provides reasonable
arguments why the decision of a division manager may be affected by al-
located costs. As an example, we return to the Louderback-Moriarity ap-
proach. The proposed allocation method clearly stimulates divisions to
joint action and implicitly assumes that the cost allocation has an ef-
fect on the behaviour of a division manager (e.g. looking for cheaper
next-best alternatives).
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3.4.2. Cost allocation in a decentralized organizational structure
Altogether, in a multi-division setting, common-cost allocation is not
only likely to occur, but will have an effect on the decision-making
within the firm. This provides a strong incentive to look for allocation
rules which are consistent with the organizational structure. Therefore,
we review two contributions in the literature that incorporate organiza-
tional considerations.
Zimmerman (1979, p. 505) observes that "cost allocations, managerial
behavior, and the structure of the organization, including the incen-
tives facing the managers, are extricably linked". In his article,
Zimmerman states that in certain situations cost allocations yield posi-
tive net benefits to the firm. This notion is further explored by indi-
cating the relationship with the agency problem. A second topic in his
presentation refers to situations where allocated costs are coupled to
the use a division makes of production factors (e.g, labour). This kind
of allocations are sometimes observed in practice, and may induce divi-
sions to switch to labour-extensive production technologies, which in
turn can be sub-optimal from a firm-wide point of view.
Contrary to Zimmerman's set up, which is of a more or less descriptive,
introductory kind, Cohen and Loeb (1982) provide a formal approach to
common cost allocation in a divisionalized firm. They start with the
characterization of a pure common good: once produced, it is free for
all divisions to consume. (Example: corporate image advertising.) The
opposite of a pure common good is a pure private good: once consumed by
some division, it is not available anymore to other divisions. (Example:
collective typing service department in a university.) While Hughes and
Scheiner (1980, p, 90) proved that no full cost allocation scheme exists
for pure private goods which enhances "efficient decentralization",
Cohen et al. shows "that it is possible to reach an efficient allocation
by decentralization and fully allocating costs" in the case of purely
common goods. Here 'efficient' refers to the performance of the firm as
a whole. .
The organizational model of Cohen and Loeb consists of a number of
divisions plus corporate headquarters. The divisions all require a cer-
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tain purely common input which is to be delivered by headquarters. The
provision of the common input leads to common costs incurred by head-
quarters, and to be allocated to the divisions which are considered as
profit centers. Having incomplete information with respect to the divi-
sional profit functions, it is difficult for headquarters to determine
the right level of the common input. The allocations of the common costs
should generate information about divisional demand and thus be helpful
in choosing the optimal level of the common input.
It is not the right place here to present the complete model as
developed by Cohen and Loeb. The main result is that the divisions are
charged according to the marginal benefits they receive from the common
input. This brings about the 'free-rider problem': divisions have the
tendency to understate their demands and still enjoy the benefits of the
common good.
3.5. The overall model
The aim of this book is to investigate two-level planning in decentra-
lized enterprises. To this end, we started to design a general model of
the firm. In chapter 2, the input-output model of the firm was genera-
lized with multiple technologies and make-or-buy decisions, thus leading
to a mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation. In the present chap-
ter, the third issue to be included was introduced, namely cost alloca-
tion. Cost allocation problems appeared to be closely related to the
organizational structure of companies. Therefore, to complete our model
of the firm, we will now add the necessary organizational features.
We consider a firm in which two sorts of subunits, viz. divisions and
departments, can be distinguished.
The divisions produce the commodities that can be sold on the external
market (i.e. the actual output of the firm) and are profit centres. The
divisionalization is based on the joining of related market products:
per division we have market products whose production processes are
highly interdependent. Because there is no direct connection between
production processes in different divisions, they operate relatively
independently of each other and can freely choose among a number of
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technology alternatives in producing their output.
To do their task, the divisions require technical services (TS) either
bought externally, from outside suppliers, or produced internally, in
the TS departments.
A second interdependency between divisions is the common use of cer-
tain resources, each with fixed capacity, to be referred to as common
resources (CR). The way in which CR is partitioned among the divisions
influences their production possibilities and hence their contributions
to the profit.
The latter property provides the essential distinction with those in-
ternal facilities and activities that we have defined as general ser-
vices (GS). The GS departments perform actions that do not affect the
production of products and services in the short run. The only problem
is the allocation of their (constant) costs, the common costs, without
distorting firm-wide desired technology and make-or-buy decisions.
The divisions and departments are coordinated by the so-called central
unit. As part of the top management of the firra, the central unit is
responsible for the total net profit, which is, by definition, equal to
the sum of the divisional profits minus internal-TS costs and common
costs. The central unit must find the optimal partitioning of CR among
the divisions. Furthermore, it is ín charge of the allocation of costs,
namely the internal-TS costs and the common cos[s.
The decision-making process in the firm is organized according to the
following two-level structure:
- At the lower level, we have the divisions. Each of them possesses the
specific knowledge with respect to available techniques, market res-
trictions etc., not known to other subunits.
- At the higher level, we have the central unit. It dírectly controls
the departments and the consimmption of CR, but does not have complete
information on the divisions.
Thus, the divisional two-level structure reflects the specialization and
the localized information in the firm.
Now we turn to the formal presentation of the model. Similar to section
2.4, a MIP foimulation is proposed, but from now on the structure of the
constraints clearly expresses the divisionalization. In table 3.1 (see
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page 36) the MIP model is given. Below, the meaning of the symbols in
this problem formulation will be clarified. A notational convention to
be used throughout the book is that scalar-valued elements of vectors
are usually indicated by an appropriate index between brackets.
There are N divisions, to be indicated by index n. The total produc-
tion vector xprod~ as introduced in section 2.3, is replaced
by
x1,...,xN and each xn is now the total production vector of division n.
Similarly, c1,...,cN replace cprod' The sales level, the maximum
outside
supply and the sales prices are indexed per division: zn, fn and pn.
Division n produces and sells ~ product types: X , m-1,...,~ . Forn n,~ n
each product type, 4'n~~ production techniques exist. Let xn~~(,y) denote
the units of produced Xn~~ by applying technique ~, ~-1,...,Y'n~~.
The production vector xn~~ for product type Xn~~ is defined by
xn~~ -- (xn~~(1),....xn.~(~Y).....xn.~(~n.~))~.
Thus, instead of ~,
~,~, x~(~), x~ (as used in chapter two), we have:
~ .- number of product types in division n,n
Xn~~ .- product type ~ in division n,
~yn~~ .- number of techniques for product type Xn~~ ,
xn~~(y) :- units of produced Xn~~ by using technique ~y,
xn ~ .- production vector for product type Xn~~.
.





of product type Xn~~
x1,...,xn,...,xN
~ ~ ~ ~xn - (xn 1'...,xn ,...,xn ~. .~ . n
xn.~ - ( xn~~(1),....xn~~(~Y)....~xn~m(~n~0))
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The matrices In - Dn, n- 1,...,N, replace I~ - D~~. Here Dn :-
(Dn~l I... ~Dn~~n) and Dn~~ contains all ~n~~ columns of inte~ediate
n
input coefficients for product type Xn~~. So Dn has ~n rows and E 4'n~~
~-1
columns, and In is a'generalized' identity matrix of the same dimen-
sion:
1...1 ~




It is assianed that only production (and not sales) activities require CR
and TS. The per-unit CR and TS inputs are given through the matrices An
and Bn, respectively. The right-hand side vector 'a' reflects the fixed
capacities for CR, whereas TS can be bought externally (yn), at prices
d, or internally produced (x0) and supplied (bn) to divisions.
The notation with respect to the TS sector is almost the same as in
section 2.4. The differences are now given. Instead of y, we have
yl' "'~yN for externally bought TS in divisions, and y~. Here y~ is not
yet defined: y~(m) is the amount of externally bought TSm as used in the
internal production of other TS, so not available for divisions.
Vector d has two functions. Firstly, it still guarantees that, whenever
x~(m) ~ 0, the related fixed cost C(m) is accounted for in the objective
function. Secondly, by the constraints b~(m) - Wd(m) t 0 and b~(m) ~ 0,
it is guaranteed that x~(m) - 0 implies bD(m) - 0. So, if TSm ís not
produced internally, then there is no internal flow of TSm towards divi-
sions; they have to buy TSm from outside the firm independently.
Finally, it is required that the central unit cannot obtain external TS
via the divisions; it has to buy external TS directly from outside the
firm, without interference of divisions. Therefore b1,...,bN are non-
negative.
With respect to the objective function, we note that the common costs
are not included as they were assumed to be entirely constant.
3 t3
Altogether, the development of our general model of the firm is com-
pleted now. The management of the firm is faced with a complex planning
problem that consists of two parts namely:
1. The problem of determining firm-wide optimal production techniques
and make-or-buy decisions without overconsumption of the common re-
sources. This problem is formally represented by the MIP problem in
table 3.1. Moreover, the constraints of the MIP formulation reflect
the divisional organization structure.
2. The problem of allocating the common costs and the costs of producing
TS internally.
Under complete information, the central unit can immediately solve the
MIP problem and then (try to) allocate costs such that divisional mana-
gers have no intention to object against the firm-wide optimal deci-
sions. In reality, however, the information needed to solve the planning
problem is dispersed among the subunits of the firm. Because of the two-
level, divisional organization al structure, decomposition-based plan-
ning procedures can be applied. The next two chapters are devoted to
these solution methods which fit into the information dispersal in the
firm.
3.6. Summary
In many firms activities of the kind 'general services' lead to common
costs to be beared by the firm as a whole. Secondly, the costs of intex~
nally produced TS must be allocated to consumers of these services.
Therefore we discussed the issue of cost allocation as a financial as-
pect of decentralized enterprises to be accounted for in our model. We
stated the necessary definitions and provided three illustrative
examples.
So, after investigating technological features in chapter two, we con-
tinued with an important financial issue which is closely related to the
organizational structure of the firm. We concluded the chapter with the
description and formalization of organizational features that are incor-




PRICE AND RESOURCE DIRECTIVE COORDINATION
4.1. Introduction
In the two preceding chapters the model of a general, two-level divisio-
nalized firm has been developed. The top management is faced wíth a
planning problem, the first technological part of which is mathematical-
ly represented by a MIP problem formulation. The constraints of this MIP
model have a special structure which corresponds to the divisionaliza-
tion in the firm.
Two-level decentralized organizations are often represented fonnally
by mathematical programming problems with a similar block-angular struc-
ture. However, these formulations may lead to large problems. In the
late fifties, solution techniques have been developed by which the
original problem is decomposed into a number of subproblems of smaller
size. This approach was necessitated by the limited capacities of com-
puters in that period. Nowadays, the computational importance of these
decomposition methods has decreased. On the other hand, the algorithms
appear to have a straightforward economic interpretation; they resemble
planning procedures in multilevel organizations.
Thus, by studying decomposition methods from an economic point of
view, planning processes in two-level, decentralized organizations can
be analysed. Examples in the field of corporate planning are, e.g.
Dirickx and Jennergren (1979, ch. 6), Obel (1981). Similarly, for
national planning we mention Dirickx and Jennergren (1979, ch. 5),
Johansen (1978, ch. 5).
In the present and the next chapter, decomposable LP problems are in-
vestigated. We consider decomposition methods that are somehow consis-
tent with the information dispersal in the organízation at hand. It is
not our purpose to provide a broad overview of all kinds of models, nor
to describe and interpret the mathematical solution techniques exten-
sively. Useful surveys, especially with respect to algorithmic details
and variants, can be found in the literature (Geoffrion (1970-b),
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Himmelblau (1972), Luna (1984), Molina (1979), Ruefli (1974)). As part
of the mathematical programming approach to organizational design, we
merely intend to illustrate the value of decomposable models when ínves-
tigating multilevel organizations. Therefore we restrict the presenta-
tion [o one price-directive (section 4.3) and one resource-directive
decomposition technique (section 4.4). First of all, a more precise
problem statement for chapters four and five is given.
4.2. The planning problem
The problems to be analysed are of the form:
Maximize plxl f.., t p~
s.t. Alxl t ... f ANxN c a
Qlxl ~ ql
. 4N~V ~ qN
x1,...,xN ) 0
Here a, qn, pn are constant vectors, An, On are constant matrices and xn
is a variable vector, all of appropriate dimensions (n-1,...,N). The
variables are assumed to be continuous.
Even without the knowledge of chapters two and three, the problem for-
mulation (4.1) can be recognized as an abstraction of the planning prob-
lem in a decentralized organization. A reasonable economic interpreta-
tion, which we will consequently apply in this and the following chap-
ter, is now given.
Blocks Onxn ~ qn, xn ~ 0(n-1,...,N) are associated with N divisions,
at the lower level in the organization. Vector xn represents the activi-
ties of a division (purchase of raw materials, production, deliveries to
other divísions, sales to outside customers). The local constraints
4nxn ~ qn refer to, for example, capacity constraints, maximum~minimum
supply to customers, and pnxn is the divisional contribution to profit.
The common constraints Alxl f... t ANxN t a reflect interdependencies
between divisions, such as mutual deliveries of semifinished products,
and common use of machinery and manpower. In our presentation, the
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common constraints will usually be interpreted in terms of 'common use
of scarce resources'. We-will assume that, at the higher level in the
organization, there is a central unit that distributes these common
resources (CR) to the N divisions. Hence, problem (4.1) will be viewed











Figure 4.1: Organizational structure underlying the formal problem for-
mulation (4.1)
In fact the central unit is faced with the following problem. Determine
an allocation of the common resources such that optimal utilization of
the allocated CR in each division yields divisional productíon plans
which are also optimal from a firm-wide point of view. Formally: choose
a1,...,aN with al t... f aN - a, such that if for n-1,...,N xn is opti-
mal to
Maximize pnxn




the set of dívisional solutions xn forms a solution x1,...,xN that is
optimal to the original problem (4.1).
The central unit cannot solve the overall planning problem (4.1) it-
self because it lacks essential pieces of information concerning the
divisions. Reversely, the divisions do not have the specification of the
common constraints. In order to be able to solve the planníng problem,
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i.e. before decisions can actually be made, the central unit must gather
the necessary information. This will be accomplished ín the form of a
planning procedure.
The term 'planning' requires some clarification. We consider planning
as one of the stages in the entire process of decision-making. A deci-
sion-making process is, in turn, defined as the whole process of solvíng
a problem related to the organization and then making sure that actions
are carried out according to this solution. Now, several stages may be
distinguished: (1) initialization, (2) planning, (3) implementation, (4)
control and~or evaluation. See e.g. Obel (1981, pp. 65-71). In this
book, we are mainly concerned with the planning phase, i.e. the phase in
a decision-making process that involves the search for the decísion to
be made and carried out.
Because of the incomplete information at the higher level in the or-
ganization, we propose decomposition-based planning procedures. This
implies that the overall problem is broken down, decomposed into a num-
ber of subproblems of reduced size and complexity. Each subproblem is
related to a subunit in the organization. Moreover:
1. The decompositíon methods to be presented are two-level methods. Each
subproblem related to a subunit at the lower level ín the organiza-
tion has its own coefficients, which do not occur in the other sub-
problems. This means that we can handle a firm in which divisions
possess technologícal knowledge and local information, not known or
relevant to other divisions and~or the central unit.
2. During the steps of the procedure, parameters are exchanged between
subproblems related to different levels. This can be interpreted as
information exchange between hierarchical levels for planning pur-
poses.
3. In decomposition-based planning procedures coordination is accom-
plished by prices (e.g. Dantzig (1963, ch. 23)), direct allocations
(e.g. Benders (1962), Ten Kate (1972)) or a combination of the two
(Obel (1978), Shapiro and White (1982)). In real organizations
transfer prices and budgets are often used as coordinating in-
struments.
In the present chapter these features are further elaborated. Mixed
price-resource directive approaches will be discussed in chapter five.
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4.3. Price-directive planning according to the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposi-
tion method
This section is devoted to a planning procedure based on the famous de-
composition method of Dantzig-Wolfe (see Dantzig (1963, ch. 23)). In a
sequence of planning sessions the central unit announces tentative
prices for common resources to the dívisions. From the divisional res-
ponses, i.e. tentative production plans with associated profit, the cen-
tral unit extends its (ever incomplete) information on local circumstan-
ces. Below we present a more detailed description of the procedure. The
underlying mathematics can be found in Appendix C.
At the beginning of a new planning session the central unit announces
tentative prices np for CR. Each division is asked to report a"(tenta-
tive) production plan xn that would yield a maximal profit Pn given
these prices for CR. Formally, each division solves
Maximize (Pn~xOAn)xn





and reports an extreme point xn of the feasible region (which is assumed
to be bounded) where the optimal solution value Pn is attained.
The central unit actually solves a sort of reformulated version of the
original problem (4.1), viz.
N Sn
Maximize E E pn ~nn-1 1-1
N Sn
s.t. E E An an t a
n-1 i-1
Sn
E ai - 1, n- 1,...,N
i-1 n
all ai ~ 0n (4.4)
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Here pl .- p xi and Ai .- A xi (i-1,...,5 , n-1,...,N), where, in turn,n n n n. n n n
{xn ~i-1,...,Sn} denotes only subset of the extreme points of the n-th
division's feasible region ( n-1,...,N). So problem (4.4) does not take
account all divisional extreme points. This represents the fact that the
central unit has incomplete information on the divisions and thus cannot
know all extreme points of each division.
However, through the succession of a number of planning sessions, the
central unit gathers a subset of each division's set of extreme points.
So at any point in the planning process, the central unit knows part of
the divisional production possibilities í n terms of a convex subset of
each divisional feasible region. Therefore solutions based on this par-
tial information and subject to the constraints for CR will always be
firm-wide feasible. But even the best solution (i.e. the optimal solu-
tion to problem ( 4.4)) may well be sub-optimal, because not all divi-
sional production possibilities are accounted for. In particular, the
total profit as 'estimated' by the central unit is a lower bound of the
actual ( but still unknown) total profit. Moreover, the sequence of lower
bounds as generated during the planning procedure i s increasing, because
the central unit has more and more information on feasible production
possibilities. At each stage in the solution process, the central unit
can derive an intermediate solution to the original problem (4.1) by
formula
Sn
xn :- E an xn, n- 1,...,N
1-1
(4.5)
Here an, i-1,...,Sn, n-1,...,N, denote the solution to the current vex~
sion of problem (4.4).
When computing the best solution given the incomplete information, the
central unit obtains a shadow price for CR. The central unit uses thís
price, say a0, as a tentative price (a sort of transfer price) for CR.
F rom the modified divisional profit function (see (4.3)), we see that
the term - nOAn acts as a penalty cost for consuming CR. The divisional
responses (formally, xn) are locally optimal plan proposals given the
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current prices n~ for CR. So the response on price information, by the





Figure 4.2: Information exchange in the price-directive planning proce-
dure according to Dantzig-Wolfe.
The use of centrally computed shadow prices for CR as tentative transfer
prices can be explained as follows.
Consider an optimal solution to the current version of problem (4.4),
say the current central solution. Let wn, n-1,...,N, denote the optimal
dual variables associated with the equality constraints in problem
(4.4). Basic columns of problem (4.4) correspond to extreme points
already generated and used in the current central solution, say 'basic
revealed extreme points'. Now the following relationship holds for basic
revealed extreme points: (pn - nUAn)xn - wn. As noted before, ~rDAn
equals the cost for using CR. Therefore wn can be seen as the net profit
contribution of basic revealed extreme points.
The central unit checks whether a division can offer plan proposals
the net profit contribution of which is larger than the contribution of
the optimally combined plan proposals as previously offered by that
division. In particular, the central unit asks for the plan proposal
which has a net contribution to profit that maximally exceeds the
current net contribution. (Formally, for which n is p~ W?) If non n
division provides improving proposals (i.e. all p ~ W), the procedure
n n
can be terminated. Otherwise the central unit updates its information by
adding the latest plan proposals, and starts a new planning session.
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4.4. Resource-directive planning according to Benders' decomposition
method
The resource-directive planning procedure to be presented here is based
on the partitioning procedure for solving mixed-variables programming
problems as developed by Benders (1962). In a sequence of planning ses-
sions the central unit announces tentative portions, allocations of CR
to the divisions. Each division reports its maxim~ profit given this CR
allocation plus a valuation of the allocated resources. Thereby the cen-
tral unit extends its knowledge concerning profit as a function of
allocated CR. A formal derivation of this mechanism is provided in
Appendix C; we continue with a more precise description of the proce-
dure.
We start our exposition with a block-angular LP problem that represents
the planning problem, but contrary to earlier sections we use the sym-
bols Bn and b for the common constraints as they wíll be decomposed in a
different way.
Maximize plxl f.., t pNxN
s.t. Blxl f ...-H BNxN c b
41x1 c ql
. QN~I ~ qN
x1,...,xN ~ 0
Problem (4.6) can be rewritten as follows:
Maximize plxl f ~ - ~ } pNXNs.t. Blxl - bl c 0
41x1 c ql
BNxN - b c 0n
4N~I c qn





In terms of the divisional organization underlying the LP problem (4,7),
the central unit tries to allocate all available CR such that the sum of
the divisional profits is maximized. So the central unit likes to know
each division's profit Pn(bn) as a function of its CR portion bn. How-
ever, due to its lack of divisional information the central unit cannot
know the profit functions Pn(bn), n-1,...,N, completely.
The idea is to solve (4.7) several times with different fixed values
of bn, say bn, where bl f... t bN - b. In a number of planning sessions












profit Pn and a valuation pn of CR portion bn to the
assume that each b is such that (4.8) is feasible...n
solution value P of (4.8) and an optimal dualn
variable p associated with constraints B x t b are reported. (Moren „ n n n „
precisely, pn is the p-part of a dual extreme point (pn, nn) where the
optimal solution value Pn is attained.)
From the reported divisional profit and the valuation of allocated CR
the central unit can derive a linear function that approximates the
divisional profit as a function of allocated resources:
Pn(bn) t Pn t pn (bn - bn) , bn E Un (4.9)
Here Un denotes the set of feasible CR allocations for division n.
By combining the divisional responses from all planning sessions up to
'now', i.e. an intermediate point in the planning process, a piecewise-
linear approximation for each of these profit functions is obtained.
Such a piecewise-linear function may, in a certain range, coincide with
the real (but unknown) divisional profit function but will elsewhere
majorize the real divisional profit function. Therefore, the optimiza-
tion based on this partial information yields an optimistic 'estimate'
of the divisional profit.
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Together with the estimates of the divisional profits, say P1' "''PN'
the central unit computes the corresponding CR allocations b1,...,bN.
The optimality test is: can each division indeed realize the optimistic
profit estimate, i.e. Pn, if it obtains its portion bn? If the answer is
'yes' for all divisions, the planning procedure can be terminated.
Otherwise, the divisions are also asked for a per-unit valuation p ofn
the current CR portion b, This information is used by the central unit,
n
to improve the piecewise-linear approximation of the divisional profit
function. Note that the total profit as 'estimated' by the central unit
(i.e. PI t.., f PN) is an upper bound of the actual (but still unknown)
total profit. Moreover, the sequence of upper bounds as generated during
the planning procedure is decreasing.
Altogether, the central unit provides for quantity-oriented informa-
tion and the divisions respond with price-oriented information. So the
nature of the information exchange is opposite to that of the price-





Figure 4.3: Information exchange in the resource-directive planning pro-
cedure according to Benders.
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4.5. Discussion
Now that we have presented two decomposition-based planning procedures
as illustrations of price-directive and resource-directive approaches,
we wíll discuss the significance of these procedures as conceptual tools
for analysing multilevel organizatíons. Furthermore, this section is de-
voted to a few related issues and features that are economically in-
teresting.
It is evident that both procedures have multilevel characteristics as
discussed in section 1.4. The overall planning problem is decomposed
into a set of subproblems related and delegated to the sub-units in the
company. Central unit as well as divisions actively participate in cal-
culating the plan. However, the procedures adapt to relatively simple
organizational structures:
1. there are only two hierarchical levels;
2. the information flows take place between the central unit and every
division, not among the divisions, i.e. not within one hierarchical
level.
Furthermore, the overall problem formulation is essentially static, so
that only short-run planning problems can be considered.
Because of these limitations the practical applicability of such pro-
cedures as institutional planning devices in real-world organizations is
probably limited. In the literature several simulation experiments with
data from existing companies are reported on. Dirickx and Jennergren
(1979, ch. 6 and section 11.2) review these test cases and conclude that
the results are not really encouraging. In a later publication Burton
and Obel (1980) provides quite a few general conclusions drawn from a
simulation study. But we doubt whether their original overall model
(i.e. a practical version of problem (4.1)) is representative enough to
defend their generalizations and interpretations of the experimental
outcomes.
The present study, however, serves more general purposes. The goal is to
gain basic understanding of multilevel decision-making, in particular
planning in decentralized firms. The analysis is of a descriptive, theo-
retical nature. Through the economic and organizational interpretation
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of decompositíon methods, a useful conceptual framework is obtained that
is straightforward, not too complicated, and that recognizes certain
essential ingredients of a multilevel problem setting.
One of the strongest arguments in favour of decomposition-based plan-
ning procedures is the feature that these procedures can handle informa-
tional decentralization. In large organizations the necessary informa-
tion for making decisions i s localized in several parts of the organiza-
tion, and planning procedures as outlined in sections 4.3 and 4.4 fit
into various forms of this information dispersal.
As an example, consider the Dantzig-Wolfe method. The procedure can be
applied if each division knows its production possibilities, in terms of
the sets {xnl0nxn t qn, xn ~ 0}, whereas the central unit knows the
amounts of available CR, the vector a. The knowledge of An, the per-unit
requirements for CR, and pn, the per-unit contributions to the profit,
can be located in various ways. It is allowed that
- the divisions do not know pn and An, or
- the divisíons do not know pn, or
- the divisions know their own pn and An.
Each of these situations gives rise to a different exchange of informa-
tion between higher and lower levels. Combinations are also possible:
for instance, some divisions know only their pn, while the others know
their An as well as their pn. Formally, information dispersal can be
defined as the specification of each subunit's knowledge of the constant
coefficients of the entire planning problem.
The description of the planning procedure was almost entirely centred
around the process of generating information from divisions until fur-
ther planning cycles were not necessary anymore. In the sequel, the
start of the planning process (initialization) and the computation of
the final production plan (termination) will be discussed.
It is reasonable to expect that the central unit has some information
on the divisions at the beginning of the planning procedure. This
a priori information could have been derived from an earlier planning
process, for instance from the final production plan of the previous
year. Hence, the central unit has a priori 'feeling' for reasonable ini-
tial prices and CR allocations respectively. For instance in the Benders
case, we implicitly assumed that some tentative CR allocation does not
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render divisional problem (4.8) infeasible. In other words, the central
unit is assumed to know a priori which CR allocations are allowed from
the divisional point of view; the central unit knows sets Un, n-1,...,N.
An interesting and valuable theoretical contribution concerning a
priori ínformation is provided by Frauendorfer (1984). This author dis-
cusses significant ranges for CR allocations, to be determined at the
divisional level before the start of the planning procedure. Such ranges
exclude a priori those divisional production plans which would cause
infeasibility from a firm-wide point of view or which do not affect the
firm-wide optimum. For completeness, we mention the publication by
Burton and Obel (1980) discussed above, which also reports on the per-
formance of planning procedures under various a priori information
settings.
We conclude the evaluation of decomposition-based planning procedures
with some thoughts on the statement of the final production plan to be
obtained at the end of the planning phase. In the Benders case, we noted
that the divisional production plans xn in the final planning session,
i.e. the divisional production plans given the latest CR allocations
b1,...,bN, are optimal for the firm as a whole. Therefore the final CR
allocations can be applied as a coordinating instrument: they direct the
divisions to optimal actions. On the other hand, the final divisional
production plans in the Dantzig-Wolfe procedure need not be firm-wide
optimal; they can be even globally infeasible. We will investigate this
situation further.
Upon termination of the Dantzig-Wolfe procedure, a price n~pt for CR
results under which the divisions cannot propose better production plans
anymore. The firm-wide optimal production plan is some 'weighted
average' of earlier divisional proposals. It would be practícal if,
given the termination price n~pt, each division chooses production plans
according to the firm-wide optimum. So the question is: if divisions
solve (4.3) with n0 equal to nÓpt, is their local optimum also globally
optimal? Baumol and Fabian (1964) have demonstrated that divisions may
choose optima that do not coincide with the overall optimum. Geometri-
cally, this remarkable feature can be clarified as follows: divisional
optima always occur at a boundary point of the divisional feasible
region, whereas the projection of the global optimum on a division's
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feasible region may well be an interior point (see also Lasdon (1970,
pp. 162-163)). Summarizing, the final price for CR, n~pt, does not coor-
dinate the divisions in the sense of directing them to actions that are
optimal for the company as a whole (see also Dirickx and Jennergren
(1979, section 2.1, especially pp. 14-15). Mesarovi~ et al. (1970) notes
that it is the sequence of coordinating inputs (in our case, the n0 in
every planning session) that leads to optimality, rather than one
particular value of the coordination input (i.e. ~óPt)~
The computation of the firm-wide desired production plan thus cannot
be accomplished through prices. Instead, the central unit can compute
each globally optimal divisional production by using formula (4.5) with
an equal to final weights (~n)opt , and then announce to each division
its x. However, this would leave a minimum degree of freedom to then
divisions. A second method, that is less centralized and seems more
appropríate in the given organizational structure, is to compute the
divisions' ultimate portions of CR, i.e. (n-1,...,N)
S
anPt .- En (an)optAn~
i-1
(4.10)
and announce to each dívision its ultimate portion aopt. Subsequently,
each division solves problem (4.2) with an equal to aopt, and in thisn
way the computation of the detailed production plan is delegated to the
divisions. It is evident that the divisional solutions are still fírm-
wide optimal.
Thus, with respect to the statement of the final production plan, we
see that the actual decision concerning CR allocatíons is made at the
top level in the organization. In other words, not so much decision
authoríty is really delegated to divisions.
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4.6. Summary
The conclusion of this chapter is that analysing decomposition-based
planning procedures provides useful conceptual insight into multilevel
planning situations. The procedures discussed in this chapter can be
adapted to various forms of infoxmational decentralization. On the other
hand, the final decisions are still made at the top level in the organi-
zations, so we have no decentralization of decision-making authority.
Before applying the gained insights to the general model of the firm
as developed in chapters two and three, the next chapter treats more
sophisticated procedures. Price and resource-directive characteristics





MIXED PRICE-RESOURCE DIRECTIVE APPROACHES
5.1. Introduction
Usually a decomposition-based planning procedure is either price- or
resource-directive. This means that the coordination of subunits at the
lower level in the organization is accomplished by prices or by quanti-
ties. In real organizations, prices and direct resource allocations
often occur simultaneously as coordinating instrwnents. Therefore it is
interesting to investigate míxed price-resource directive decomposition
methods.
One way of mixing prices and quantities is division-oriented mixed
decomposition (DMD), where part of the divisions are coordinated by
prices while the remaining divisions are coordinated by resource alloca-
tion. For instance, manpower can be allocated to some divisions on the
basis of prices, where, at the same time, the other divisions are faced
with a budget for manpower, i.e, a direct allocation of manpower. The
second mixed approach is resource-oriented mixed decomposition (RMD).
Here a subset of the CR-types are coordinated by prices while the re-
maining CR-types are coordinated by direct allocations. Atkins (1973)
suggests that 'soft' common constraints may well be handled by price
coordination, (e.g. concerning resources that can be additionally
bought), whereas for 'hard' constraints direct coordination seems to be
more appropriate.
In the literature, mixed decomposition was introduced by Obel (1978),
who used the terms vertical and horizontal mixed decomposition, instead
of ih~ID and RMD respectively. Similar ideas, with emphasis on the econ-
omic implications, have been found in a working paper by Atkins (1979).
We will present a DMD and an RMD planning procedure (sections 5.2 and
5.3). Contrary to Obel (1978), substantial attention is paid to the res-
pective master problems, i.e the coordinating problems the central unit
is faced with. In the RSD case we follow the approach of an earlier
paper, viz. Meijboom (1985). Again, we will stress the economic signifi-
cance of both methods as information gathering procedures.
5.2. Division-oriented mixed decomposition
In this section a hybrid version of the two planning procedures as pre-
sented in sections 4.3 and 4.4 is discussed, Certain divisions are coor-
dinated by prices; the others are faced with direct resource alloca-
tions. Without loss of generality, the case with only two divisions is
considered:
Maximize plxl t p2x2




A complete presentation of the procedure would be a mixture of sections
4.3 and 4.4. However, we leave this synthesis to the reader and provide
a sianmary of the planning procedure. In brief, division I faces prices
for CR and responds with plan proposals, while division 2 faces alloca-
tions of CR and responds with valuations. Based on the divisional res-
ponses the central unit decides upon continuation or termination of the







Figure 5.1: Information exchange in the DMD-based planning procedure.
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At the beginning of each planning session, the central unit announces
tentative prices n~ for CR to division 1 and a tentative allocation a2
of CR to division 2. Now division 1 has to solve
Maximize (pl - n~Al)xl
s.t. Olxl C qi
xl ~ 0 (5.2)
and report the optimal production plan with associated profit to the
central unit. At the same time, division 2 solves
Maximize p2x2
s.t. B2x2 t b2
Q2x2 ` q2
x2 ) 0 (5.3)
and reports the maximal profit and a valuation of the allocated re-
sources to the central unit.
In the course of the planning procedure, the central unit 'reveals' a
number of production possibilities of division 1. At the same time, it
gathers information concerning the profit of division 2 as a function of
allocated CR. Hence, at each stage in the planning process the central
unit has different types of information on the two divisions available.
An obvious reason for mixing price- and resource-directive planning is
the dispersal of information at the beginning of the planning procedure.
The central unit's a priori knowledge on divisions may be such that it
naturally chooses to coordinate one division by prices and the other by
direct resource allocations.
Mathematical derivation of the procedure
The block-angular LP problem to be decomposed is given in (5.1).
Matrices and vectors with index '1' will be decomposed according to
Dantzig-Wolfe, and matrices and vectors with index '2' according to
Benders.
Assume that the set F1 :- {x1IQlx1 t ql, xl ~ 0} is bounded. Problem
(5.1) can be reformulated as follows:
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S1
Maximize E plxiai f p2
i-1
S1
s.t. E Alxiai f b2 - a
i-1
all ai ~ 0, x2 ) 0 (5.4)
Here xi, i-1,...,51, denote the extreme points of F1. Now let (p2,n2),
j-1,...,SZ, be the extreme points of the dual region {(p2,n2)~ pZBZ i-
n2Q2 ~ PZ: PZ~ ~12 ~ 0}. Ass~ing that bZ is chosen from the set UZ :-
{bZl ~(B2x2 t b2, Q2xZ s q2, x2 ~ 0)}, problem (5.4) is equivalent to
x2
the following full master problem (FMP).
S1
Maximize E plxiai f p2
i-1
S1
s.t. E Alxiai f b2 - a
i-1
ai
P2 ' PZ b2 ~ n2 92~ j-1,...,S2
all ai ~ 0 (5.5)













- E u~P2 - 0
j-1
all ui ~ 0
i-1,...,S1
(5.6)
In each iteration, a restricted version of FMP is solved. This restrict-
ed master problem (AMP) takes into account some of the columns indexed
by superscripts i and some of the rows indexed by superscript j. If we
extend the solution to RMP by setting ai - 0 for every col~n i which
has not been specified in RMP, we obtain a vector which does not violate
the equality constraints of FMP. If we extend the solution to ILKP-d by
setting u~ - 0 for every row j which was not specified in RMP, we obtain
a vector which does not violate the equality constraints of FMP-d.
Hence we can construct a primal and a dual solution, denoted by
(~1,...,~51, z2, b2) and (~r0, nl, ui,...,uS2), respectively, which are
'partially feasible' to FMP and its dual, and the objective function
values of which are equal to each other. If this primal-dual pair also
satisfies the inequality constraints in FMP and as FMP-d, respectively,
an optimum of FMP has been found. Therefore we must check whether
plxi - nQAlxi - nl t 0, i- 1,....51~
equivalent to
max {(pl- n0A1)xl ~ Olxl t ql, xl ~ 0} t nl,
and






P2 s min {p2b2 t n2q21 p2B2 t n2QZ ~ P2~ P2~ n2 ) 0} (5.10)
In case (5.8), the Dantzig-Wolfe criterion, is not fulfilled, a colwnn
is to be added to RMP. In case (5.10), the Benders criterion, is not
fulfilled, a row is to be added to RMP. In both cases, RMP is then re-
solved with an augmented set of columns and~or rows. As soon as (5.8)
and (5.10) are fulfilled, optimality has been achieved and the procedure
can be terminated.
5.3. Resource-oriented mixed decomposition
The present section is devoted to decomposable planning problems in
which two sorts of common constraints are distinguished:
Maximize plxl t... f pNxN
s.t. Alxl f... f ANxN c a (~)
Blxl f . .. f BNxN c b (~~)
41x1 c ql
QN~I c qN
x1,...,xN ~ 0 (5.11)
We will present a new two-level decomposition method (Meijboom (1985))
in which common constraints (~) are coordinated by prices while common
constraints (~~) are coordinated by direct allocations. This treatment
of common constraints (~) and (~~) will be referred to as resource-
oriented mixed decomposition. Common constraints (~) and (~~) are taken
to express the common use of certain resources by all divisions. First-
ly, the mathematical derivation of this new approach will be given. In
this context we will speak of an algorithm rather than of a planning
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procedure. Subsequently the economic implications are thoroughly ana-
lysed.
Before presenting the algorithm, a few assianptions and definitions are
in order. We asswne the existence of a feasible solution of problem
(5.11). The divisional feasible regions Fn, which are defined as
Fn:- {xnlQnxn t qn, xn ~ 0} are assumed to be bounded. So (5.11) has a
finite optimwn. For n- 1,...,N, the set Un is again defíned as follows:
U:- {b ~ a vector x E F exists with B x t b} (5.12)
n n n n n n n
Set Un will be called the set of feasible allocations for division n
concerning common resources (~~).
For notational convenience, set U is introduced:
N
U:- {(b1,...,bN) I E bn t b; bn E Un, n- 1,..., N} (5.13)
n-1
Set U will be called the set of globally feasible allocations concerning
common resources (~~).
5.3.1. Development of the algorithm
The Lagrange function relative to common constraints (~) is:
N N
L(x,a).- n-1 pnxn f n(a -n-1 Anxn)




s.t. x E F, n-1,...,N, E B x C bn n ~1 n n
(5.14)
Optimal solutions (X~n) to the minmax problem (5.14) are saddle points
of L(x,n). The next theorem provides the necessary and suffícient con-
ditions for the existence of a saddle point.
bZ
Theorem 5.1:
A vector x-(xl,..., xn) is a solution to the LP problem (5.9) if, and
only if, a vector n~ 0 exists such that (x,n) is a saddle point of
L(x,r).
Proof: see Appendix D.
The usefulness of a saddle point is evident: if (x,n) is a saddle point
of L(x,a), then x solves the original problem (5.11).
If we use the set U(see formula (5.13)) and introduce functions
Pn(n,bn) defined as
Pn(n,bn):- Max{(pnnAn)xn I xn E Fn, Bnxn G bn}, n- 1,...,N,
problem (5.14) can be rewritten as
N
Min Max E Pn(x,bn) f na
n~0 (b1,...,bN) E U n-1
(5.15)
Problem (5.14) and (5.15) are equivalent because, for every n~ 0, the
inner maximization problems are equivalent (see Lasdon (1970, p. 462)).
Functions Pn(n,bn) are concave in bn and convex in n. Moreover, they are
even piecewise-linear in both bn and n.
Due to the assumed existence of a finite optimum of (5.11), the origi-
nal Lagrangian L(x,n) has a saddle point. So the function
N
E Pn(n,bn) t na has a saddle point, too. Aence, it is allowed to re-
n-1
verse the order of maximization and minimization in (5.15) (see Zangwill
(1969, pp. 45-46), thereby obtaining:
N
Max Min E Pn(n,bn) f na
(b1,...,bN) E U n~0 n-1 (5.16)
In the sequel, (5.15) will be referred to as (D), the dual problem, and
(5.16) as (P), the primal problem. Problems (P) and (D) have the same
optimal solutions. Equivalent formulations of (P) and (D) are
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N
Max w s.t. w t E Pn(n,bn) f na, n ~ 0 (5.17)
(b1,...,bN) E U n-1
a nd
N
Min v s.t. v~ L Pn(n,bn) f,ra, (b1,...,bN) E U
n~0 n-1
(5.18)
respectively. By applying tangential approximation, we will derive ap-
propriate relaxed versions of (P) and (D).
Suppose we have at hand r sets {nk,bi,...,bN}, k- 1,...,r, of tentative
prices and allocations concerning common resources ( ~) and (~~)
N
respectively. Let nk ~ 0, bn E Un, n-1,...,N, L bn t b for all k.
n-1
N
From w G E P(n,b ) t na, n~ 0, it follows that~1 n n
N
w t~1Pn(nk,bn) i- nka, k - 1,...,r
Similarly
N
v a~1Pn(n,bn) f na, k- 1,...,r
(5.19)
(5.20)
The r right-hand sides of (5.19) are not easily handled, so we apply a
further relaxation. Tangential approximations are readily obtained by
solving the subproblems
Maximize (p -nkA xn n) n
s.t. B x t bkn n n
xn E F n (5.21)
For, let xk be an optimal solution, let ~k be an optimal dual solution
n pn
associated with constraint B x G bk, while the optimal solution valuen n n
is p(nk~bk) by definition. Then it is easy to show thatn n
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Pn(nk'bn) L Pn(nk'bn) } pn(bn bn)' bn E L1n (5.22)
(See Geoffrion (1970-a, p. 381) or Dirickx and Jennergren (1979, p. 69)).
The right-hand sides of (5.20) can also be approximated:
N
~ra t E Pn(n,bn) ) fk t(n-nk) Da
n-1
where (k - 1,..., r):
N N
PS~ :- E Pn(nk,bn) ~- nka - E (pRnkAn)xn t~rka,
n-1 n-1
N









s.t. w c PS~ t E pn(bnbn) , k- 1,...,r
n-1
(b1,...,bN) E U (5.25)
From (5.18), (5.20) and (5.23), we derive the following relaxed dual
problem:
Min v
s.t, v ) PS~ ~- (n-nk) Dá , k- 1,...,r
n ~ 0 (5.26)
Let w(P) be the optimal solution value of (5.17), let v(D) be the opti-
mal solution value of (5.18). We know that w(P) - v(D). Now, if wr and
~r are the optimal solution values of (5.25) and (5.26) respectively, it
holds that
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vr C v(D) - w(P) G wr (5.27)
So the optimal solution value of the original problem lies between vr
and wr.
The algorithm approximates the solution of (P) and (D) by solving re-
laxed versions of (P) and (D), and adding new constraints to the relaxa-
ted problems when necessary.
Let e~ 0 be the desired accuracy. Suppose one has arrived at a re-
laxed primal and a relaxed dual problem of forms (5.25) and (5.26), res-
pectively, each with r constraints. We call these problems (Pr) and
(Dr). Solve (Pr) and denote the optimal solution by wr, b~1,...,bN
1.
Similarl r r~ly, v and n denote the optimal solution to (Dr).
If wr - vr ~ e, we may terminate. Now we can generate a globally fea-
sible solution with value ~ vr (see section 5.3.2).
Otherwise, if wr - vr ~ e, we solve the following subproblems:
Max (pnn~lAn)xn




"rtl "ri-1 rtl rfl N from which a ro-This yields xn ' pn ' Pn(n ,bn ), n- 1,...,., pp
priate constraints to be added to (Pr) and (Dr) can be deduced. The aug-
mented problems are called (P~1) and (D~1). If we solve (P~1) and
(D~1), then w~l and v~l will result. These are, possibly better,
upper~lower bounds for the optimal objective function value of the
origínal problem as
vr G v~l G v(D) - w(P) ~ w~l c a'r
Now it is clear that, by successively solvíng (Pr) and (Dr) and adding
new constraints to them, we expect to find shrinking intervals
[vr, wr], r- 1,2,..., which contain the optimal objective function
value. Indeed, the difference between vr and wr converges to zero. A
rf 1
convergence proof is given in Appendix D.
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The algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Summary of algorithm:
N
Step 0. Choose nl ~ 0, and bl E U, n-1,...,N, such that E bl t b.
Set r:- 0.
Ste 1. For n- 1 "~1 "rtlp ,...,N, solve (5.28), which yields x , p and
rF-1 r-F1 n n
Pn(n ~bn ).
Step 2. Compute PS1 and Dá 1, and add appropriate constraints to (Pr)
and (Dr) thereby obtaining (P~1) and (D~1), respectively.
Step 3. Set r:- r f 1 and solve (Pr) and (Dr) which yields wr, vr,
r~l rFl r~lbl ,...,bN , n .
Step 4. Optimality test:
if wr - vr ~ e then terminate, otherwise return to step 1.
Until now, we have treated set U as if it is completely known. In prac-
tical applications it is usually impossible to obtain set U(or the sets
U1,...,UN) in an explicit form. The literature, in particular Geoffrion
(1970, section 3.1), offers several useful methods to generate sets
U1,...,UN during the iterations of the algorithm described above. Es-
pecially in the present linear case, each Un can be specified without
approximation by a finite collection of linear equalities. Each of these
inequalities can be added to (5.25) 'when needed'.
Secondly, sets U1,...,UN are partly determined by matrices B1' "''BN
(cf. definition (5.12)). These matrices, in turn, depend on the choice
between price-directive or resource-directive coordination for each of
the common constraints. Note that these choices are to be made before
actually starting the algorithm.
These aspects highlight the importance of the algorithm as an informa-
tion gathering procedure.
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5.3.2. Generation of globally feasible solutions
So far we described a procedure which simultaneously generates a de-
creasing sequence of upper bounds as well as an increasing sequence of
lower bounds for the optimal solution value. Moreover, both sequences,
i.e. (vr)1 and (wr)1, converge to this value. In this section, we will
show that, without much extra effort, a globally feasible solution can
be computed.
The relaxed dual (Dr) is simply an LP problem and can be written as
Minimize v








r k k- E a e
k-1 a
t 0
which is equivalent to (cf. (5.24)):










all ak ~ 0 (5.31)
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Now let ( ál,,,,, ár) be an optimal solution to (5.31). Its solution
value is equal to vr, the optimal value of (Dr). If we define
r
x :- E ak xk ,
n k-1 n
n - 1,...,N (5.32)
then (xl,..., xN) is feasible to (5.11), due to the convexity proper~
ties, and it has solution value vr,
Summarizing we can derive a globally feasible solution by a convex
combination of previously generated divisional solutions. The weighting
factors are exactly the optimal dual variables associated with (Dr), and
the solution value is equal to the optimal value of (Dr),
5.3.3. Economic interpretation
As noted before, the original problem (5.11) is viewed as the overall
planning problem in a divisionalized organization. Blocks Onxn ~ qn~
xn ) 0(n-1,...,N) are associated with divisions and the common con-
straints (~) and (~~) reflect the interdependencies between them (e.g,
allocation of common resources). Furthermore, there is a central unit at
the top level of the organization, that is aware of these interdependen-
cies but does not have complete information on the divisional con-
straints. Therefore, a planning procedure by which top management
gathers information, must be applied. Below we describe a procedure that
is based on the decomposition algoríthm as developed in section 5.3.1.
The essential feature of the method is that
- the (~) interdependencies are coordinated by prices, while
- the (~~) interdependencies are coordinated by direct allocations.
Hence, we provide a mixed price-resource directive planning procedure.
Recall that the (~) and (~~) interdependencies are asswned to reflect
the common use of certain resources by all divisions. The goal of the
firm is assumed to be profit maximization.
The planning procedure is formed by a number of planning sessions. At
the start of a new planning session, the central unit announces a tenta-
tive price nr for the (~) resources and tentative direct allocations
bi,...,bN of the (~~) resources to the divisions. These are asked to
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compute their maximum profit P(nr,br), the required amount A xr of (~)n n „ n n
resources, and per-unit valuations pn (n-1,...,N) of allocated (~~)
resources given price nr and allocation bi,...,bN. This information ex-







r {Pn(nr, bn), Anxn, pn}
Figure 5.2: Information exchange in the r-th planning session of the
RMD-based planning procedure.
Formally, each division solves its problem
Maximize (Pn nrAn)xn
rs.t. Bnxn t bn
x E Fn n
(5.33)
and reports the optimal solution value P(nr,br), quantity A xr, wheren n n n 'rxn is the optimal solution to (5.33), and an optimal dual variable p n
with respect to constraint Bnxn t bn.
Based on the divisional responses and on information gathered in pre-
vious sessions, the central unit can derive a lower bound vr and an up-
per bound wr for the maximum attainable total profit (i.e. the optimal
value of the original problem (5.11)). The maximum attainable profit
lies between these bounds, so the central unit can terminate the proce-
dure as soon as the difference between lower and upper bound has become
small enough. The central unit finds a distribution of the (~) and (~~)
resources at which the divisions together will at least realize a profit
of vr, if the previous claims for (~) resources, i.e. A xk, k-1,...,r,n n
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and allocations of (~~) resources, í.e. bn, k-1,...,r, are adequately
weighted. Weighting factors with this property, which apply to both CR-
types and are uniform over the divísions, can be obtained by a slight
modification of the computational procedure for vr.
Formally, the dual optimum to problem (Dr) delivers the desired
weighting factors ál,...,ár (cf. section 5.3.2). Additionally the cen-
tral unit must compute (n-1,...,N):
r
an :- E ak Anxn;
k-1
r
br .- E ak bk.n k-1 n (5.34)
If the divisions optimally use these (final) amounts of CR, they solve
the problems ( n-1,...,N):
Maximize p xn n
s.t. A x ~ arn n n
B x t brn n n
x E Fn n (5.35)
and the sum of their profits will be at least vr.
On the other hand, if the central unit is not satisfied with bounds vr
and wr, it can update the prices and resource allocations leading to new
bounds v~l and w~l. It will hold that
vr t w~l c OPT c w~l t wr (5.36)
where OPT denotes the maximum attainahle total profit. So the more in-
formation the central unit gathers, the better it approximates the maxi-
minn attainable profit.
Now we will pay attention to the way the central unit derives the
príces, CR allocations and profit 'estimates' in subsequent planning
sessions. To this end, we have to explain the economic meaning of prob-
lems (P) and (D), to be referred to as 'maxmin' and 'minmax' respective-
ly.
For some fixed allocation of (~~) resources, say (b1,,,,,bN) E U, the
inner minimization of maxmin yields a price for (~) resources that min-
imizes the valuation of these resources given allocation (b1,...,bN).
Hence maxmin determines an allocation of (~~) resources that maximizes
this valuation, i.e. the amount of money that the divisions together
offer for (~) resources.
For some fixed price vector for (~) resources, say n~ 0, the inner
maximization of mirnnax determines an allocation of (~~) resources at
which the divisions together maximize their total profit given price n,
Now mimnax chooses a price for (~) resources that minimizes this total
profit. So minmax determines the minimal valuation of (~) resources.
We know that maxmin and minmax have equal optimal solution values.
This means: a price nopt and an allocation bipt,...,bNpt exist at which
the divisions together offer an amount of money for (~) resources exact-
ly equal to the amount the central unit wants to receive minimally for
these resources.
However, in the planning procedure the central unit is merely concerned
with a'pessimistic' version of (D) and with an 'optimistic' version of
(P). As a result, the prices nr and the lower bounds vr on the one hand,
and the allocations bi,...,bN and the upper bounds wr on the other fol-
low from two separate computations. We will first consider the prices
nr together with the lower bounds vr.
Suppose we are at the end of the r-th planning session. The central
unit has at hand the divisional responses of sessions 1,2,...,r. From
the divisional responses of each session separately, the central unit
can form a linear function which approximates the maximal profit of the
divisions together as a function of the internal prices n. Hence, com-
bining the divisional information as collected in all previous sessions
up to this moment, the central unit derives a piecewise-linear approxi-
mation of this profit as a function of the prices for (~) resources. The
collected information is used in a'pessimistic' way, since the approxi-
mating valuation function lies below the correct profit function. The
estimated minimal valuation of (~) resources vr is exactly the minimum
value of this approximating function. As a result vr is a lower bound
for the correct minimal valuation. In the course of the procedure, the
piecewise-linear approximating function becomes better and better, hence
giving rise to improved lower bounds v~l~ v~2 etc.
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The determination of subsequent wr and bi,...,bN proceeds in a similar
way. The difference is that here the central unit works with an improv-
ing piecewise-linear approximation for the minimal valuation of (~) re-
sources as a function of the allocation of (~~) resources, which always
lies above the correct valuation function. Hence a decreasing sequence
of upper bounds wr is the cesult.
To conclude, we compare the present planning procedure with the two pro-
cedures of chapter four, that were based on the Dantzig-Wolfe and the
Benders method.
Just like in the Benders case the updating of CR allocations is
coupled with the generation of a decreasing sequence of optimistic
profit estimates. And the price corrections are coupled with the genera-
tion of an increasing sequence of pessimistic profit estimates, similar
to the Dantzig-Wolfe procedure.
Finally, we note that subproblem (5.21) (or (5.33)) is clearly a mixed
version of problems (4.3) and (4.8) in chapter four.
5.4. Summary
The main purpose of this chapter has been to discuss two-level planning
procedures with prices and direct allocations for resources occurring
simultaneously. We were particularly interested in the computation of
prices and allocations. In the F~íD case, this computation provided an
upper and lower bound for the optimal value of the problem at hand. The
lower bound, which increases during the iteration sequence (cf. (5.36)),
is directly associated wíth a globally feasíble solution, so that glo-
bally feasible solutions can be obtained with increasing solution value.
In the DMD case, monotonic bounds are not available.
The contribution of the present chapter is that it provides the cor-
rect mathematical foundation of míxed coordination by prices and budgets
in a general two-level organization. Each of the subproblems, at the top
level as well as at the divisional level, has a clear appealing economic
interpretation in terms of a planning procedure. Secondly, the mixed use
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of prices and budgets is a most realistic feature when comparing the
present planning procedure with planning in real-world organizations
(e.g. see Atkins (1973), Obel (1981)). From a computational point of
view, several improving modifications could be incorporated. However
this is beyond the scope of the text.
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CHAPTER SIX
OVERALL ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL OF THE FIRM
6.1. Introduction
In chapter two and three we have developed a general model of the firm,
thus providing the economic context for our analysis of two-level plan-
ning. We included multiple techniques, make-or-buy decisions and cost
allocation issues. Furthermore, a two-level organizational structure was
proposed, with a central unit at the top level and a number of divisions
at a lower level. The central unit's task is to coordinate the division-
al consumption of common resources (CR), to determine the make-or-buy
decisions for technical services (TS) and to allocate costs.
The problem of finding a firm-wide optimal technology and TS alterna-
tive without overconsumption of CR has been formulated as a mixed-
integer programming (M IP) problem (see table 6.1). Provided a full spe-
cification of the constant coefficients in the MIP formulation is avail-
able, the solution can in principle be determined immediately. Subse-
quently, the common costs and the costs of internally produced TS are to
be allocated by the central unit.
The present chapter is mainly devoted to the fictitious outcome of
applying an appropriate overall solution technique to a fully specified
version of the MIP problem. We will investigate the properties of opti-
mal solutions. In fact the MIP model of the firm is analysed from an
'overall' point of view: the organizational aspects are neglected and
the firm is considered as an entity directed by or identified with one
single decision-maker who is 'all-knowing' and 'all-mighty'. In discus-
sing the properties of the optimal solution to the MIP problem in terms
of make-or-buy decisions, choice of techniques and CR consumption, we
will keep these rather centralized circumstances in mind.
The overall approach leads to some insight in the relationships be-
tween production techniques and make-or-buy decisions. Secondly, the
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tion as a reference when we, subsequently, investigate the properties of
the solution under more decentralized circumstances.
The chapter is organized as follows. Fírst properties of overall solu-
tions are treated (section 6.2) followed by a numerical example that
informally clarifies obtained results (section 6.3). Then the establish-
~ent of an overall plan is discussed (section 6.4). Finally cost alloca-
tion mechanisms are proposed (section 6.5).
6.2. Properties of overall solutions
In thís section we consider the MIP formulation of the general model of
the firm as a computational problem with all input data available and
thus immediately solvable. Recall that the MIP problem integrates all
possible technology and TS-alternatives in one overall formulation. Here
a technology alternative is a collection of techniques at least one for
each product, and a TS alternative is a combination of make-or-buy deci-
sions stating which TS types are produced internally and which TS types
are bought externally. The outcome of the overall solution approach will
be referred to as the overall solution. It implies a technology alter-
native and a TS alternative which are optimal from a firm-wide point of
view. From the overall solution the CR and internal-TS portions of each
division, denoted by anpt and bnpt respectively, can be derived.
As an intermediate step, we will analyse the overall solution for a
situation with omission of the CR constraints, as if each CR is avai-
lable in unlimited amounts. Subsequently, we turn to the general case in
which each CR-type is available in limited amounts. Two useful theorems
are presented. The formal proof is provided in Appendix E because it is
rather technical. The result will be explained from an economic point of
view.
6.2.1. The case with common resources in excess supply
Suppose CR is available in unlimited amounts. In these circumstances the
CR constraints can be omitted from the MIP problem. The resulting formu-
lation does not differ essentially from the MIP model as presented at
the end of chapter two, i.e. problem (2.8). We will now compare problem
(2.8) and problem (6.1) ignoring the CR constraints, and show that both
problems must have optimal solutions of the same character.
The first difference between the two MIP models is that in table 6.1
products with directly interrelated production processes are grouped in
divisions. So in comparison with (2.8) rows and columns are simply put
in a specific order, which, in turn, does not affect the feasibílity or
even the optimality of the solutions. The other difference is the occur
rence of a few additional constraints, namely b~ - W6 t 0, in problem
(6.1). These constraints together wíth the non-negativity conditions
b~,b1,...,bN ~ 0 rather guarantee that each division buys its external
TS on its own, than affect choice of techniques, amounts of sold pro-
ducts or make-or-buy decisions. As a result, the following theorem is
valid:
Theorem 6.1:
If the MIP problem as presented in table 6.1 with omission of the CR
constraints has an optimum, then an optimal solution exists with the
following properties:
1. For each product that is produced exactly one technique is applied.
2. Products are either sold maximally or not sold at all.
3. Each TS-type that is required is either produced internally or bought
externally.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Jus[ as in section 2.5, the variable part of the TS costs, given a par
ticular TS alternative, can be regarded as direct costs. Given the (mod-
ified) direct costs of each of the production techniques, a pure tech-
nology alternative exists that can realize every final output at minimal
costs. The per-unit redistributed variable costs given this technology
alternative must be compared with the sales prices in order to determine
which market products are 'profitable' and which are not, given the TS
alternative. Of course, profitable products should be sold as many as
possible, whereas unprofitable products should not be sold at all.
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6.2.2. The case with common resources in limited supply
Now we turn to the case in which each of the CR is available in limited
amounts. Contrary to the previous case, in which all CR was in excess
supply, it is possible that products are sold on the outside market but
below the outside demand level. Furthermore, an overall solution may
exist that uses two or more techniques for a particular product. Ho~r
ever, there are no overall solutions in which some TS-type is produced
internally but also additionally bought from outside the company. We
will first provide an economic clarification concerning the conjectures
just mentioned.
Consider again the case without CR and suppose that there is a number
of profitable product types given the optimal technology and TS-alterna-
tive. Profitable products should of course be sold as much as possible
and unprofitable product types should not be sold; they only support the
production of other products. The higher the outside demand for profit-
able products, the more of these product types the firm tries to sell.
As a result, the entire production intensity, i.e. the production levels
of profitable and unprofitable products, will increase. Returning to the
situation including CR available in limited amounts, the main observa-
tion is that scarcity of one or more resources may limit the production
level of products. This, in turn, affects the sales levels. So the pre-
sence of production constraints, due to the common use of certain re-
sources, may force the management of the firm to sell profitable pro-
ducts below their outside demand level thereby receiving smaller reve-
nues. However, there is a possibility to avoid these decreased sales
levels.
For each product more than one production technique may exist. When
faced with production volume barríers, the firm could try to apply dif-
ferent techniques for some products in order to reduce CR consumption.
For instance, given the TS alternative of the preceding paragraph, sup-
pose a technology alternative exists that can realize the outside demand
for certain products while using less CR than available and still yield-
ing a positive total profit Palt' ~noting the total net profit of the
case without CR by Porig~ it holds that Palt ~ Porig' In order to im-
prove Palt~ the firm will now mix the corresponding CR-extensive produc-
tion and sales schedule with the original Porig Yielding schedule such
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that the CR are precisely used up. The ultimate profit Pmix will lie
between Palt and Porig~ i'e' Palt c Pmix c Porig~ and for at least one
product type two or more techniques are applied.
Now we present the formal result with respect to mixed techniques and
lowered sales levels. Recall that ~ denotes the number of product typesn
in division n and L denotes the number of CR-types.
Theorem 6.2:
Let dopt be part of an optimal solution to problem (6.1). Assume that
the optimum of the continuous LP problem that is obtained if 6 is taken
equal to dopt is unique. For this optimum:
1. we assume that each TS-type is required while in every dívision every
product is produced;
2. we define un, Bn, SA as follows:
un :- the number of techniques as applied in division n(n-1,...,N);
Bn :- the number of product types in dívision n that are sold but
below the outside demand level, so 0 c Bn c~n ( ~1,...,N);
SA :- the number of CR-types that are not fully used up, so
0 c SA c L.
Then it holds that:
un - ~n ~ 0, n-1,...,N,
N
0 c E ((u
n-1 n
f Bn) z L- SA.
(6.2-a)
(6.2-b)
Furthermore each TS-type is either produced internally or bought extet~
nally.
Proof: The result is proved in Appendix E.
Suppose part of the CR-types are not fully used up so that 0 ~ SA C L
and thus L - SA ~ 0. Then formula ( 6.2-b) implies that, for at least one
n, we have un -~n ~ 0 or Sn ~ 0. In other words, at least one division
exists that applies more than the minimum number of ~ techniques (son
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that for at least one product two or more techniques are applíed), or
that sells at least one of its product below the outside demand level.
So under the stated assumptions we have demonstrated that 'mixing' and~
or 'decreased sales levels' indeed occur. However, the above theorem
does not provide information concerning the number of applied techniques
per product.
6.3. Numerical example
The overall analysis as provided in the preceding sections yields se-
veral formalized general results. For instance Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 sum-
marize general properties concerning mixed techniques, decreased sales
levels and TS alternatives in a more or less formal way. In this section
we will present a numerical example that is meant as an informal clari-
fication of obtained results. The data of the example are not borrowed
from an existing planning problem: we work with a low-dimension instance
of problem (6.1) which has been constructed for the purpose of illustra-
tion.
Description of the example
In terms of the general model of the firm (cf. section 3.5) we have at
hand a fictitious enterprise with two divisions: N-2. Each division pro-
duces two different product types, so ~n - 2(n-1,2). In division 1, the
first product type, i.e. X1 1, can be produced in two alternative ways,~
while the second product type, i.e. X1 2~ has just one single production~
technique: ~1,1 - 2' ~1,2 - 1. Similarly
we have W2~1 - 2, ~2,2 - 1 for
division 2.
For the production in division 1 and 2, CR and TS are required. There
are two CR types: L-2. There are three TS types: M-3. Division 1 asks
for TS1 and TS3, division 2 asks for TS2 and TS3, and TS1, TS2, TS3 also
support each other, if they are produced internally.
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Table 6.3 Overall solutions qiven four different CR-capacity
vectors: total profit, divisional part and TS part
respectively.
type
available l a(l) unlimited ó0 80 80
common 2 a(2) unliaited 80 60 30
resuurces











- DIVIS[ONS n-1 ,2 - -n-1 n~2 nsl n~2 n-l n-2 n~l n-2
produc[ [echnique production
type volume
I zn I(t) 0 0 20 60 0 33.33 0 0
1 2 xn 1(2) 38.82 60 IO 0 36.61 26.67 l5 60
2 I xn 2(1) 43.52 60 34.44 60 41.85 60 25 60
- - product -sales
type Level
1 zn(1) 18 30 13.67 30 16.78 30 4.5 30
2 zn(2) l2 IS l2 15 12 l5 12 IS
TS external
[ype purchase
1 yn(I) 63 0 51.68 0 59.49 0 24.34 0
2 yn(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 yn(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 I3.52 60
TS internal
[ype supply
1 bn(I) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 bn(2) 0 80 0 70 0 74.46 0 80























al[erna[íve 0 1 l 0 I I 0 I 1 0 l 0
interoal z0 0 89.87 98.74 0 79.94 99.15 0 84.39 99.34 0 80 0
produc[ion
exteroal y0 19.92 0 0 18.28 0 0 19.03 0 0 13.36 0 3.)3
purchase
aupply to 60 0 80 95 0 70 95.83 0 74.46 95.83 0 80 0
dív(sions
84
Overall solution for several CR capacities
In table 6.3 the results of solving the MIP example are presented given
four different capacities for CR. First we optimize a version of the MIP
example with omission of the CR constraints, as if CR are available in
unlimited quantities. Note that:
1. xl~l(1) - 0, xl~l(2) ~ 0 so product type X1~1 applies only one tech-
nique (viz. its second technique), and x2 1(1) - 0, x2 1(2) ~ 0 so. .
product type X2~1 applies just one technique.
2. zl -(18,12) - fl, z2 -(30,15) - f2, i.e. all product types are sold
maximally.
3. x0(1) - 0. YO(1) ~ 0. Y1(1) ~ 0 and x0(m) ~ 0, Yp(m) - 0~ Yn(m) - 0
for m-2,3. Hence each TS-type is either produced internally or bought
externally.
Subsequently, the MIP example including the CR constraints is optimized
with three different values of the CR-capacity vector a-(a(1),a(2)).
The results can also be found in table 6.3.
- Case a(1) - 60, a(2) - 80:
In division 1 product type X1~1 is not sold maximally (fl(1) - 13.67 ~
18) and applies both of its two techniques (xl 1(1) ~ 0 xl 1(2) ~ 0),. ' ~
In division 2 product type X2~1 applies only its first technique
(x2~1(1) ~ 0, x2~1(2) - 0). Both CR-types are fully used up.
- Case a(1) - 80, a(2) - 60:
In division 1 product type X1~1 is not sold maximally (fl(1) - 16,78 ~
18). In division 2 product type X2~1 applies both of its two tech-
niques (x2~1(1) ~ 0 and x2~1(2) ~ 0). Both CR-types are fully used up.
- Case a(1) - 80, a(2) - 30:
In division 1 product type X1~1 is not sold maximally (fl(1) - 4.5 ~
18). One CR-type is not fully used up. Note that in comparison with
the two earlier cases TS3 is not produced internally anymore.
Note that in all cases a'pure' TS alternative occurs: each TS type is
either produced internally or bought externally.
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6.4. Establishment of the overall production plan
The overall approach assumes that the firm is directed by one single
decision-maker, the central unit, that has complete information about
the entire company. The central unit utilizes its knowledge on all sub-
units in the firm to compute an overall solution, i.e. an optimal solu-
tion to the MIP problem as presented in table 6.1. This MIP problem for-
mally represents the overall production planning problem the firm is
faced with. In the present section we will describe in which way the
central unit can establísh a production plan according to the computed
overall solution: the overall production plan.
The overall solution can immediately be translated in terms of produc-
tion and sales levels, internally available TS, production techniques
and so on. Hence the central unit could, in principle, establish the
overall plan centrally and simply announce to each division the corres-
ponding production and sales schedules, and the technology alternative
to be applied. But a similar centralized approach clearly overrules the
divisions. Therefore the following two-stage method seems more appro-
priate.
As a first step the central unit computes an overall solution in order
to decide upon the following interrelated problems:
- How many of which TS-types must be produced internally?
- How should internally produced TS be allocated over the divisions?
- How should CR, capacities of which are constant, be allocated over the
divisions?
Secondly, the central unit announces to each division its CR allocation
anpt and its internal-TS allocation bnpt. Here bnpt follows directly
from the overall solution and anpt .- Anxnpt (n-1,...,N).
Every dívision, in turn, determines its own production and sales plan,
including the technology alternatíve to be applied and the amount of TS
to be purchased externally. The whole set of divisional plans is firm-
wide optimal if each division optimally uses its CR and internal-TS por-
tions, i.e. if each division solves its problem
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Maximize - c x - dy f p zn n n n n
s.t. A x t áptn n n
opt
Bnxn - yn ~ bn
(In - Dn)xn - z - 0n
z C f
n n
xn. Yn~ zn ) 0 (6.3)
and then plans to produce, buy and sell according to the optimal values
of xn, yn and zn, respectively.
Now suppose that the optimum to MIP problem (6.1) is uniquely deter
mined. Then the division will ultimately come up with xn, yn, zn that
coincide with this unique overall optimal solution. From section 6.2 we
know that it is possible that, instead of a pure technology alternative,
mixed techniques occur. Secondly, instead of the strict distinction
between profitable product, to be sold maximally, and unprofitable
products, not to be sold at all, there is also a'transient' class of
products which are sold but not maximally. As the divisions will deter-
mine solutions that are overall optimal, the just mentioned properties
of overall solutions will indeed be observed at the local level.
6.5. Incorporation of cost allocation mechanisms
As outlined above, the establishment of the overall production plan
develops in two stages. Firstly, the central unit decides upon the TS to
be produced internally. Secondly, the divisions independently determine
their productíon plans given certain amounts of CR and internal-TS as
allocated by the central unit. Now we describe how a cost allocation
mechanism can be incorporated.
At this point, a clarification concerning the word 'allocation' is in
order. The announcemen[ of CR and internal-TS portions to divisions are
typical examples of an allocation of input factors. On the other hand,
allocation of costs, as extensively discussed in chapter three, refers
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to a setting in which a number of cost objects (e.g, dívisions, pro-
ducts) each bear an appropriate fraction of certain costs. Here we use
the term 'allocation' in both senses.
6.5.1. The allocation of internal-TS costs
As part of the overall solution the central unit has found optimal make-
or-buy decisions. Some TS-types are to be produced and supplied inter-
nally, the other TS-types are to be bought externally. In section 3.3.2
we argued that it is reasonable to allocate the costs of internally pro-
duced TS to users of that service. In brief, allocating costs of inter-
nal TS may stimulate prudent usage, while the TS producing departments
will be required [o operate efficiently and to satisfy the demands of
the users. In this section it is supposed that the central unit has al-
ready determined the TS-types to be produced internally and also the
amounts of internal TS are to be allocated to the divisions. Now the
idea is to announce the portions of internal TS to each of the divisions
together with a per-unit price for these internally supplied services.
Below we describe the compu[ation of this price.
Recall that as soon as two or more TS-types are produced internally
these services may also deliver to each other. Thereby the computation
of the correct price to be charged to the users is complicated. However,
in these circumstances the reciprocal allocation method (see section
3.3.2) can be fruitfully applied. Being originally introduced and clari-
fied for a situation in which all TS-types are produced internally, the
method is easily adapted to the present circumstances, with only a sub-
set of TS-types internally produced and supplied.
We now give the formulas that summarize the (modified) reciprocal allo-
cation method. Suppose we have at hand x~pt, y~pt and dopt ( as elements
of an overall solution). From Theorem 6.2 we know that x~pt(m) ~ 0 and
opty~ (m) ~ 0 do not occur simultaneously, m-1,...,M. Here M denotes the
number of TS-types. For notational convenience we assume that for each m
x~pt(m) f y~pt(m) ~ 0. The diagonal matrix diag[x~pt;y0pt~
inverse diag 1[x~pt; y~ptj are defined as follows:
and its
diag[Xpt~Yopt~ .- xopt(m) t yopt(m), m-1,...,M (6.4)0 0 mm 0 0
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dia8 1[x~pt.Y~pt)~ :- (x~pt(m) f Y~pt(m))-1. m~1,...,M (6.5)
Let Copt and copt be the (row) vectors of fixed costs and per-unit
direct costs, i.e. (m-1,...,M)
Copt(m) :- C(m) dopt(m)~
copt(m) :- c(m) óopt(m) t d(m)(1-dopt(m)) (6.6)
The input-output matrix of optimal TS alternative dopt is denoted by
D~pt; its columns are given by
(DCpt)~m :- (DD)~m dopt(m)~ m-1,...,M. (6.7)
Now we can give the formula for the per-unit redistributed costs, namely
g:~ (~pt f Coptdiag 1[x~pt,Y~pt))(I-D~pt)-1 (6.8)
The components of g are the prices for each TS type. If TSm is bought
externally, it will turn out that g(m) - d(m). If TSm is produced inter-
nally, g(m) is the internal price for this service to be charged to all
users. Now suppose division n obtains an amount bnpt(m) of internal TSm.
By charging price g(m), the central unit allocates a cost equal to g(m)
times bopt(m) to division n.n
In this way all redistributed costs of TSm are allocated with con-
sumption of TSm as the allocation basis.
6.5.2. Common cost allocation
The second class of costs to be allocated are the costs of the sector
general services (GS). The GS sector performs activities from which the
firm as a whole benefits. The incurred costs are therefore called 'com-
mon costs'. Similar to internally produced TS, the outpu[ of the GS sec-
tor is not delivered to the outside market, so that the common costs
have to be allocated. However, the common costs are entirely fixed and,
in the short run, it is impossible to measure each subunit's benefit
from GS activities. Hence, lacking any natural allocation basis, any
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mechanism for common cost allocation will suffer from a certain degree
of arbitrariness. As a minimum requirement, the common costs must be
allocated without provoking suboptimal decisions. In this book, focusing
on planning in a general divisionalized enterprise, this requirement i~
plies that some allocation mechanism for common costs must not distort
the overall production plan.
The planning problem we are dealing with is formally represented by a
MIP problem. But if one fixes the integer variables at their optimal
value a continuous LP problem is obtained. As discussed in section
3.3.3, Kaplan and Thompson (1971) addressed the problem of allocating a
fixed cost in the context of an LP model of the firm. In this section we
will demonstrate how that cost allocation method can be adapted to our
MIP formulation of the planning problem.
Recall that two pieces of information were required for applying the LP
based cost allocation method as introduced in section 3.3.3. Firstly,
one has to know the shadow price for (a subset of) the resources needed
in the production process. Secondly, the available amounts of these re-
sources must be known and then multiplied by the shadow price vector.
This multiplication yields the valuation of the considered resources and
is required to be larger than the costs to be allocated.
Returning to our planning problem, suppose that the central unit has
announced to each division its CR allocation anpt and ínternal-TS allo-
cation bopt. In section 6.3 we explained that the divisions can deter-n
mine production plans which are firm-wide optimal by solving problems
(6.2), n-1,...,N. In addition the central unit will now ask each divi-
sion to report its periunit valuation of allocated CR. Formally, an op-
timal dual variable nnpt associated with constraint Anxn G anpt is re-
quired. All divisional responses together yield a valuation V(a) :-
N ~
~lnnptanpt of the total CR capacity.
Now let the common costs be equal to H and suppose they are smaller
than the total valuation of CR, i.e. H t V(a). Then the fraction h
defined as h:- H~V(a) is smaller than 1. Secondly, let popt be the op-n
timal solution value to (6.3), i.e. popt is the contribution to then
profit by division n. If each division solves the problem
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n n ~ an
B x - optn n yn ~ bn




then the originally optimal xn, yn, zn (i.e, optimal to (6.3)) are again
optimal and the optimal solution value is Pnpt - hnnptanpt. Hence the
overall production plan is maintained and the divisíons together realize
N N
a contribution to profit equal to E(Pnpt - hnnptan) - E Pnpt - H. But
n-1 n-1this means that the sum of the original profit contributions is main-
tained while a cost equal to H is allocated.
6.6. Summary
The planning problem related to our general model of the firm was
analysed from an overall point of view. Hence organizational aspects
were neglected and the central unit was assumed to have full informa-
tion. In these circumstances the central unit can immediately compute an
overall solution. However, the divisions participated actívely in the
elaboration of the overall production plan, i.e. a production plan ac-
cording to the overall solution as computed by the central unit.
Finally, we saw that it is possible to allocate common costs and in-
ternal-TS costs without distortion of the overall production plan. In
particular, certain properties of the overall solution (e.g, simulta-




MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL OF THE FIRM
7.1. Introduction
This chapter embodies our contribution to the theory on multilevel deci-
sions in a general, decentralized enterprise. We will investigate the
model of the firm within the conceptual framework for multilevel plan-
ning as introduced in chapter four. So the model will be studied with
explicit attention for organizational features, in particular the issue
of localized information.
We will start with a review of multilevel features as included in our
model of the firm (section 7.2). Then we will propose a planning proce-
dure in which the central unit and the divisions exchange information in
their search for techniques and make-or-buy decisions that are desired
for the company as a whole (section 7.3). Costs will be allocated care-
fully. As cost allocations should not distort the firm-wide optimum,
their incorporation in the planning process should, at least, not damage
the information exchange in the firm (section 7.4).
In earlier work (Meijboom (1986)), we proposed a similar planning pro-
cedure including cost allocations. The present chapter provides more
insight into the divisional contribution to the planning process.
Secondly, we propose an improved method for common cost allocation.
7.2. The multilevel approach for decentralized firms
Here we briefly review the general model of the firm, in particular the
proposed organizational structure. First of all, we repeat the main ar-
gianents why a multilevel scope cannot be left out from the present econ-
omic context.
In every real-world company of a reasonable size a certain degree of
decentralization has taken place. A number of product divisions and ser-
vice departments exist and the information to make decisions is díspers-
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ed among these subunits. Thus many existing firms consist of more or
less independently acting subunits to be coordinated by a central unit
at a higher organizational level. The central unit gathers information
from subunits before the final plan can be established and allocates
costs during this planning process.
With this view of the reality of decentralized companies, we developed a
model of the firm along the following lines. See also figure 7.1.
The divisions in the firm produce the commodities that can be sold on
the external market. For each of these market products more than one
technique may be available. The divisions operate relatively indepen-
dently of each other and are viewed as profit centres. They are connect-
ed through the joint use of internally produced technical services (TS).
Secondly, the divisíons share a nimmber of facilities and materials re-
ferred to as common resources (CR).
Apart from production supported by TS the firm has a sector general
services (GS). The GS departments produce common goods from which the
firm as a whole benefits. These activities result in common costs.
The central unit of the firm ís responsible for the total net profit,
i.e. the sum of divisional profits minus internal-TS costs and common
costs. Furthermore, the output of TS and GS departments is not sold out-
side the firm, so the central unit must allocate the internal-TS costs
and the common costs.
As a natural consequence of specialization and localization of infox~
mation, we suppose the following two-level organizational structure. At
the lower level, there are the divisions. Each of them possesses speci-
fic knowledge with respect to its techniques, market restrictions etc.,
not known to other subunits. At the top level, there is the central
unit, which decides whether to make or to buy technical services, which
coordinates the distribution of CR and internal TS, and allocates costs,
namely internal-TS costs and common costs. The crucial difficulty for
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Figure 7.1: Organízational structure
The overall planning problem the firm is faced with consists of two
parts, namely:
1. The problem of determining firarwide optimal production techniques
and make-or-buy decisions without overconsumption of the common re-
sources. This problem is formally represented by MIP problem (3.6) in
table 3.1.
2. The problem of allocating common costs and the costs of producing TS
internally.
Because of its incomplete information about the divisions, the central
unit cannot formulate and solve a fully specified version of the MIP
problem. Firstly the central unit has to resolve its problem of lack of
information with respect to the divisions in the firm. To this end it
initiates a decomposition-based planning procedure. Such a procedure
embodies a sequence of planning sessions during which the central unít
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phase in the decision-making process is thus devoted to the planning
sessions of this procedure. At the end of the planning phase the central
unit has collected sufficient information to establish a final plan and
to allocate costs.
7.3. Proposal for a two-level planning procedure
The planning procedure in which the central unit gathers the necessary
ínformation to solve the planning problem will now be presented. We do
not consider cost allocation mechanisms yet; this issue ís treated in
the next section.
As a start we slightly modify the MIP problem according to table 7.2.
This reformulated equivalent problem formulation shows that the central
unit is dealing with the following three interrelated problems:
- How much of which TS-types must be produced internally?
- How should the internally produced TS be allocated over the divisions?
- How should the CR, the capacities of which are constant, be allocated
over the divisions?
The decision variables associated to these problems are {x~, y0, b~, d},
{b1,...,bN} and {a1,...,aN} respectively. Throughout this chapter we
assume that problem (7.1) has an optimal solution with finite solution
value.
The planning procedure as described in section 4.4 can also be applied
if a subset of the variables is not continuous (e.g. integer variables)
provided they occur in the central unit's part of the decomposed prob-
lem. In the present situation there are 0-1 variables (vector d) due to
occurrence of make-or-buy decisions including fixed cost components.
Therefore we propose a resource-directive procedure in which (tentative)
decisions concerning 6, i.e. concerning TS alternatives, are not 'dele-
gated' to the divisions. In each planning session the central unit con-
fronts the divisions with tentative amounts of CR and internally avail-
able TS. The divisions, in turn, respond with per-unit valuations for
the allocated resources and services. In section 7.3.2 we will investi-
gate in more detail how each intermediate allocation of CR and TS
affects the tentative divisional activity plans. Subsequently, we will
analyse the information contents of the data as exchanged between top
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level and lower level (section 7.3.3). We start with an introductory
description of the proposed planning procedure.
7.3.1. Outline of the planning procedure
Based on the current divisional information as available at the top
level, tentative amounts of CR and internal TS, an and bn respectively,
are computed. At the same time, estimates pk for the divisional profitsn
given ak and bk are determined. Here k denotes the current planning ses-n n
sion. Subse uentl ~kq y, each division is asked to compute its profit Pn
given an and bn. Formally, each division solves




and Pn is the optimal solution value of problem (7.2).
The estimates Pn as computed by the central unit are optimistic: the
actual divisional profits Pk will not exceed these estimates: pk c pkn n nfor all n. Optimality of the current Pn, an, bn is now tested by check-
ing whether pk c pk for all n. If this is so, the latest allocations
-k k n nan, bn of CR and internal TS and the associated profit estimates Pn are
optimal for the firm as a whole and the procedure is terminated. Other-
wise, if at least one estimate of dívisional profit exceeds the actual
profit of that division, the
-k -k
central unit will ask the division's
unit valuations of a and b. Formally, then n
nn and pn associated with the divisional CR
constrain[s Bnxn - yn c bn respectively








valuations contain sufficient information for the central unit
A x c akn n n
B x - kn n yn c bn
(In - Dn)xn - zn - 0
z c fn n
improved profit estimates in the next planning session. The procedure is
terminated as soon as the central unit has gathered sufficient informa-
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tion to determine company-wide optimal allocations of CR and internal
TS. This will occur after a finite n~nnber of planning sessions.
The outline of the planning procedure presented above is very brief
and superficial. See also figure 7.3. In the remainder of this chapter
the gaps will be filled. We will work out several aspects of the proce-
dure and add cost allocation mechanisms, thus building up the complete
description of the planning process in our two-level divisionalized com-
pany. We continue with a further analysis of the divisional contribution
to the planning procedure.
CENTRAL
UNIT
{an, bn} I I {Pn, ~rn, pn}
DIVISION
n
Figure 7.3: Information exchange in k-th planning session.
7.3.2. Intermediate divisional activity plans
In this section the divisional plans and calculations as occurríng durL
ing the planning sessions will be analysed. Recall that each division is
repeatedly asked to solve problem (7.2). For the planning procedure to
succeed, it is sufficient if each division reports its profit and per-
unit valuation of each CR type and TS type to the central unit. However,
from a model-building point of view, a few more questions should be
answered. For instance, how many techniques are involved in the n-th
division if it optimally utilizes the allocated resources and services?
The purpose of this section is to investigate the primal solution to
problem (7.2) in more detaíl. As the related decision varíables xn, Yn,
zn represent the n-th division's planned production, purchase and sales,
it is reasonable to call the primal solution to (7.2) the divisional
activity plan.
In general, the tentative allocations of CR and internal TS will lead to
divisional activity plans in which for some product types more than one
technique is involved. Or, certain product types occur that are supplied
to the outside market, but below the outside demand level. To understand
this, consider the hypothetical situation in which a division can ignore
the CR and TS constraints, for instance because the division at hand
does not require any CR or TS. Then the division's remaining problem is
to find a technology alternative by which it can maximize its individual
profit. From chapter two, in particular from the analysis related to
problems (2.2) and (2.3), we know that some profit maximizing production
schedule always exists that applies not more than one technique per
product. Secondly, the profitable products are sold maximally, the un-
profitable products are not sold at all.
However, the CR constraints are not redundant. This means: the divi-
sion may well be allocated CR portions that set a limit to the produc-
tion intensities and thus to the sales levels, given the original profit
maximizing (and pure) technology alternative as introduced in the prece-
ding paragraph. In order to cope with the CR shortage, the division
could lower the production and sales levels of certain product types. An
alternative would be to mix the original pure technology alternative
with another technology alternative that uses less CR than the original
one. Then at least one product applies more than one technique.
Of course, the allocation of internal TS to divisions in limited
amounts could similarly yield 'mixed techniques' and~or 'decreased sales
levels'. But a third way exists for TS to overcome shortages, namely
additional external purchase of services. From an overall point of view,
i.e. considering the firm as a whole, we saw that each TS-type is either
produced internally or bought externally (cf. chapter six, section 6.3).
However, during the planning procedure the tentative allocation of in-
ternal TS could tempt that division to plan additional external purchase
of these services.
Altogether, when faced with some intermediate allocation of CR and
internal TS, a division has several options to resolve eventual short-
ages of these input factors, briefly speaking 'mixed techniques', 'de-
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creased sales levels' and 'external TS purchase'. We now present a theo-
rem concerning the number of applied techniques, the ninnber of product
types with decreased sales levels and the number of TS-types that are
internally supplied to some division and planned to be additionally
bought from outside the firm by that division.
As a matter of fact, the theorem below states a property of optimal ba-
sic solutions to a modified but equivalent version of problem (7,2).
It is ass~ed that we are considering a division that faces a positive
outside demand for each of its product types, i.e. fn ~ 0. It requires
all CR-types and is therefore allocated tentative CR portions each of
which is positive. Furthermore, from the TS constraints Bnxn - Yn ~ bn
we omit the rows the ríght-hand side of which (i.e. bk(m) for some m) aren
equal to zero. The remaining constraints, denoted by Bnxn - yn s bn'
are concerned with TS-types that are indeed supplied to the division:
bk ~ 0. If additional amounts of these TS-types are still (planned ton
be) bought externally, the associated costs are dy. The TS-types that
were not internally supplied at all have to be bought entirely from out-
side the firm. The associated costs are assumed to be accounted for in
the direct costs of production and we wríte c x instead of cnxn.n n
The modified formulation of the divisional planning problem is thus:
Maximize - cnxn - dYn } pnzn
s,t. Anxn









and an ~ 0, bn ~ 0, fn ~ 0. Recall that 4n denotes the number of product
types of division n and that there are L different CR-types. We have:
Theorem 7.1
Consider an optimal basic solution to problem (7.3)
fn ~ 0. For this solution:
with an ~ 0, bn ~ 0,
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1. we assume that for each product at least one technique is applied;
2, we defíne un, Sn, SAn, SBn, an and 6n as follows:
kpn .- the number of applied techniques, so un ~~n'
Sk
n .- the number of product types that
side demand level, so 0 c Sn G~n'






0 c SAn c L;
.- the dimension of bk~ i.e, then
are sold but below the out-
nwnber of TS-types that are in-
ternally supplied to division n;
.- the number of TS-types that are
fully used up, so 0 c SBk c Mk;n n
.- the number of TS-types that are
bought from outside the firm, so
.- the number of basic zeros.
Now it holds that:
on t SBn c Mn,
internally supplied but not
internally supplied and also
0 c an c Mn;
(Vk - ~ ) f Bk t ak - (L - SAk) f (Mk - SBk) - Okn n n n n n n n
Proof: See Appendix F.
(7.4-a)
(7.4-b)
Símilar to Theorem 6.2, this result does not give an economic explana-
tion for mixing, decreased sales levels or external TS purchase. It is a
statement of necessary conditions concerning divisional activity plans
as occurring during the planning procedure. If we assume, i n addition,
knon-degeneracy of the considered basic optimal solution ( i.e. On - 0),
we see that the more CR-types and internal-TS types are fully used up,
the larger the number L- SAn f Mn - SBn, so the more mixing, decreased
sales levels and~or additional external TS purchase must be noticed. A
further comparison of Theorems 6.2 and 7.1 yields the following in-
teresting difference: at intermediate instances i n the planning process,
additional external purchase of some internally supplied TS-type may
well occur. Furthermore, the sum of the right-hand sides of ( 7.4-b) over
all divisions counts the total amount of mixing, decreased sales levels
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and external TS purchase and can be much larger than in the optimal
situation.
7.3.3. The information contents of exchanged data
In the previous section we focused on the details of intermediate divi-
sional activity plans in response on tentative allocations of CR and
internal TS. However, for the planning procedure to succeed, typically
aggregated, so less detailed data can be submitted to the central unit.
In the present section we further analyse the information contents of
data as exchanged in the planning procedure. The analysis is centred
around the following two questions:
- What concrete information can the central unit derive from the data
collected up to 'now', i.e. at some intermediate instance within the
planning phase?
- In which respect does the central unit enlarge its knowledge on the
divisions in subsequent planning steps?
As noted before, the central unit has incomplete information with re-
spect to the divisions. Hence it cannot solve the overall planning prob-
lem independently. Instead the divisions are asked to solve their part
of the planning problem a number of times, given various, fixed CR and
TS portions an and bn respectively. In this way the central unit gathers
information concerning each division's profit as a function of allocated
CR and TS. These profit functions will be denoted by Pn(an,bn) with
an,bn as usual (c~1,...,N). Below we introduce a reformulated version of
the overall planning problem in tertns of Pn(an,bn) (n-1,...,N). Then we
will clarify the ínformation gathering process as occurring during the
planning procedure.
Define the TS-production domain V by
V:- {(x0,y0,b0,d) ~(I - DO)x0 -F y0 - b0 - 0; x0 - Wd C 0;
b0 - Wó c 0; x0, y0, b0 ~ 0; d 0-1 vector} (7.5)
and the divisional profit functions Pn(an,bn) (n-1,...,N) by
1t~ÍL
Pn(an,bn) :- Max {-c x - dy f p z I A x t a ; B x- y t b ;n n n n n n n n n n n n
(In - Dn)xn - zn - 0; zn t fn; xn, yn, zn ~ 0} (7.6)
The overall planning problem can be written as:
N
Maximize (- cOxD - dyD - Cd f E Pn(an,bn))
n-1
N N
s.t. (x~.YO~b~.d) E ~r E bn - b~ - 0, E an - a.
n-1 n-1
all an, bn ~ 0 (7.7)
The terms cDxD~1- dyD f Cd are the costs of internally supplied TS. For
mulation (7.7) explicitly represents the problem of the central unit of
determining allocations an, bn (n-1,...,N) such that the sum of the
divisional profits minus the internal-TS costs is maximal.
Immediate solution of this problem would be possible if the divisional
profits were known by the central unit for all possible CR and TS al-
locations. Of course, this requirement cannot be met. In the assumed
organizational conditions the central unit has only limited insight into
the production and sales opportunities of each division. Hence the cen-
tral unit cannot fully know profit functions Pn(an,bn) (n-1,...,N).
The purpose of the planning procedure is to generate information on the
basis of which the functions Pn(an,bn) can be approximated. In each sep-
arate planning session divisions report their maximal profit Pn and per-
unit valuations nn, pn of the (tentatively) allocated CR and internal
TS. These data can be used to derive a linear function that approximates
Pn(an,bn) in the following way:
P(a ,b ) c Pk t nk (a - ák }"k k (7.8)n n n n n n n) Pn (bn - bn)' an' bn ~ 0
At an intermedíate instance in the planning procedure, i.e. after a num-
ber of planning sessions, the central unit has generated some linear
approximations of type (7.8) for each division's real (but unknown)
profit function Pn(an,bn). Hence, combining the data as generated up to
this point in the planning process, the central unit can derive piece-
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wise-linear approximations of each of the divisional profit functions
Pn(an,bn).
The central unit computes the CR and internal TS allocations of the
next planning session by solving (7.7) with each Pn(an,bn) replaced by
its approximating function. As these piecewise-linear approximations
majorize the real profit functions (recall inequality (7.8)), the cen-
tral unit obtains an upper bound, i.e. an optimistic 'estimate' of the
total profit. Therefore we say that the partial information concerning
the divisional profit functions is used in an optimistic way.
Subsequent planning sessions yield additional divisional information
and help to improve the piecewise-linear approximating functions. For
the more inequalities of the form (7.8) are known to the central unit,
the better it is able to 'estimate' the divisional profit functions.
Note that the data as reported to the central unit in each separate
planning session have a rather limited information contents. It is the
succession of planning sessions, however, that enables the central unit
to 'build up' improving approximations of divisíonal profit functions.
In section 7.3.2 we investigated the intermediate divisional activity
plans in a rather detailed way, particularly the occurrence of mixing,
decreased sales levels and additional external TS purchase (cf. Theorem
7.1). N~ne of these three options can be foreseen separately; they are
interrelated and follow from the (primal) solution of divisional problem
(7.2). In the planning procedure, however, the central unit is not in-
terested in the complete specifications of planned activities given CR
and TS allocations as calculated in each division. The central unit is
satisfied with information of an essentially less detailed, more aggre-
gated nature namely divisional profits and per-unit valuations of allo-
cated resources and services. What can we say about the meaning of these
valuations?
In section 7.3.2 we argued that in some planning session a shortage of
CR and~or TS is likely to occur in divisions. Hence the per-unit
valuation or shadow price of the corresponding CR or TS constraints in
problem (7.2) seems to be interpretable in terms of these shortages.
However, suppose that a shortage of some CR-type is resolved by mixing
of techniques. In turn, the latter 'reaction' may cause a shortage of
some TS-type to be resolved by additional external purchase. More
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generally, scarcity of CR and TS are interrelated and these mutual
dependencies will ultimately be accounted for in the per-unit valuations
of allocated CR and TS.
7.3.4. Numerical example
The presentation of the planning procedure is of a rather formal and
general nature. Just like in chapter six, matters will be further clari-
fied by means of the numerical example introduced [here.
Recall that in this example we consider a firm with two divisions. The
central unit is faced with make-or-buy decisions for three TS-types and
must allocate two types of CR. Below we describe a simulation of the
planning procedure as outlined earlier. The CR-capacity vector a-
(a(1), a(2)) is taken equal to (80, 60), so the total profit should turn
out to be 33882.13 at the end of the procedure (cf. section 6.3, table
6.3).
Initially (k-1) the central unit proposes not to produce and supply TS
internally, i.e. dk -(0,0,0) (see table 7.?) and all bn(~) - 0(see
table 7.4), and to allocate to each division half of the total CR capac-
ity, i.e. ai(1) - a2(1) - 40 and ai(2) - a2(2) - 30 (see table 7.4).
Having no information at all, the initial estimates by the central unit
of divisional profits are both ~, while no TS costs are incurred (see
table 7.4). Formally, this follows from the initial 'relaxed master
problem' given by
Maximize - cOxO - dy0 - Cd t P1 f P2
s,t. ( x0, Y0, b0, d) E V, bl f b2 - b0 - 0, al f a2 - a,
al. bl~ a2. b2 ~ 0 (7.9)
an optimal solution of which is P1, P2 -~; x0, y0, d, b, b, b - 0;
al - a2 - 0.5a. 0 1 2
Subsequently, the divisions compute their profits Pn, n-1,2, and their
per-unit valuations nn(,)~ pn(,)~ ~1,2, of allocated CR and TS, and
report them to the central unit. See table 7.4. Note for instance that
the per-unit valuation of TS1, by division 1, equals market price d(1)
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(- 165). Indeed, one extra unit of internal TS1 would reduce the ex-
ternal purchase costs of this service with 165 units of money.
As Pi ~ Pi and PZ C PZ the central unit adds constraints of form (7.8)
to problem (7.9), viz.
P1 - 143.49 al(2) - 165 bl(1) - 65 bl(3) c 7333.33, (7.10-a)
P2 - 195 b2(2) - 65 b2(3) c 18721.23 (7.10-b)
and resolves modified problem (7.9): a new planning session starts.
The central unít ultimately finds the total profit for the firm as a
whole in the lOth planning session, i.e. k- 10. The results of this
sequence of 10 planning sessions are listed in table 7.4.
In table 7.4 we have listed the tentative make-or-buy decisions, the
associated costs, the profit estimates for division 1 and 2 and the es-
timate of the total profit Pi t P? - cOx~ - dy~ - Cdk. It is worthwile
to note that the latter estimates, k- 1,2,... form a decreasing se-
quence of upper bounds for the correct (but unknown) total profit. On
-k
the other hand, the estimates of the divisional profit P1 (k-1,2...)
and PZ (k-1,2,...) are not monotonic. See figure 7.5.
The remainder of table 7.4 is concerned with the divisions. Given the
CR and internal-TS allocations ( an(~), bn(~), n-1,2), the divisional
responses (nn(~)' pn(~)' Pn' n-1,2) are listed. The final coltmin nnfn is
merely added for explanatory purposes. Each nkf is actually computed byn n
the central unit to be used as right-hand sides in constraints such as
"k "k "k -k "k k(7.10) (rlnfn - Pn - nn an - pn bn). Note that before reaching
optimality
we have Pk ~ Pk for at least one n. In figure 7.5 this is furthern n
illustrated.
To conclude the niunerical illustration, a few considerations are in
order with respect to (inteitnediate) divisional activity plans. As an
example we have listed the divisional solutions in the fourth planning
session. See table 7.6. Division 1 has lowered the sales level of
product X1 1, viz, zl(1) - 14.60 ~ 18, while one CR-type is not fully~
used up and no external TS is additionally bought. Divísion 2 uses two
techniques for product X2 1 and has lowered the sales level of this~
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Table 7.4 Profit and shadow prices as reported by the divisions












of divislon 1 and 2 ptofit
Pi PZ
1 0 0 0 0 . . m
2 D I I 28951.10 28400.87 53821.23 53271.00
3 0 L 1 28951.10 ISI78.48 66279.52 52506.90
4 0 I l 28951.10 15178.48 63144.67 49372.05
5 1 I I 43800.00 40300.50 51217.10 47711.59
6 1 1 0 40474.59 45904.02 31590.00 43019.43
7 1 1 1 35894.46 33616.66 37590.00 353I2.20
8 0 I 1 17937.45 15178.48 37590.00 3483I.03
9 0 1 1 I82I7.75 I4758.72 37590.00 34130.97
IO 0 1 1 17900.10 14742.64 37040.00 33882.13
TentatSve TS alternatlvea and proflt estimatea as computed by the
central unit in ihe subsequent planning seeslons.
DIVISION 1:
common resources internal-TS supply profi[
given valuation
alloca[ed ahadow allocated shadow allocated ehadow allocated shadow CR~TS marke[
atep CRI price CR2 price TS1 price TS3 prlce portlone restrlction
k ak(1) xk(I) ak(2) xk(2)l 1 1 1 bk(I) pk(I) bk(s) ó(3)1 1 1 1 Pkl qkf1 1
1 40.00 0 30.00 143.49 0 I65 0 65 11637.95 7333.33
2 80.00 0 60.00 0 0 I65 191.67 0 15178.48 15178.48
3 SI.56 0 54.67 0 0 165 0 65 12904.02 12904.02
4 51.56 0 32.83 202.07 0 165 48.23 0 13966.79 1333.33
5 0 1604.67 35.23 0 156.67 0 3I.75 0 0 0
6 31.22 388.63 38.82 22.56 200.00 0 0 65 20343.67 7333.33
7 63.20 0 21.23 469.18 133.30 0 19.13 0 17305.23 7333.33
8 II.72 212.17 45.00 0 0 165 35.00 0 9820.22 7333.33
9 75.00 191.98 36.15 10.09 0 165 33.12 0 14423.09 7333.33
10 76.67 19I.98 36.67 10.09 0 l65 33.05 0 14142.64 7333.33
DIVISION 2:
common reaourcea in[ernal-TS supply profí[
given valuetion
allocated ehadow allocated shadow allocated shadow allocated shadow CR~TS matket
ete CRI price CR2 príce TSI price TS3 price portlone ree[r1c[Lon
k ak(I) xk(1) ak(2) xk(2)2 2 2 2 bk(2) Pk(2) bk(3) ó(3)2 2 2 2 Pk2 qkf k2
1 40.00 0 30.00 0 0 l95 0 65 18721.23 18721.23
2 0 1892.50 0 0 I80 0 0 65 0 0
3 28.44 0 5.33 2099.33 180 0 192.67 0 17279.33 6100
4 28.44 360.89 27.17 655.78 I80 0 143.44 0 34182.68 6100
5 B0.00 0 24.77 0 113.34 0 159.92 0 37590.00 37590.00
6 48.78 43.83 21.18 0 96.76 0 0 65 33198.09 31060.26
7 I6.80 I016.67 38.77 0 67.05 0 89.13 0 23181.38 6099.90
8 68.28 0 15.00 42.08 78.62 195 54.42 65 36958.B1 17458.14
9 45.00 0 23.25 0 74.85 99.2 70.11 0 37078.91 29653.98
IO b3.33 33.00 23.33 0 74.46 0 62.78 0 37040.00 35610.00
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Figure 7.5 Estimated and reported profits during the planning
sessions.
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product, viz. x2~1(1), x2~1(2) ~ 0 and z2(1) - 26.99 ~ 30, while both
CR-types are fully used up and no external TS is additionally bought.
For the two divisions together the total nwnber of decreased sales
levels, mixing and additional external TS purchase is equal to 1 t(ltl)
- 3, while in the optimal situation this number is equal to 2(cf, table
6.3-a).
The second example is concerned with additional external purchase of
internally available TS. To this end we consider the divisional solu-
tions in planning session 8. See table 7,6. Although division 2 is allo-
cated TS2 as well as T53, it buys additional TS2 and TS3 outside the
firm: y2(2), y2(3) ~ 0.
Finally, we present the divisional solutions of the last planning ses-
sion (k-10). See table 7.6 and note the equivalence with table 6.3.
ín[ermedia[e 4[h Sth IOth
dívísional plann ing planning plan ning
ac[ivíty plans sessi on sessi on session
DIVISIONS n-1,2 rn] ~2 crl na2 `rl rn2
product technique productlon
type volwoe
t xn 1(I) 0 53.50 I1.72 0 0 33.33
1 2 xn 1(2) 32.A3 I.69 0 60 36.67 26.67
2 1 xn 2(1) 38.87 56.79 21.15 60 41.85 60
product sales
type level
~ 1 zn(1) 14.60 26.99 3.03 30 16.18 30
2 zn(2) 12.00 15.00 12.00 15 12.00 15
TS external
type purchase
1 yn(1) 53.26 0 20.78 0 59.49 0
'- Yn(2) 0 0 0 1.38 0 0
3 yn(3) 0 0 0 5.58 0 0
uní[s of CR CR
not consumed type
1 19.73 0 0 8.28 0 n
2 0 0 21.56 0 0 0
Table 7.6: Tentative dívisional activíty plans during the planning pro-
cedure.
7.4. Cost allocations durinR [he planninR process
Up to now we have mainly been concerned with the two-level planning
procedure that resolves the central unit problems concerning make-or-buy
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decisions, distributing internally produced TS to the divisions and
coordinating the consumption of CR. This section completes the multi-
level analysis wíth the incorporation of cost allocation mechanisms. In
particular, the costs of producing certain TS-types internally have to
be borne by consumers of these services. Similarly, the common costs,
i.e, the costs incurred in the sector general services (GS), must be
allocated. As in section 6.5, we cannot avoid the use of the word 'allo-
cation' in its two different meanings: allocation of input factors
(namely of CR and internal TS) and allocation of costs (namely costs of
internal TS and common costs).
7.4.1. Allocation of internal-TS costs
We know that there are several good reasons for allocating the internal-
TS costs associated with certain make-oribuy decisions (cf. sections
3.3.2 and 6.6.1). Because of the multilevel circumstances accounted for
in this chapter, the central unit applies a planning procedure to
generate information before decísions can actually be made. This pro-
cedure yields a sequence of temporary, tentative make-or-buy decisions
and the central unit is permanently confronted with costs for internal
TS. Therefore it will allocate these costs during the planning sessions
in order to keep internal-TS consumers cost-conscíous.
Because internal TS departments also deliver services to each other,
costs will be allocated according to the reciprocal allocation method
(cf. sections 3.3.2 and 6.5.1). This implies that in each planning ses-
sion the central unit calculates a per-unit price for each internal TS-
type and announces this price to the divisions together with their
portions of each internal TS-type. The vector of prices is computed
according to the formulas of section 6.5.1 with the only difference that
the superscript 'opt' is replaced by 'k', which indicates the number of
the current planning session. Thus the vector gk of per-unit TS prices
follows from:
gk :- (ck t Ckdiag l~x~: Y~~)(I - D~)-1 (7.10)
Here xp is the total amount of internally produced TS, yp is the amount
of external TS required in the production of x~, and DD is the input-
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output matrix of the TS alternative in the current planning session. The
row vectors ck and Ck contain the associated per`unit direct costs and
fixed costs, respectively.
The allocation of internal-TS costs proceeds as follows. Let gk -
(gk(1),...,gk(M)) be the (row) vector of per-unit prices. Let bn be the
vector of internal TS as allocated to division n. So division n obtains
bn(m) units of internally produced TSm. Now it is charged price gk(m) so
that the division is allocated a cost equal to gk(m)bn(m). The total
costs allocated to division n are
M
E gk(m)bn(m) - gkbn
m-1
(7.11)
However, the division has insight into the composition of the allocated
costs because they are specified per TS-type.
To conclude, we analyse the influence of the incorporated cost alloca-
tion mechanism on the planning procedure. Instead of problem (7.2), each
division now faces the following problem (recall that bn ~ 0)
Maximize - c x - dy f p zn n n n n
gkbk
n
s.t. A x ` akn n n
Bnxn - yn c bn
(In - Dn)xn - zn - 0
z t fn n
xn~ yn~ zn ) 0
which is formally equivalent to




Bnxn - Yn - bn c 0
b - bkn n




xn~yn'zn ~ ~ (7.13)
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The latter problem formally expresses that the division is obliged to
use up the allocated amounts of internal TS while paying a perunit
price for each TS-type. As a result, the pex~unit valuations of the ob-
tained internal TS to be reported to the central unit will turn out to
be lower, namely gk, than the per-unit valuations that would have been
obtained from solving the original divisional problem (7.2), i.e. in
absence of the cost allocation mechanism. The central unit, knowing the
deviation gk, can easily reconstruct the correct pex~unit valuations.
Therefore the cost allocation mechanism does not distort the planning
process.
In summary, internal-TS costs can be fully allocated during the plan-
ning procedure provided each division is obliged to use up its portion
of the internally produced TS.
7.4.2. Common cost allocation
The allocation of i~ternal-TS costs has been accomplished on a basis of
usage and during the process of searching the production plan to be es-
tablished, i.e. the planning sessions of the applied planning procedure.
For common costs, there is no natural allocation basis and common cost
allocation will take place after termination of the planning procedure,
so at the end of the planning phase.
Similar to the 'complete information case' as treated in chapter six, we
propose the application of an LP based cost allocation mechanism. The
method requires the central unit to know shadow prices for CR. Secondly,
the cost allocation method only allocates the common costs fully if they
are smaller than the final valuation of the total CR capacity.
More precisely, let anpt, bnpt (n-1,...,N) be the ultimate firm-wide
optimal divisional portions of CR and internal TS respectively, as ob-
tained at the end of the planning procedure. In other words, anpt and
bopt are the CR and internal-TS allocations in the planning sessionn
that, subsequently, appeared to be the final planning session. Consider
the divisional problem:
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Maximize - c x - dy f p z - goptboptn n n n n n
s.t. Anxn
B x -n n yn
(In - Dn)xn




z c fn n
(7.14)
where gopt is the vector of per~unit TS príces in this final planning
session (cf, section 7.4.1.). Let xnpt, ynpt, znpt denote an optimal
solution to (7.14) with solution value pnpt- goptbnpt. This final
divisional activity plan is also firm-wide optimal, as the division is
allocated firm-wide optimal CR and TS portions. Furthermore, let nnpt
denote the per-unit valuation of allocated CR (formally, an optimal dual
variable associated with constraint Anxn c anpt). Now nnpt, n-1,...,N,
which are reported by the divisions in the final planning session, can
be used to allocate common costs as follows.
N
Let H denote the common costs, let V(a) :- H c E noptaopt and suppose
n nn-1
H c V(a). Then fraction h defined by h:- H~V(a) is smaller than 1. If
division n is charged for consuming CR with a price equal to hnopt, then
original final activity plan remains optimal. Formally, if each division
solves the modified problem:
Maximize - (c fhnoptA )x - dy ~- p z - goptboptn n n n n n n n
s.t. c aopt
Anxn n
Bnxn - yn G bnpt
(In - Dn)xn - zn - 0
z c fn n
xn,Yn,zn ~ o (7.15)
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then xnpt, ynpt, znpt is an optimal solution to (7.15) with solution
value Popt - gPtbopt -
h~optaopt~ The s~ of these perturbed divisional
n n n n
t tN
profits is equal to E(pnPt - gop bnp )- H. In other words, common
n-1
costs H are allocated without distortion of total net profit
E (popt - goptbopt) - H.n n
n-1
Common costs are thus allocated on the basis of the responses (nopt) onn
the CR portions (aopt), because these portions do not change anymoren
after termination of the procedure. Common costs cannot be allocated at
any earlier point in the procedure, for CR portions as well as per-unit
valuations change during the sessions of the planning procedure. For
this reason, common costs are allocated at the end of the planning
procedure, instead of during the procedure.
The proposed allocation methods can be applied to the numerical example
as discussed in section 7.3.4.
The final price gopt for TS appeared to be (cf. formula (7.10)):
1 0.169 0.067
gopt -(165, 40 f 7000~84.39, 24 t 2000~99.34) 0 1.004 0.100
0 0.042 1.004
- (165, 122.95, 44.13)
The final portions and valuations of CR, i.e. anpt, nnpt, n-1,2, were
(cf, table 7.4):
aipt - (36.67, 36.67),
aZpt - (43.33, 23.33),
:ript - (191.98, 10.09)
,r2pt - ( 33.00, 0)
so that V(a) - 8839.80. Suppose a common cost equal to 5000 has to be
allocated. Now h- 0.566, and indeed the sum of the divisional profits
is 5000 lower than in a situation with no common cost allocation.
iI4
7.5. Summary
On the basis of our general model of the firm we have investigated how
to handle informational decentralization, being an important issue in
two-level, divisionalized enterprises. The planning problem the central
unit is faced with has been resolved by a resource-directive planning
procedure. During the planning sessions information exchange has taken
place between the central unit and the divisions in order to determine
the portions of CR and internal TS of each division.
We have analysed intermediate divisíonal activity plans and, recalling
the results of chapter six, compared them with the ultimate firm-wide
situation. Furthermore attention was paid to the information contents of
data as exchanged during the planning process.
The costs of internal production of TS can be allocated during the
planning sessions. Common costs can be allocated at the end of the
planníng procedure. These final conclusions complete the multilevel




8.1. Review of the text
In the introductory chapter of this book we started with an informal
description of a general decentralized enterprise. We noted that the top
management is faced with complex planning problems while having incom-
plete information about subunits at the lower level in the organization.
We then formulated the aim of the book and discussed related contribu-
tions to the literature. In this section we will summarize how we
achieved the three goals in terms of which the aim of the book was ex-
pressed.
The first goal was to design a general model of the firm. The technolo-
gical part was considered in chapter two in which we generalized the
input-output model of the firm. Products were allowed to have more than
one production technique. Secondly, we accounted for make-or-buy de-
cisions with respect to technical services. Formally, the input-output
framework was transformed into a MIP formulation by an integral repre-
sentation of all technology and TS alternatives.
In chapter three we treated an important financial issue, namely cost
allocation. The costs incurred in GS and TS departments have to be allo-
cated, as these subunits do not supply to the outside market. We argued
that cost allocations can affect managerial behaviour and thus play a
role in multilevel decision-making. We concluded the chapter with the
incorporation of several organizational features and the statement of
the overall planning problem the firm is faced with.
The second goal was to obtain insight into the concept of multilevel
planning. This was achieved by analysing decomposition-based planning
procedures. Analogous to price and budget directed planning in existing
organizations we presented one price and one resource directive planning
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procedure, based on the decomposition methods of Dantzig-Wolfe and
Benders respectively.
The procedures can be adapted to various forms of informational decen-
tralization. But decision-making authority is almost never decentral-
ized: final decisions are made at the higher level in the organization.
In chapter five more sophisticated procedures were treated. We mixed
price and resource directive characteristics. Special attention was paid
to the way the central unit updates tentative prices and resource allo-
cations. In this way we provided a theoretical basis for the simul-
taneous application of prices and budgets as observed in existing orga-
nizations.
In simmmary, we consciously built up the model of a two-level, divi-
sionalized enterprise and then analysed decomposition-based planning
procedures. The third goal of our work was to interpret the effects of
such procedures in terms of the general model of the firm. Before this
was accomplished, we investigated the planning problem of the firm from
an overall point of view, i.e. not taking into account multilevel orga-
nizational features. The obtained provisional insight into the relation-
ships between technology and TS alternatives functioned as a reference
point when we subsequently decomposed the overall planning problem ac-
cording to the underlying organization structure. In the latter ap-
proach, the central unit in the company deals with aggregated informa-
tion on the divisions. During the planning process more alternatives are
considered than ultimately applied in the final activity plans. However,
the total amount of information processing is probably less than in the
case of an overall solution approach.
8.2. Evaluation of the results
The main characteristic of the present book is its theoretical nature.
We did not investigate a concrete practical problem existing in and
borrowed from the real-world. Instead a general, theoretical basis for
certain phenomena as observed in (particular areas in) reality was
developed.
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We have worked with mathematical techniques and model formulations
which are not too advanced and which have límited complexity. For this
reason the development as well as the final statement of results can be
well understood. In this context we mention the ass~ption of linearity
as used in the input-output and the mathematical programming models.
Linearity is a most convenient and familiar way of thinking, not only in
different theories but also in many practical rules of thumb.
The theoretical nature of the study can be further illustrated along
the lines of our general model of the firm. We speak of a'general'
model, because several ideas on decision-making in a divisionalized en-
terprise are represented in a general, formal manner. Subsequently, the
model of the firm functions as the basic economic framework or context.
The final, overall planning problem, i.e. problem (3.6), is clearly an
abstraction of reality. Nevertheless, it is impossible to be completely
general: no model can integrate all relevant theories and still be easy
to understand; no model can capture the integral reality of any multi-
level enterprise.
At this point we wish to discuss the limitations of the theoretical re-
search in more detail.
At first glance, one could be tempted to group the restrictions of the
study into two separate classes, namely tool-oriented and problem-
oriented restrictions. In this book tool-oriented limitations would
refer to the particular choice of mathematical techniques and formula-
tions (linearity, static and deterministic problems, one-dimensional
objective functions). Problem-oriented restrictions are concerned with
the chosen problem statement: they define or at least indicate boun-
daries of the problem field (informational decentralization, planning
problems, two-level organizational structure). However, tool-oriented
and problem-oriented restrictions are often interrelated. Therefore we
now review the bounds between which problems have been investigated
combined with the technical restrictions as implied or allowed by the
research scope.
After having developed the general model of the firm, we focused our
attention on the planning problem of the firm. In other words, one spec-
ific phase in the multilevel decision-making process was considered: the
planning phase. We had at hand a relatively short-run planning problem,
1lR
so that the problem formulations were static and deterministic. Further-
more we dealt mainly with informational decentralization, being an es-
sential characteristic of planning in multilevel organizations. However,
if subsequent stages ín the decision-making process, such as implementa-
tion and control, would be considered, more dimensions of decentralíza-
tion would 'inevitably' be noticed.
Secondly, we aimed at obtaining conceptual understanding of planning
by prices and budgets. We provided a theoretical framework for coordina-
tion by transfer pricing and budgeting as observed in real-world organi-
zations, particularly in divisionalized enterprises. As we wanted quali-
tative rather than quantitative insight, we could simply use linear
models. The restriction to organizational structures with only two hier-
archical levels is also a consequence of the theoretical nature of the
study.
A more restrictive assumption is the assumption of 'harmony': central
unit and dívisional managers agree on the goal of the firm as a whole
and there is no conflict of interests. Therefore it was reasonable to
expect that every subunit contributes to the planning procedures as
expected (e.g. reliable reporting of divisional profits, shadow prices
and other data required by the central unit). The second consequence is
that the ultimate decisions as made upon termination of the planning
phase can be performed by the central unit. From a tool-oriented view-
point the harmony assumption allowed the application of one-dimensional
objective functions.
Although we presented a theoretical study, including several limitations
of the research scope, the applied models and obtained results are prob-
ably reasonable descriptions, approximations of the real-world. Es-
pecially with respect to cost allocation, reality was approached quite
closely. Indeed, cost allocation problems exist in organizations. A dis-
tinction between joint (or common) costs and costs of internally sup-
plied technical services is most desirable. The linkage with coordina-
tion issues is obvious. We experienced that the incorporation of cost
allocation mechanisms must be accomplished carefully. This explains why
cost allocation is usually a problem in existing organizations.
The multilevel analysis of the model of the firm (cf, chapter seven)
indicates that in the presence of make-or-buy decisions including avoid-
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able fixed costs, a resource-directive system has to be applied. It
seems very difficult to coordinate through prices when fixed costs have
to be taken into account.
A third implication of our work is that the importance of information
in planning situations is stressed and clarified. In our set-up the cen-
tral unit has almost no information at the beginning of the planning
phase. We have seen how the subsequent planning sessions enable the cen-
tral unit to build up its information. It is reasonable to expect a
somewhat richer description if a priori information is taken into
account, i.e. the information the central unit possesses at the start of
the planning procedure.
Within the context of our general model of the firm, which captures
several realistic features, the study completely describes two-level
planning in the presence of informational decentralization. Nevertheless
the theory on multilevel decisions is extensive. The present book hopes
to contribute to the exploration of this wide and challenging problem
area.
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APPENDIX A: appendix to CHAPTER TWO
In sections 2.3 and 2.4, we ended up with an LP and a MIP model of the
fírm, respectively. Furthermore, a number of properties of the formal
models were discussed. This appendix is devoted to the formal proofs of
the conjectured properties.
Consider problem (2.2), i.e.
Minimize cprod xprod




It is required that cprod ~ 0, f~ 0 and D~~
~ 0. Recall that a pure
technology alternative is a technology alternative that applies exactly
one technique per product. Now we have:
Theorem 2.1:
Assume that problem (2.2) is feasible for a certain final demand vector
f that is strictly positive. Now the following conjectures are true:
1. A cost minimizing technology alternative exists that can produce f
while using exactly one technique per product. Moreover, this pure
technology alternative can produce every non-negative final demand at
minimal costs.
2. Let D~ be the square matrix of the intermediate input coefficients





technology alternative at hand. Now:
Matrix (I-D~) is invertible and (I-D~)-1 ~ 0.
,~ ~ ~ -1
v.- c(I-D ) is dual optimal.
~
v is dual optimal for every non-negative final demand.
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Proof:
For a feasible solution x to problem (2.1), it holds that
~~ ~ ~~
E x í~Y) - f f E E D (~) x~(V~) ~ 0,
~r-1 ~ ~ ~-1 ~ 1 ~~
as D~~ ~ 0 and f~ 0. Thus
m
x(~) ~ 0. This means that
~-1,...,~,
for each ~ at least one y~ exists such that
for each product at least one technique is
~
applied. Each basic feasible solution, however, has at most ~ positive
components. Hence it applies exactly one technique per product. The con-
clusion is that every basic feasible solution corresponds to a pure
technology alternative that can produce the final demand. The associated
basis matrix is of the form (I-D). Here D is a square submatrix of D~~,
because exactly one technique per product is applied. Being a basis
matrix, (I-D) is no~rsingular. Moreover, (I-D) x- f with f~ 0 has a
noirnegative solution and from the theory of M-matrices it follows that
(I-D)-1 ~ 0(See Berman and Plemmons (1979, Ch. 6)).
Suppose that for some f~ 0 problem (2.2) is feasible and recall
cprod ~ 0. It is evident that problem (2.2) has a finite optimum: its
feasible region is closed and not empty while its solution value is
bounded from below. One of the basic feasible solutions is optimal. Let
~
(I-D ) be the associated basis matrix. From standard LP theory, it fol-~ ~ ~t -1lows that v.- c(I-D ) is dual optimal.
Now consider (2.2) with an arbritrary final demand f z 0. The equation~ ~
(I-D ) x- f has a solution x, namely x-(I-D )-1 ~`. Thanks to ~) 0~and (I-D )- ~ 0, we have x ~ 0. The vector x is easily extended to a
~ti ~feasible solution of (2.1) with solution value c x. Furthermore v is
still dual feasible as the dual feasible region has not changed, and has
solution value v~f - c~(I-D~)-1 f- c~x. Hence, we have found a primal-
dual pair of solutions that is even optimal and still applies the origi-
~nal pure technology alternative. The vector v is dual optimal for every
non-negative final demand. (End of proof)
In order to relax the assumption that every product faces a positive
outside demand, we state and prove the following lemma:
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Lemma A1:
Consider problem (2.2) with f~ 0, f~ 0. Suppose one has at hand a ba-
sic feasible solution that produces every product, i.e. for each ~
there exists at least one ~ such that x~(~) ~ 0. Then this basic solu-
tion applies exactly one technique per product.
Proof:
Problem (2.2) has ~ rows, so basic feasible solutions do not have more
than ~ positive elements each. But because each product is produced,
feasible solutions have at least ~ positive elements. Hence basic fea-
sible solutions have exactly ~ positive elements and thus apply exactly
one technique per product. (End of proof)
Note that if for some f~ 0 problem (2.2) is feasible, then the assump-
tion as introduced in Lemma A1 holds for every basic feasible solution.
For the more general situation where at least one (but eventually not
every) product faces a positive outside demand, we can state the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem A1:
Assume that problem (2.2) is feasible for a certain non-negative and
non-zero final demand vector. Then a cost-minimizing solution exists
that applies exactly one technique for each product that is actually
produced.
Proof:
The problem at hand has a finite optimum for the same reasons as in the
proof of Theorem 2.1. A cost minimizing solution that applies exactly
one technique for each product actually produced can be determined as
follows. Solve problem (2.2) with the simplex method. This yields an
optimal basic solution. Now two possibilities exist:
1. For each ~ at least one ~ exists such that x~(~,) ~ 0. From Lemma A1
it follows that we have found an optimal solution with the desired
property.
2. At least one m exists such that x~(~) - 0 for all ,~, i .e. some pro-
duct types are not produced at all. Now omit the coefficients and
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variables associated to these products from the problem formulation
and resolve the problem with the simplex method.
The process of solving and modifying the LP problem must be repeated
until one has found a basic optimal solution to the latest version of
(2.2) that obeys the condition as stated in Theorem A1. It can readily
be transformed into an optimal solution of the starting version of (2.2)
and indeed applies exactly one technique for products actually produced.
(End of proof)
We turn to the maximization model (2.3), i.e.
Maximize -cprod xprod } pz
s.t. (I~ - D~~) xprod - z- 0
z C f
xprod' z ~ 0
For this model a result similar to Lemma A1 can be proven.
(2.3)
Lemma A2:
Consider problem (2.3) wíth f~ 0. Suppose one has at hand a basic fea-
sible solution with the property: for each ~ at least one ,~ exists such
that x~(~,) ~ 0. Then for this solution it holds that:
1. For each ~ exactly one ~ exists with x~(~) ~ 0;
2. For each ~ either z~ - 0 or z~ - f~.
Proof:
The basic optimal solution at hand has at least one x~(~,) ~ 0 for each
~, while z~ and the slack variable corresponding to the constraint
z~ t f~ jointly deliver at least one positive element for each ~.
However, basic feasible solutions to (2.3) cannot have more than 2~
positive elements. Now property 1. and 2. easily follow. (End of proof)
Símilar to the proof of Theorem A1, we can solve and modify problem
(2.3) a number of times until we have obtained an optimal basic solution
to the la[est version of (2.3) that applies exactly one technique per
product, í.e. obeys the condition as stated in Lemma A2. Therefore,
without a complete proof, we state
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Theorem A2:
Ass~e that (2.3) with f~ 0 has a non-trivial optimum i.e. at least one
z~ ~ 0. Then an optimal solution exists with the properties:
1. Exactly one technique is applied for each product actually produced;
2. Products are either sold maximally or not sold at all.
The MIP problems (2.6) and (2.8) account for make-or-buy decisions. We
will prove that in an optimal situation each TS type is either produced
internally or bought externally. First problem (2.6) is considered, i.e.
Minimize c~x0 f dy t Cd
s.t. (I - DQ)x~ f y - b~
x~ - Wd c 0
x~, y ~ 0; d 0-1 vector (2.6)
It is required that DD ~ 0, cD ~ 0, d~ 0, C~ 0 and bD ~ 0. Furthermore
(I-DD)-1 exists and is nocrnegative.
Theorem A3:
Consider problem (2.6) with Dp ~ 0, c~, d, C, b~ ~ 0. Assiane that
1 opt opt opt opt
(I-D~)- ~ 0. Let d be part of an optimal solution (x~ , y , d )
to (2.6).
Now it holds that:
dopt(m) - 1~ x~pt(m) ~ 0, yopt(m) - 0
dopt(m) - 0~ x~pt(m) - 0, ypt(m) ~ 0
Proof:
If dopt(m) - 0,
and y~pt(m) ~ 0
If dopt(m) - 1,
(A.1-a)
(A.1-b)
then xÓpt(m) - 0, because of x~pt(m) - W dopt(m) c 0,
because of yopt(m) - b~(m) t(D~x~pt)(m) ~ 0.
then x~~`(m) ~ 0 because of C(m) ~ 0.
So the remaining statement to be proved is: if gpt(m) - 1, then yopt(m)
- 0. The proof of this conjecture follows from certain propertíes of
optimal basic solutions of a reformulated, equivalent version of (2.6).
Consider (2.6) with d fixed, namely d- dopt, and re-optimize the resul-
ting continuous LP problem. For any optimal solution (x~, y), it holds
to the original MIP problem (2.6), andthat (x0, y, dopt) is optimal
thus x~(m) ~ 0 if d"Y`(m) - 1
we know in a8vance
which will be zero
and x~(m) - 0, y(m) ~ 0 if dopt(m) - 0. As
which elements of x~ will turn out to be positive and
in an optimal solution, we rewrite the constraints of




xOfYfY 3 0 (~)
Now the constraints x~ t W dopt have become redundant. In fact we are
dealing with the continuous LP problem:
Minimize cxD f áy t áy s.t. (~) (A.2)
Note that the opt(constant) term CS is omitted from the objective func-
tion.
Basic feasible solutions to this LP problem have at most M positive ele-
ments. Optimal solutions must have x~ ~ 0, y~ 0 and this yields already
M positive elements. Hence optimal basic solutions have exactly M posi-
tive elements, viz. the elements of x~ and y, and the y-part must be
equal to zero. Now suppose that no unbounded solution exists that
attains the finite optimal solution value. Then each optimal solution to
(A.2) can be written as a convex combination of the optimal basic solu-
tions, and the property y- 0 is maintained.
Indeed, the feasible region of (~) is bounded. Returning to the original
notation as used in problem (2.6), we note that xp -(I-DD)-1 bD
-(I-D~)-ly, b~ ~ 0, y~ 0. Hence 0 t x~ t(I-D~)-1 b~. Secondly x0 f y
- D~x~ t b0 with D~ ~ 0. So x~ is bounded and this implies the bounded-
ness of y.
The conclusion is that optimal solutions to (A.2) must have y- p, In
terms of problem (2.6) with d- dopt~ this means that yopt(m) - 0
whenever dopt(m) - 1~ (End of proof)
We conclude the appendix with a theorem concerning the MIP problem
(2.8), i.e.
Maximize -cprod xprod } pz - cCxp - dy - Cd
s.t. (I~ - D~~) xprod - z - 0
z t f
- DM~ xprod
f(I - Dp)xC f y - 0
x~ - Wd t 0
xprod. z~ xC. Y~
0
6 0-1 vector (z.8)
Problem (2.8) resulted from putting together (2.3) and (2.6), so that
the following theorem is valid.
Theorem A4:
Assume that problem (2.8) with cprod' c~, d, C, f~ 0 has a non-trivial
optimum, i.e. at least one z~ ~ 0. Then an optimal solution exist with
the properties:
1. Exactly one technique is applied for each product actually produced;
2. Products are either sold maximally or not sold at all;
3. Each TS type that is required is either produced internally or bought
externally.
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APPENDIX B: appendix to CHAPTER THREE
This appendix is devoted to the mathematical background of the alloca-
tion method as presented in section 3.3.3. It is thus concerned with the
LP problem
Maximize px





Minimize na f pb
s.t. na f pb ~ p
.~~p ~ 0 (B.1)
Let (x;n,p) be primal-dual optimal to (3.4) and (B.1) respectively with
solution value OPT. We assume 0 c OPT ~~.
Take hl,h2 c 1 and consider the following perturbed version of (3.4):
Maximize (p-hlnA-h2pB)x






Consider problem (B.2) with hl,h2 c 1 and (n,p) optimal to (B.1). Let x
be optimal to (3.4). Then:
1. x is also optimal to (B.2);
2. The optimal solutíon value of (B.2) is OPT-hlna-h~pb;
3. ((1-hl)n,(1-h2)p) is dual optimal to (B.2).
i3u
Proof:
It is clear that x is prímal feasible. Furthermore ((1-hl)n, (1-h2)p) is
dual feasible, as (1-hl)n ~ 0, (1-h2)p ~ 0, due to hi, h2 t 1, and
(1-hl)nA t(1-h2)pB - nA f pB - hinA - hZpB ~ p- h1nA - h2pB
Because of n(AX-a) - 0 and p(Bx-b) - 0, the objective function value of
x is equal to px -hlna - h2pb. On the other hand, ((1-hi)n, (1-h2)p) has
solution value (1-hi)na t(1-h2)pb - na f pb - hina - h2pb. Now recall
that OPT - px - na f pb. It follows that the primal and dual solution
value are equal.
Conclusion:
x and ((1-hi)n, (1-h2)p) are primal-dual feasible with equal solution
value, viz. OPT - hina - h2pb, and are thus primal-dual optimal.
(End of proof)
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APPENDIX C: appendix to CHAPTER FOUR
C.1. Derivation of the price-directive planning procedure following
Dantzig-Wolfe
The price-directive planning procedure as discussed in section 4.3 is
based on the decomposition method of Dantzig-Wolfe (see Dantzig (1963,
ch. 23)). In this part of the appendix, the mathematical derivation of
the procedure is given under a reasonable set of assumptions.
The problem to be solved is the following block-angular LP problem,
which is presumed to be feasible.
Maximize plxl f . . . } pNxN
s.t. Alxl f... t ANxN t a
Qlxl t ql
4NXIV t qN
x1,...,xN ~ 0 (4.1)
For notational convenience, it is assumed that the divisional feasible
regions Fn .- {xnl Qnxn t qn' xn ~ 0}, n-1,...,N, are bounded. Ex-
pressing each xn as a convex combination of the extreme points xn,







s.t. E E An an c a
n-1 1-1
S
g an - 1 , n- 1,...,N
i-1
n i
all ai ~ 0n
Here pi .- p xi and Ai .- A xi (i-1,...,Sn, n-1,...,N). Pr.oblem (C.1),n~ n n n n n
to be referred to as the full master problem, is again an LP problem,
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with the ai as variables. In comparison with problem (4.4) we see thatn
in (C.1) all extreme points of each Fn are specified. Therefore we have
Sn instead of Sn.
The algorithm to be presented solves (C.1) rather than (4.1). In com-
parison with'the original formulation, the full master problem has only
a few rows, but could have a large n~ber of colimmns. The whole set of
columns is not specified in advance; columns will be generated when they
are needed.
Suppose that, at some stage in the solution process, a subset of all
columns of the problem is avaílable. The LP problem based on this subset
of columns, i.e. problem (4.4), is called the restricted master problem
and is optimized. The optimal solution of the current restricted master
problem is also optimal to the full master problem if the relative cost
coefficient (rcc) of every non-basic column, i.e. every column not
specified in the restricted version of the master problem, is non-posi-
tive. Otherwise, the column with the largest positive rcc will be added
to the restricted master problem. It should be noted that this solution
strategy has much resemblance to the ordinary simplex method for linear
programming problems (see e.g. Lasdon (1970, section 1.2)). The essen-
tial difference is that we do not have a complete specification of the
non-basic columns here.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Solve the restricted master problem
with a certain subset of columns. Let n0 be the optimal dual multiplier
associated with the inequality constraints and let r~n, n- 1,...,N, be
the optimal dual multipliers associated with the equality constraints.
Now the rcc of the column corresponding to the extreme point xn is given
by the expression
i i - i - - -rccn
'- pn - ROAn - ~n - (pn xOAn)xn - Wn (C.2)
As already noted, the current solution to the restricted master problem
is also optimal to the full master problem if for all n every rccn t 0.




s.t. Qnxn c qn
x ~ 0n
(4.3)
Denote the optimum value by Pn. Because (4.2) is feasible and the set Fn
is bounded, p is finite. This finite optimum is attained at an extreme
..i n ,. - -i -
pointixn, and Pn (pn nOAn)xn. In case Pn - wn ~
0, the column
((Anxn)', 0,...,0,1,0,...,0)' should be added to the restricted master
problem, with associated objective function coefficient p xi. In casen n
pn - Wn c 0, the n-th divisional problem
does not deliver a new column
for the restricted master problem.
If, for each n, Pn - mn c 0, then no columns exist that not already have
been specified in the restricted master problem and that can improve the
current optimal solution to the restricted master problem. So this solu-
tion is also optimal to the full master problem and the algorithm is
terminated. If, on the other hand, columns are to be added for some n, a
new iteration is necessary with at least one and at most N new columns
added to the restricted master problem. Assuming no degeneracies, an
optimum will be reached in a finite number of iterations, for the full
master problem (4.4) is an ordinary LP problem, with a finite number of
columns.
Two final remarks are in order. At each stage in the solution process,
the solution to the current restricted master problem (denoted by an,
i-1,...,Sn, n-1,...,N) can be transformed into a solution of the
original problem (4.1), viz. by the formula
S n
xn :- E an xn,
i-1
n - 1,...,N (4.5)
This holds particularly for the optimal solution to the full master
problem. Secondly, we mention the assumption that, upon initialization
of the algorithm, a set of columns of the restricted master problem is
available such that the problem has a feasible solution. Then it is pos-
sible to optimize the restricted master problem and obtain a set of dual
multipliers. Further (technical) consíderations concerning this assump-
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tion, which is not really restrictive, can be found in Dirickx et al.
(1979, p. 46).
C.2. Derivation of the resource-directive plannin~; procedure followin~
Benders
In this part of the appendix, the resource-directive planníng procedure
of section 4.4 is mathematically derived.
Again, we start our exposition with a block-angular LP problem, which
is presumed to have a finite optimum. Contrary to section C.1, we use
the symbols Bn and b for the common constraints:
Maximize plxl t... t pNxN
s.t. Blxl f ... t BNxN t b
41x1 t ql
. ~N~I t qN
x1,,,,,xN ) 0
Problem (4.6) can be rewritten as follows:
Maximize plx1 f ~ ~ ~ } pNXN
s.t. Blxl - bl t 0
~lxl t ql
. BNxN - bn t 0
4NXN t qn




Problems (4.6) and (4.7) are equivalent in the sense that (4.6) has an
(optimal) solution if (4,7) has an (optimal) solution, and reversely.
See also Dirickx and Jennergren (1979, p. 66).
Roughly speaking, the idea is to solve (4.7) with fixed values of bn,
say bn, where bl f... f bN - b. By using information from the dual ver-
sion of (4.7), a better partitioning of CR vector b is computed. This
process is repeated until it is not possible to improve the partitioning
of b.
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At this point in the presentation, it is worthwile to note that
Benders (1962) developed his partitioning method for a more general
class of problems than (4.7), namely problems of the form:
Maximize px f f(b)
s.t. Ax f F(b) t a
x ~ 0
b E U (C.4)
Here f is a scalar valued and F is a vector valued function. U is an
arbitrary subset of IRS, where 1~ denotes the s-dimensional Euclidian
space. Moreover the b variables are not restricted to be contínuous. In
chapter seven, we will utilize this property of the Benders method: 0-1
variables wi11 occur in the b-part of the variables. Now we return to
the solutíon of (4.7).
For a given partitioning (b1,...,bN), problem (4.7) decomposes into N
separate problems, which we write in the following form (n-1,...,N):
Maximize Pn
s.t. Pn - pnxn G 0
B x C bn n n
4nxn G qn
x ~ 0n (4.8)
Instead of searching a combination (xn, Pn) that optimizes (4.8), we
proceed the other way round: given some (bn, Pn), is there a vector xn
such that Pn C pnxn, Bnxn t bn, Onxn G qn, xn ) 0?
Below, necessary and sufficient conditions for bn and Pn are stated that
guarantee the existence of this xn. They can be derived by applying
Farkas' lemma (See e.g. Diricloc and Jennergren (1979, p. 57)). The next
problem is then to choose bn and maximal Pn, subject to these conditions
and such that bl f... t bN - b.
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If we assume that each bn is taken from the set
Un :- {bn~ g(Bnxn c bn' Qnxn t qn' xn ~ 0)}, the conditions meant above
xn
are
Pn G pn bn t nn 9nr j- 1,...,Sn, (C.5)
where (pn, nn), j- 1,...,Sn denote the extreme points of the dual
feasible region {(pn,nn)I pnBn } nn~n ~ pn' pn' nn ~ 0}.
(Assimmption bn E Un may be unrealistic. However, it can easily be
dropped, but this would induce notational complications. For the more
general case, we refer to the literature, e.g. Dirickx and Jennergren
(1979, section 3.3.6)).
Thus, we have arrived at the following full master problem:
Maximize P1 f... t PN
s.t. Pn G pn bn t nn 9n, ]- 1,...,Sn; n- 1,...,N
(b1,...,bN) E U (C.6)
where U:- {(b1,...,bN) ~ bl f... f bN - b, bn E Un, n- 1,...,N}. The
algorithm to be presented solves (C.6) rather than (4.7). The LP problem
(C.6) may have many restrictions, because the n~ber of extreme points
can be very large. On the other hand, only a small fraction of the con-
straints will be binding at optimality. The algorithm generates con-
straints successively, only when they are needed.
Suppose that, at some stage in the solution process, a subset of all
rows of the problem has been generated. The problem based on this subset
of rows is called the relaxed master problem and is optimized. The
optimal solutíon of the current relaxed master problem is also globally
optimal, if this solution appears to obey the constraints not specified
in the current relaxed problem.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Each iteration starts with the solu-
tion of a relaxed version of (C.6), so with a certain subset of rows.
Let (pl' „~'pN' bl'..~~bN) denote the solution of the relaxed master
problem. This solution is optimal for (C.6), if and only if each of the
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constraints in (4.12) is satisfied. For every n, the most unsatisfied
constraint can be found by checking
Pn ~ min {pn bn f nn qnl j-1,...,Sn} (C.7)
Such an index can be determined by solving the dual divisional problems
(n-1,...,N):
Minimize p b t n qn n n n
s.t. PnBn } nn 4n ~ pn
pn.nn ) 0 (C.8)
Denote the optimum value by Pn. The primal version of (C.8) is feasible
as bn E Un, so Pn ~-~. Secondly, Pn ~ f~ because we assumed that the
original problem has a bounded optimum. The finite optimum Pn is
attained at an extreme point, say (pj, rlj). In case P~ P, the con-n n n n
straint
P c p~ b f n~ q
n n n n n
is added to the relaxed master problem. Note that this inequality is
equivalent with (4.9),~ as nnqn - Pn - Pn bn and
superscript j was
suppressed in (4.9). If P~ P, for each n, the solution to the currentn n
version of the relaxed master problem obeys (C.5). Then we have found a
solution which is optimal to the full master problem (C.6), too, and the
algorithm is terminated. The primal solutions to (C.8), say xn
(n-1,...,N) are now globally optimal. If, on the other hand, constraints
have been added, a new iteration will be necessary with the augmented
subset of constraints.
The algorithm converges in a finite number of íterations, as the full
master problem (C.6) has a finite number of constraints.
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APPENDIX D: appendix to CHAPTER FIVE
D.1. Proof of Theorem 5.1
Consider the problem
Maximize px
s.t. Ax c a
Bx c b
x ) 0 (D.1)
with optimal solution x. Let n, p solve the dual problem
Minimize na f pb
s.t. nA f pB ~ p
n,p ) 0
Then it holds that ~r(Ax-a) - 0, and x is an optimal solution to
(D.2)
Maximize (p-:rA)x
s.t. Bx c b
x ~ 0 (D.3)
Define:
L(x,n) :- px - n(Ax-a), Bx c b, x~ 0, n~ 0.
We will prove that (x,n) is a saddle point of L(x,~r), i.e.
L(x,~rt) G L(x,n) G L(x,n) for n~ 0 and all x with Bx c b, x~ 0 (D.4)
As x solves (D.3), we have (p-~rA)x c(p-~rA)x, so L(x,~r) c L(x,n).
Secondly, n(Ax-a) - 0 whereas -n(Ax-a) ~ 0, so L(x,n) c L(x,n).
Simmmarizing, we have shown that if (D.1) has an optimal solution x, then
some n ~ p exists such that (x~n) is a saddlepoint of L(x,n).
14n
Reversely, if L(x,n) has a saddlepoint (x,a) then x solves the original
problem (A.1). This statement is true for any mathematical programming
problem, see Lasdon (1970), p. 85).
D.2. Further relaxation of problem (5.20)
We will show that for each k- 1,...,r the following inequality holds:
P (n,bk) ~ P (nk,bk) f (nk-tr)A xkn n n n n n
with (obviously) equality for n- nk.
Recall the definition of Pn(n,bn) (page 62). For all xn satisfying
B x c bk, x E F, it holds thatn n n n n
P (n,bk) ~ (P -nkA )x f (nk-n)A xn n n n n n n
In particular
Pn(n~bn) ~ (PrinkAn)xn f (nk-n)Anxn
which is equivalent to
Pn(n,bn) ~ Pn(nk.bn) t (nk-n)Anxn.
Now that we have proved (D.5), it easily follows that
N
E Pn(n,bn) f na ) PS~ f(n-nk)~a
n-1




(D.6) is precisely inequality (5.23).
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D.3. A convergence proof for the algorithm as presented in section
5.3.1.
In this section we will prove convergence of the algorithm as presented
in section 5.3.1. Two more assumptions are required. After the proof, a
sufficient condition for one of them is given.
Theorem:
If we assume that
1. the sequence (nr)1, is bounded,
2. the pr are uniformly bounded,
n
then the algorithm of section 5 converges in the sense that
r r
w- v 1 0, r a~.
Proof :
We already know that vr s v~l t v(D) - w(P) t w~l c wr. In the sequel
we will prove that wr - vr ~ 0 on a subset of indices. Of course, this
implies that
lim vr - v(D) - w(P) - lim wr.
r-.~ raW
The reasoning proceeds as follows.
The sequence (nr,bi,...,bn)1 converges on a
nr and all br come from bounded sets.n
subset of indices, as the
(The boundedness
the compactness of each Fn and the global
convergent sub-sequences are denoted by
r ~ r ~
(n s) and í b s) . n- 1,..., N.n
s-1 s-1
As vrstl ~ Pss~ } (nrstl-rrs)eás
and
wrs-F1
G Prs t F,
prs(brsfl-brs).
sum ~1 n n n
of U follows from
N
restriction E b G b) The
n-1 n
we have
0 G wrstl - ~rstl G(nrstl-xrs)ers } É"rs(brsfl - brs
a ~1 pn n n )
For s-. m, the right-hand side of this expression converges to 0 as
rs ,.rs r
4a and pn are bounded. (The boundedness of pas is simply due to the
boundedness of the sets Fn, n-1,...,N.) Aence
r r
v s- w s i 0, s ~ m (End of proof)
Finally, we present a sufficient condition for assumption 1 in the theo-
rem. Suppose that there exísts a known, feasible solution xl,...,xn
N
such that E Anxn ~ a. The knowledge of this 'interior point' can be
~1
used as follows. From (5.14) it is clear that
v(D) a min L(x,n) for every fixed feasible x
n~0
As a consequence,each (Dr) remains to be a relaxed dual problem if we
add the constraint v~ L(x,n) to (Dr) (r - 1,2,...). With respect to the
algorithm, we suppose that, upon initialitation, (Dr) with r- 0 has
only one constraint, viz.
N N
v~ E pnxn t n(a - E A x)
n-1 ~1 n n
which will be maintained throughout the subsequent iterations. An imme-
diate consequence of this modification is that the sequence (nr)~ will1
be bounded. To prove this, define: ni :- the i-th component of ~rr;
N N
P:- E pnxn ; ~i :- the i-th component of a- E A x.~1 ~1 n n
Now we have:
0 G,ri}1 Ai t E,r~l 4i c vr - P c v(D) - P
i
rf1so 0 G ni t(v(D)-P)I(ei), as di ~ 0
In other words, all future nr are bounded.i
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APPENDIX E: appendix to CHAPTER SIX
In this appendix we will prove Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 as presented in
section 6.2. We introduce a different, more compact MIP problem which
will appear to be equivalent to problem (6.1) in a certain sense.
Observe that the constraints
Bixl - yl - bl c 0
gNxN-yN-bN
c 0
bl ... f bN - b~ - 0
b~-(I-D~)xp-Yp-O
as present in problem (6.1) can be replaced by
N
c~lBnxn - (I - D~)xD - y c 0
where y:- y~ t yl f.-. f YN- In this way the variables b~,b1,...,bN
and y0, y1,...,yN are eliminated. Omitting the constraints bp - Wó
c 0
we obtain the following MIP problem:
N
Maximize E (-cnxn t pnzn) - c~xp - dy - C6
n-1









E Bnxn - (I - DD)x0 - y c 0
xn, zn ( n-1,...,N), x0,y ~ 0
d 0-1 vector (E.1)
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Recall from chapter three that, among other assumptions, we assume c0,
d, C~ 0 and Bn (n-1,...,N), D~ ~ 0.
Before clarifying the link between problem (6.1) and problem (E.1), we
investigate optimal solutions of problem (E.1).
Lemma E.1:
Consider an optimal solution
óopt, xnpt (n-1,...,N), znpt
Assume that we have
to problem (E.1) denoted by x~pt~ yopt~
(n-1,...,N).
N
dopt(m) - 0~( E Bnxnpt f DCx~pt)(m) ~ 0, m-1,...,M
n-1
Then
doptím) - 1~ x~pt(m) ~ 0, yopt(m) - 0
dopt(m) - 0~ xÓpt(m) - 0~ Yopt(m) ~ 0
and
N
E Bnxnpt -(I - D~)x~pt - yopt - 0
n-1
Proof:
0If dop (m) - 0, then x~pt(m) - 0 because of the constraints x~pt(m)
wdopt(m) ~ 0, and thus yopt(m) ~ 0 because of assumption (E.2).





Now we are going to prove that yopt(m) - 0 if dopt(m) -1. Consider prob-
lem (E.1) with d and xn held fíxed: d- óopt and xn - xnpt (n-1,...,N).
It follows that zn opt opt-(In - Dn)xn - zn ( n-1,...,N), so that we have
at hand a continuous LP problem with x~, y as the only variables. For
any optimal solution (x~, y) it holds that (xipt, zipt,...,xNpt, zNpt,
optx~, y, d ) is optimal to the original problem (E.1). As a result
x0(m) ~ 0 if dopt(m) -1, and x~(m) - 0 if dopt(m) - 0, i.e. we know in
advance which elements of x~ are posítive and which elements are zero in
an optimal situation. Therefore the above mentioned continuous LP prob-
lem can be written in the following fonn:
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Minimize c~x~ t dy t dy
s.t. (I - Dp) LOCJ t L O J f I OJ - L SbJ- ~1Bnxnpt
xC, y, Ly, sb, sb ~ 0 (E.5)
Here sb and sb are slack variables. Note that the constant terms
N
E(-cnxnpt f pnznpt) - Cdopt and the redundant constraints x0 c
Wóopt
n-1
are omitted in formulation (E.5).
Basic feasible solutions to the LP problem (E.5) have at most M positive
elements. Optimal solutions must have x~ ~ 0, y~ 0 and this yields al-
ready M positive elements. Hence optimal basic solutions have exactly M
positive elements, viz. the elements of x~ and y. As a consequence the
y-part, sb-part and sb-part must be equal to zero. Now suppose that no
unbounded solution exists that attains the finite optimal solution
value. Then each optimal solution to (E.5) can be written as a convex
combination of the optimal basic solutions, so that y-0, sb-0, sb-0.
Suppose an extreme ray, say (x~, yr, yr, sbr, sbr), exists along which
the optimal solution value is maintained. Then x~, yr and yr are identi-
cally zero, because c, ~, á~ 0. If some element of sbr or sbr tends to
f~, then the corresponding element of x~, yr tends to f~ as well. But
this contradicts the requirements x~ - 0, yr - o. Hence extreme rays of
the feasible region of (E.5) can be neglected.
The conclusion is that optimal solutions to (E.5) must have y- 0,
sb - 0, sb - 0, which, in turn, proves (E.3-b) and (E.4) respectively.
(End of proof)
Now we can prove an important theorem concerning problem (E.1). Recall
that there are L different CR-types, so there are L common constraints.
Furthermore ~ denotes the nianber of product types in division n.n
Theorem E.1:
Let gopt be part of an optimal solution to problem (E.1). Assume that
the continuous LP problem that is obtained by taking d equal to aopt has
a unique optimal solution, say xnpt, znpt (n-1,...,N), xópt~ yopt~ with
1 4 F,
the following two properties:
1, in every division every product is produced;
N
2. dopt(m) - 0~( E Bnxnpt f DDx~pt)(m) ~ 0, m-1,...,M.
n-1
For this solution we define un, Sn, SA as follows:
un :- number of techniques as applied in division n(n-1,...,N);
R .- nianber of product types in division n that are sold but belown .
the outside demand level, so 0 c Sn c~n ( n-1,...,N);
SA :- nianber of CR-types that are not fully used up, so 0 c SA c L.
Now it holds that:
un - ~n ~ 0, n-1,...,N
N
D c E((u -~ ) f S c L- SAn-1 n n n
(E . 6-a)
( E . 6-b )
Proof:
From property 1. it follows that for each ~(~-1,...,~n) at least one ~
exists with xn~~(,~) ~ 0, so that un -~n ~ 0(n-1,...,N). Knowing in
advance which elements of x~ will turn out to be positive (recall Lemma
E.1) the continuous LP problem can be rewritten as follows:
N
Maximize E (cnxn i- pnzn) - cpxp - dy - dy'
n-1











-(I - DD~00~-I O J -I O J s 0
xn, zn ( n-1,...,N), x~. Y~ Y~ 0 (E.7)
The optimum of this LP problem is unique and coincides with one of the
basic feasible solutions. Hence the optimal solutíon has
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N
E 2~ t L f M- 0 positive elements, where 0 denotes the number ofn
n-1
basic zeros of the optimal basic solution.
On the other hand:
xn yields un positive elements (n-1,...,N);
zn and the slack variables associated to zn t fn yield ~n f~n positive
elements (n-1,...,N); N
the slack variables associated to nElAnxn C a yield SA positive ele-
ments;
we are considering an optimal solution so furthermore only x~ ~ 0 and
y~ 0, which yields M positive elements (recall Lemma E.1). The optimal
N
basic solution thus possesses E(un }~n } Sn) } SA f M
positive
n-1 N




E((un -~n) t Bn) - L- SA - 0.
n-1
Because un - ~n 1 0, Bn ~ 0, 0~ 0, the conclusion is that
N
0 t E((un -~n) t Sn C L- SA
n-1
(End of proof)
We return to the original MIP problem (6.1) and clarify the link with
problem (E.1).
From the beginning of this appendix it follows that every feasible and
thus every optimal solution to (6.1) can be transformed into a feasible
solution of (E.1) without changing the solution value. Reversely, let




bn(m) :- ( E Bnxnpt)(m) and yn(m) :- 0 if dopt(m) - 1;
n-1
N
bn(m) :- 0 and yn(m) :- (~1Bnxnpt)(m) if dopt(m) - 0;
N
Y~ :- Y - E Yn;
n-1
N
b0 :- E bn.
n-1
Note that some b~(m) can only be positive if gopt(m) - 1, so constraint
b~ - Wdopt ~ 0 is fulfilled. Together with xnpt, znpt (n-1,...,N), vec-
tors bn, yn (n-1,...,N), b~, y~ form a feasible solution to problem
(6.1) with unchanged solution value. Now it is clear that there is a
mutual correspondence between the optimal solutions of (E.1) and (6.1).
Therefore the following result, which is similar to Lemma E.1, holds:
Lemma E.2:
opt opt opt opt opt opt opt optLet xn , Yn ' zn ' bn (n-1,...,N), x~ , Y~ , b~ , d be opti-
mal to problem (6.1). Assume that condition (E.2) is fulfilled. Then
this solution has the following property (m-1,...,M):
aopt(m) - 1~ x~pt(m) ~ 0~ Ynpt(m) - 0, n-1,....N~ YNpt(m) - 0; (E.8-a)
dopt(m) - 0~ xÓpt(m) - 0, ynpt(m) ~ 0, n-1,...,N, y~pt(m) ~ 0. (E.8-b)
We see that overall solutions, i.e. optimal solutions to problem (6.1),
capture 'pure' TS alternatives: if some TS-type is produced internally,
no additional amounts of this TS-type are bought from outside the firm;
if some TS-type is bought externally, there is no internal production of
this TS-type. The d-part of an overall solution expresses which TS-types
are entirely produced internally and which TS-types are entirely bought
externally.
As a second consequence, Theorem E.1 is not only valid for problem
(E.1) but also for problem (6.1). Together with Lemma E.2 this result
proves Theorem 6.2. Finally, Theorem 6.1 is just a special case of Theo-
rem 6.2, namely the case L- 0.
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APPENDIX F: appendix to CHAPTER SEVEN
This appendix contains a proof of Theorem 7.1 as presented in section
7.3.2. Consider the divisional problem
Maximize - c x - dy f p zn n n n n
s.t.
-k
A x t a
n n n
k
Bnxn - yn t bn
(I - D )x - z - 0
n n n n
xn. Yn~ zn ~ 0
z t f
n n
It is assumed that ak ~ 0, f~ 0. Furthermore bk ~ 0 as bk contains then n n n
TS-types that are actually supplied to the division. The remaining TS-
types are not internally available in the current planning session. If
the division requires them, they must entirely be bought externally. The
associated costs are included in the objective function. For this rea-
son, we have written cn instead of cn. Now we present a theorem concern-
ing optimal basic solutions to (7.3). Recall that ~ denotes the numbern
of market products in division n, L is the dimension of ak and Mk is then n
dimension of bk.n
Theorem 7.1
Consider an optimal basic solution to problem (7.3) with a~ ~ 0, bn ~ 0,
fn ~ 0. For this solution:
1. we assume that for each product at least one technique is applied;
2. we define uk, Sk, SAk SBk k
k
k n n n' n' on and On as follkws:
un .- the number of applied techniques, so un ~~n'
kgn .- the number of product types that are sold but below the out-
kside demand level, so 0 t B t á;n n
SAk .- the number of CR-types that are not fully used up, son
0 t SAn t L;
isn




bought from outside the firm, so 0 t o t M;
ternally supplied to division n;
the number of TS-types that are internally supplied but not
fully used up, so 0 t SBk t Mk;n n
the number of TS-types that are internally supplied and also
k k
Ok .- the number of basic zeros.n
Now it holds that:
on f SBn t Mn,
n n




We write the constraints of (7.3) in equality formulation by adding
slack variables, thus obtaining:
Anxn } san - ák
n
Bnxn - yn f sbn - bn
I - D
n n)xn - zn - 0
z f sf - fn n n
We consider an optimal situation, so for all m we have sb (m)~y (m) - 0n n
(externaliy bought TS are fully used up). As a result, on f SBn t Mn,
which proves formula (7.4-a).




u a ~ .n n






number of positive elements in the opti-
elements. As each product is produced,
deliver
Here ak denotesn
an } Sn } sn } Yn -~n } Sn
the nutnber of product types that are
maximally sold and yk denotes the number of product types that are not
sold at all, so that ak } Sk } Yk -~.
n n n n
By definition, vectors sa , sb and y deliver SAk, SBk and ak positiven n n n n n
elements, respectively.
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Hence, the total n~ber of positive elements in the basic optimal solu-
tion at hand is given by the expression:
ukf~ f SkfSAktSBk}ok
n n n n n n
On the other hand, problem (7.3) has L f Mk -F 2~ rows, so our basicn n
optimal solution has L t Mk t 2~ - Ok positive elements. Combining thisn n n
with (F.1) yields the following relationship
(un -~n) f gn f an -(L - SAn) t(Mn - SBn) - n
and (7.4-b) is proved. (End of proof)
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LIST OF S~IIBOLS
This líst should be used as follows. First one tries to find the unknown
symbol in the list of the chapter in which the unknown symbol was
noticed. If the unknown symbol is not listed there it can be found in
the list with heading 'General symbols'. In case the unknown symbol was
noticed in some appendix, one starts with consulting the list of the
chapter associated with this appendix. However, symbols that are only
used in one specific appendíx are not listed here.
Chapter two
flow c~modity flow within TS sector~M
~fl~ow commodity flow from TS sector to the sector 'products'
D~~ow commodity flow within the sector 'products'




DM~ matrix of intermediate input coefficients with respect to I~~
flow
matrix of intermediate input coefficients with respect to D~~
~ number of product types; index is ~
X~ ~-th product type
x(~) units of produced X~
~Y~ number of techniques for product X~; index is ~,
x~(~) units of produced X~ by applying technique ~y
cM}~(~) per-unit direct cost coefficient associated with x~(~,)
x~ production vector of product X~; elements ~~(V~), ~-1,...,4'~
xprod total production vector composed from
x~, ~-1,...,~
cprod row vector associated
with xprod'
elements cM}~(~), ~-1,...,4'~, ~-1,...,~
f(~) outside demand for product X~
f vector with elements f(~), ~-1,...,~
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z(~) sales level of product X~
z vector with elements z(~), m-1,...,~
p(~) sales price for product X
~
p row vector with elements p(~), ~-1,...,~
I~ 'generalized' identity matrix (cf, section 2.3)
input-output matrix of a cost minimizing,
pure technology alternative
row vector containing the pe~unit direct cost coefficients
of a cost minimízing, pure technology alternative
row vector containing the perunit redistributed variable costs
of a cost minimizing, pure technology alternative
y(m) units of externally bought TSm
y vector with elements y(m), m-1,...,M
b~(m) net demand for TSm
b~ vector with elements b~(m), m-1,...,M
Dm~(~) per-unit requirements for TSm of product m under technique ~
Chapter three
CD joint costs
Cn finishing costs in division n
Yn costs of independent actíon by division n
Zn minimum of Yn and C~ t Cn
Gn costs allocated to division n
TOTAL CD f C1 f.... f CN
g(m) price to be charged to users of TSm
g' row vector of per-unit redistributed costs;
elements g(m), m-1,...,M
G' row vector of redistributed costs
x activity vector
p row vector containing pec~unit contributions to profit
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A,B coefficient matrices of certain LP problem
a,b right-hand side vectors of certain LP problem
n optimal dual variable associated with constraint Ax G a
OPT gross profit
Chapter four
xn activity vector of division n
pn
4n' Qn
row vector containing per-unit contributions to profit
coefficient matrix and right-hand side vector respectively con-
cerning divisional constraints
An, Bn coefficient matrices concerning common constraints
a, b right-hand side vectors concerning common constraints
an, bn allocation of common resources to division n
xn
Xn
optimal xn as computed by division n
optimal xn as computed by the central unit
Sn number of extreme points in division n
S number of extreme points in division n known to the central unitn
xn divisional extreme point, i-1,...,Sn
pi p xl; profit contribution of extreme point xnn n n
An Anxn; CR consumption by extreme point xn
n0 row vector with tentative prices for common resources
x~ extreme point reported by division n given price n0
an relative weight of xn to be determined by the central unit
án optimal ~n in intermediate planning session
(an)opt optimal an at the end of the planning procedure
P profit as reported by division nn
p profit of division as estimated by the central unit
n
wn
net profit contribution of basic revealed extreme points
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Pn(bn) maximal profit of division n given bn
pn per-unit valuation of bn as reported by division n





n~ of the final planning session
final CR allocation based on (~n)opt, 1-1,...,Sn
Chapter five
DMD division-oriented mixed decomposition
RMD resource-oriented mixed decomposition
Fn
An' Bn
activity vector of division n
row vector containing per-unit contributions to profit
coefficients matrix and right-hand side vector respectively
concerning divisional constraints
feasible region of division n
coefficient matrices concerning common constraints
a, b right-hand side vectors concerning common constraints
rtD tentative price for common resources
b2 tentative allocation of common resources to division 2
S1 number of extreme points of F1
S2 nvmber of dual extreme points of division 2
ixl extreme point of division 1, i- 1,...,51
(p2, n2) dual extreme point of division 2, j-1,...,S2
FMP full master problem
FMP-d dual of F"tP
RMP restricted master problem
Ia1P-d dual of RMP
ai,p2,b2 variables in FMP and RMP
i
u ,np,nl varia~les in tMY-d and RMP-d
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Un set of feasible CR allocations for division n
U set of globally feasible allocations
L(x,n) Lagrange function; x replaces x1,...,xN
(x,n) saddle point of L(x,n)
P(n,b ) division profit given price n for (~) resources and allocation
n n
bn of (~~) resources
(D) dual problem
(P) primal problem
v dual objective function
w primal objective function
v(D) optimal solution value of (D)
w(P) optimal solution value of (P)
r current planníng session
k index for planning sessions up to now, k-1,...,r
(Dr) relaxed dual problem
(Pr) relaxed primal problem
vr optimal solutíon value of (Pr)
wr optimal solution value of (Dr)
rk tentative price for ( ~) resources in k-th planning session
bk tentative allocation of (~~) resources in k-th planning sessionn
xn}1 divisional activity plan given rk and bn








optimal ~k computed by the central unit
xn computed by the central unit; cf. (5.32)
ar,br cf. (5.34)n n
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Chapter six
xnpt xn part of overall solution
aopt A xoptn n n
nnpt per-unit valuation of anpt
~(a) niptaipt f... t nNaNpt







CR allocation to division n in k-th planning session
internal TS allocation to division n in k-th planning session
cf. introduction to problem (7.3)
divisional profit estimated by the central unit in k-th
planning session
Pn divisional profit given an and bn
~rtn per-unit valuation of akn
'kpn per-unit valuation of bn
"k
nn per-unit valuation of fn given ak, bkn n
V TS production domain
Pn(an,bn) divisional profit given an and bn
kg(m) price for TSm in k-th planning session
k row vector- elements ,,,,~8 , gk(m), m-1 M
gopt gk in the final planning session
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á pt ák in the final planning sessionn n
bnpt bn in the fínal planning session
Pnpt divisional profit given anpt and bnpt
nopt final valuation of allocated CR by division nn
V(a) noptaopt }...
t xopt aopt
1 1 N N
General symbols
LP linear programming
MIP mixed integer programming
L number of CR-types; index is 1
M number of TS-types; index is m
N number of product divisions; index is subscript n
TS technical services




h fraction of a shadow price; used for common cost allocation
a CR capacity
An coefficient matrix with respect to CR consianption
an CR allocation to division n
x~(m) units of internally produced TSm
x~ internal-T5 production vector with elements x~(m),
diag[x0] diagonal matrix; diag[x~]mm :- x~(m)
c0(m) per-unit direct costs of producing TSm internally
c~ row vector with elements cp(m), m-1,...,M
C(m) fixed costs of producing TSm internally
C row vector with elements C(m), m-1,...,M
m-1,...,M
160
d(m) 0-1 variable associated with making or buying TSm
d vector with elements d(m), ~1,...,M
W large positive constant representing maximum capacity of inter-
nal TS production
d(m) external price for TSm
d row vector with elements d(m), m-1,...,M
yn(m) units of externally bought TSm by division n
yn vector with elements yn(m), m-1,...,M
y0(m) units of externally bought TSm used
in the internal production of other TS-types
y0 vector with elements y0(m), m-1,...,M
bn(m) units of internally produced TSm as supplied to division n
bn vector of internal-TS supply to division n; elements bn(m),
m-1,...,M
b0(m) units of internally produced TSm supplied to the divisions
b0 vector of internal-TS supply; elements b0(m), m-1,...,M
Bn coefficient matrix with respect to TS consumption
~n number of product types in division n; index is ~
Xn~~ ~-th product type in division n
~n~~ nianber of techniques for product type Xn~~; index is ~
xn~~(~) units of produced Xn~~ by using technique ~
xn~~ production vector of product type Xn~~; elements
xn,~(~). V~-1,...,~n .~
xn production vector of division n composed from xn~~, ~-1,...,~n
cn row vector containing all per-unit direct cost coefficients
associated with xn
fn outside demand vector for product types Xn~~, ~-1,...,~n
pn row vector containing the sales prices of Xn~~, ~-1,...,~n
zn outside supply vector for product types Xn~~, ~-1,...,~n
Dn~~ matrix composed from the ~n columns of íntermediate.~
Dn
ln
input coefficients for product type Xn,~
matrix composed from Dn'~~ ~-1,,,,,~
n
'generalized' identity matrix (cf, section 3.5)
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n dual variable associated with CR constraints
n
p dual variable associated with TS constraintsn
k superscript referring to a specific planning session
u number of applied techniques ín division nn
k in the k-th lannin sessionun un P g
S number of product types that are sold but not maximally
n
Sk g in the k-th planning sessionn n
SA number of CR types not fully used up
SAk SA in division in k-th planning sessionn
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SAMENVATTING
In grote, complexe organisaties treedt veelal een proces van decentrali-
satie op: er ontstaan eenheden die betrekkelijk zelfstandig opereren
(divisies, functionele afdelingen). Die eenheden zullen vooral infor-
matie bezitten en verwerken ten aanzien van de eigen activiteiten en
zich minder richten op andere eenheden of op het beleid van de orga-
nisatie als geheel. Zo beschouwd heeft decentralisatie betrekking op
lokatie van informatie.
Het ontstaansproces van zelfstandig opererende deeleenheden brengt
delegatie met zich mee: taken en bevoegdheden worden aan deeleenheden
overgedragen. Vindt de besluitvorming eenmaal op meer plaatsen binnen
een organisatie plaats, dan rijst de vraag of het totaal van beslissin-
gen tot resultaten leidt die gewenst zijn voor de organisatie als ge-
heel. Beslissingen moeten op elkaar afgestemd worden: er is behoefte aan
coórdinatie.
In dit boek richten we de aandacht op het planningsproces, i.e, de
fase in het besluitvormingsproces welke vooraf gaat aan het daadwerke-
lijk nemen van beslissingen (beslissingsvoorbereidíng). Bovendien kiezen
we een bedrijfseconomische context: de gedecentraliseerde onderneming
met twee hiérarchische niveaus (Engels: two-level planning).
Onze doelstelling bestaat uit drie componenten:
1. het formuleren van een bedrijfsmodel, algemeen genoeg om het
planningsproces te bestuderen;
2. het analyseren van "two-level planning" op basis van de economische
interpretatie van wiskundige decompositie algoritmen;
3, de onder 2. verworven inzichten toepassen op het onder 1. ontwikkelde
algemeen bedrijfsmodel.
Na het inleidende hoofdstuk (probleemstelling en literatuuroverzicht)
volgen zes hoofdstukken waarin de drieledige doelstelling wordt
gerealiseerd.
Hoofdstuk twee behandelt een realistische generalisatie van het welbe-
kende input-output bedrijfsmodel (Verheyen (1965)): voor produkten kan
meer dan één produktietechniek beschikbaar zijn en ten aanzien van tech-
nísche diensten moeten "make-or-buy" beslissingen worden genomen. In
l~o
hoofdstuk drie introduceren we een belangrijk fínancieel aspect: kosten-
allocaties. Kosten van algemene diensten en interne technische diensten
moeten zodanig doorgerekend, toegewezen worden dat beslissingen die het
totale bedrijfsresultaat bepalen niet nadelig beYnvloed worden. We
besluiten het hoofdstuk met de organisatorische kenmerken van het
ontwikkelde bedrijfsmodel en formuleren het "overall" planningsprobleem
waarmee de onderneming geconfronteerd wordt.
Hoofdstuk vier is formeler van aard. We presenteren een prijs- en een
toewijzingsgerichte planningsprocedure, analoog aan prijs en budget
coórdinatie in reéle organisaties en gebaseerd op de decompositie
methoden van Dantzig-Wolfe (Dantzig (1963)) en Benders (1962). De proce-
dures laten de decentralisatie van informatie intakt. Er is echter geen
sprake van delegatie van beslissingsbevoegdheid.
In de realiteit komen prijzen en budgetten naast elkaar voor. Obel
(1981) stelt daarom gemengde decompositie voor. In hoofdstuk vijf brei-
den we de theorie over gemengde decompositie verder uit, op basis van
Meijboom (1985).
In de hoofdstukken zes en zeven staat het algemeen bedrijfsmodel weer
centraal. In hoofdstuk zes wordt voorwerk verricht door het "overall"
planningsprobleem te bestuderen zonder rekening te houden met organisa-
torische aspecten. Vervolgens, in hoofdstuk zeven, presenteren we de
uiteindelijke analyse en oplossing van het two-level planningsprobleem,
inclusíef organisatorische opties en kostenallocatie methoden. Diverse
fonnele resultaten worden verduidelijkt met een getallenvoorbeeld.
Ofschoon het boek een theoretische studie behandelt, vormen de gebruikte
modellen en de verkregen resultaten een redelijke beschrijving, benade-
ring van de werkelijkheid. Dat geldt met name ten aanzien van de behan-
delde kostenallocatieproblemen. Bovendien wordt de decentralisatie van
informatie uitvoerig behandeld. Voor een uitgebreidere evaluatie van het
onderzoek verwijzen we naar par. 8.2.
Samenvattend stellen we dat er een bijdrage is geleverd aan de theorie
over beslissen bij meer niveaus. We presenteren namelijk een nieuwe,
gemengd prijs-toewijzingsgerichte planningsprocedure, als analogon van
coórdinatie door middel van prijzen èn budgetten. Ten tweede worden de
effecten van op decompositíe gebaseerde planning volledig beschreven in
de context van een gegeneraliseerd input-output bedrijfsmodel.
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